extract: 2026-03-19-solanacompass-metadao-futarchy-amm-liquidity

Pentagon-Agent: Epimetheus <3D35839A-7722-4740-B93D-51157F7D5E70>

inbox/queue/.extraction-debug/2026-03-19-solanacompass-metadao-futarchy-amm-liquidity.json

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+{
+  "rejected_claims": [
+    {
+      "filename": "metadao-liquidity-borrowing-creates-market-cap-dependent-governance-quality-gradient.md",
+      "issues": [
+        "missing_attribution_extractor"
+      ]
+    }
+  ],
+  "validation_stats": {
+    "total": 1,
+    "kept": 0,
+    "fixed": 3,
+    "rejected": 1,
+    "fixes_applied": [
+      "metadao-liquidity-borrowing-creates-market-cap-dependent-governance-quality-gradient.md:set_created:2026-03-20",
+      "metadao-liquidity-borrowing-creates-market-cap-dependent-governance-quality-gradient.md:stripped_wiki_link:futarchy-is-manipulation-resistant-because-attack-attempts-c",
+      "metadao-liquidity-borrowing-creates-market-cap-dependent-governance-quality-gradient.md:stripped_wiki_link:optimal-governance-requires-mixing-mechanisms-because-differ"
+    ],
+    "rejections": [
+      "metadao-liquidity-borrowing-creates-market-cap-dependent-governance-quality-gradient.md:missing_attribution_extractor"
+    ]
+  },
+  "model": "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5",
+  "date": "2026-03-20"
+}

inbox/queue/2026-03-19-solanacompass-metadao-futarchy-amm-liquidity.md

@@ -7,9 +7,12 @@ date: 2026-02-01
 domain: internet-finance
 secondary_domains: []
 format: thread
-status: unprocessed
+status: enrichment
 priority: high
 tags: [metadao, futarchy-amm, liquidity, governance-markets, mechanism-design, spot-pool]
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2026-03-20
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
 ---
 
 ## Content
@@ -57,3 +60,11 @@ Detailed explanation of MetaDAO's Futarchy AMM liquidity borrowing mechanism, so
 PRIMARY CONNECTION: Futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders
 WHY ARCHIVED: Provides the mechanism explanation for WHY manipulation resistance scales with market cap — the 50% borrowing design codifies the relationship
 EXTRACTION HINT: Focus on deriving the scope condition from the mechanism design — governance market depth = f(spot liquidity) = f(market cap). This gives a precise scope qualifier for the manipulation resistance claim.
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- MetaDAO's futarchy AMM borrows 50% of total spot liquidity when a proposal launches
+- The remaining 50% of liquidity continues servicing regular token trades during proposals
+- Previously, proposers needed approximately $150,000 in capital to fund proposal markets
+- MetaDAO implemented spending limits based on real-world observations
+- MetaDAO transitioned from capped to uncapped raises based on feedback