From 4f50224e8fb0ba3e084a5531c8479e010364f3d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Teleo Agents Date: Tue, 14 Apr 2026 17:24:09 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] auto-fix: strip 5 broken wiki links Pipeline auto-fixer: removed [[ ]] brackets from links that don't resolve to existing claims in the knowledge base. --- agents/rio/musings/leverage-role-in-futarchy.md | 2 +- ...ch layer use the mechanism best suited to its objective.md | 2 +- ...use auction theory optimized for one degrades the other.md | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/agents/rio/musings/leverage-role-in-futarchy.md b/agents/rio/musings/leverage-role-in-futarchy.md index 5f7b1a19b..81afc577d 100644 --- a/agents/rio/musings/leverage-role-in-futarchy.md +++ b/agents/rio/musings/leverage-role-in-futarchy.md @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ Counter-argument: futarchy governance is designed to handle this. If the market - On-chain data: Omnipair TVL trajectory, fee revenue, utilization rates - Governance data: has any leverage-related proposal gone through futarchy? What was the market's reaction? - Comparative data: what happened to other DeFi leverage protocols' token prices relative to their ecosystem during growth phases? -- Team situation: is the Omnipair team adequately resourced? Does the milestone-vested package from [[omnipair needs milestone-vested team and community packages to align builder incentives with ecosystem growth|Position #6]] have traction? +- Team situation: is the Omnipair team adequately resourced? Does the milestone-vested package from omnipair needs milestone-vested team and community packages to align builder incentives with ecosystem growth|Position #6 have traction? ## Claim candidates that might emerge diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/optimal token launch architecture is layered not monolithic because separating quality governance from price discovery from liquidity bootstrapping from community rewards lets each layer use the mechanism best suited to its objective.md b/domains/internet-finance/optimal token launch architecture is layered not monolithic because separating quality governance from price discovery from liquidity bootstrapping from community rewards lets each layer use the mechanism best suited to its objective.md index fcbc6a50b..d3b96ea08 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/optimal token launch architecture is layered not monolithic because separating quality governance from price discovery from liquidity bootstrapping from community rewards lets each layer use the mechanism best suited to its objective.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/optimal token launch architecture is layered not monolithic because separating quality governance from price discovery from liquidity bootstrapping from community rewards lets each layer use the mechanism best suited to its objective.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ depends_on: # Optimal token launch architecture is layered not monolithic because separating quality governance from price discovery from liquidity bootstrapping from community rewards lets each layer use the mechanism best suited to its objective -The [[early-conviction pricing is an unsolved mechanism design problem because systems that reward early believers attract extractive speculators while systems that prevent speculation penalize genuine supporters|early-conviction pricing trilemma]] implies that no single mechanism can simultaneously be shill-proof, community-aligned, and price-discovering. The [[token launches are hybrid-value auctions where common-value price discovery and private-value community alignment require different mechanisms because auction theory optimized for one degrades the other|hybrid-value auction theory]] explains why: common-value and private-value optimization require fundamentally different mechanism properties. +The early-conviction pricing is an unsolved mechanism design problem because systems that reward early believers attract extractive speculators while systems that prevent speculation penalize genuine supporters|early-conviction pricing trilemma implies that no single mechanism can simultaneously be shill-proof, community-aligned, and price-discovering. The token launches are hybrid-value auctions where common-value price discovery and private-value community alignment require different mechanisms because auction theory optimized for one degrades the other|hybrid-value auction theory explains why: common-value and private-value optimization require fundamentally different mechanism properties. The resolution is not finding a better single mechanism. It is separating the launch process into layers, each handling one objective with the mechanism best suited to it. diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/token launches are hybrid-value auctions where common-value price discovery and private-value community alignment require different mechanisms because auction theory optimized for one degrades the other.md b/domains/internet-finance/token launches are hybrid-value auctions where common-value price discovery and private-value community alignment require different mechanisms because auction theory optimized for one degrades the other.md index 1bec47ed8..a9356ae74 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/token launches are hybrid-value auctions where common-value price discovery and private-value community alignment require different mechanisms because auction theory optimized for one degrades the other.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/token launches are hybrid-value auctions where common-value price discovery and private-value community alignment require different mechanisms because auction theory optimized for one degrades the other.md @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Token launches are neither. They are **hybrid-value auctions** with two interact **The interaction creates a specific failure mode.** When you optimize for common-value price discovery (dutch auction, batch auction), you correctly find the clearing price but allocate tokens indiscriminately — a bot and a future core contributor pay the same price, or the bot gets a better deal through sophisticated bidding. When you optimize for private-value community alignment (reputation gates, tiered access, vesting discounts), you reward the right participants but sacrifice price accuracy because the mechanism no longer aggregates common-value information efficiently. -**This is why the trilemma exists.** The [[early-conviction pricing is an unsolved mechanism design problem because systems that reward early believers attract extractive speculators while systems that prevent speculation penalize genuine supporters|early-conviction pricing trilemma]] is a consequence of the hybrid-value structure. Shill-proofness + price discovery = common-value optimization (ignoring private values). Community alignment = private-value optimization (potentially sacrificing common-value accuracy). No single mechanism handles both simultaneously because the auction theory results that govern each case conflict. +**This is why the trilemma exists.** The early-conviction pricing is an unsolved mechanism design problem because systems that reward early believers attract extractive speculators while systems that prevent speculation penalize genuine supporters|early-conviction pricing trilemma is a consequence of the hybrid-value structure. Shill-proofness + price discovery = common-value optimization (ignoring private values). Community alignment = private-value optimization (potentially sacrificing common-value accuracy). No single mechanism handles both simultaneously because the auction theory results that govern each case conflict. **The implication: separate the value components across mechanism layers.** If common-value and private-value optimization require different mechanisms, the solution is not a hybrid mechanism but a layered architecture — one layer for common-value price discovery (batch auction or dutch auction) and a separate layer for private-value community alignment (retroactive rewards, conviction bonuses, governance participation incentives). This separation is the theoretical basis for the layered launch architecture thesis. @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Relevant Notes: - [[early-conviction pricing is an unsolved mechanism design problem because systems that reward early believers attract extractive speculators while systems that prevent speculation penalize genuine supporters]] — the trilemma is a consequence of the hybrid-value structure argued here - [[dutch-auction dynamic bonding curves solve the token launch pricing problem by combining descending price discovery with ascending supply curves eliminating the instantaneous arbitrage that has cost token deployers over 100 million dollars on Ethereum]] — Doppler optimizes for the common-value component, sacrificing private-value alignment - [[speculative markets aggregate information through incentive and selection effects not wisdom of crowds]] — information aggregation in common-value auctions works through the same mechanism as speculative markets -- [[futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders]] — futarchy handles the common-value governance layer; a separate private-value mechanism handles community alignment +- futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders — futarchy handles the common-value governance layer; a separate private-value mechanism handles community alignment Topics: - [[internet finance and decision markets]]