Merge pull request 'rio: extract claims from 2024-06-08-futardio-proposal-reward-the-university-of-waterloo-blockchain-club-with-1-mil' (#723) from extract/2024-06-08-futardio-proposal-reward-the-university-of-waterloo-blockchain-club-with-1-mil into main

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Leo 2026-03-15 14:34:56 +00:00
commit 5176fa323a
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---
type: entity
entity_type: decision_market
name: "IslandDAO: Reward the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club with 1 Million $DEAN Tokens"
domain: internet-finance
status: passed
parent_entity: "[[deans-list]]"
platform: "futardio"
proposer: "HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz"
proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/7KkoRGyvzhvzKjxuPHjyxg77a52MeP6axyx7aywpGbdc"
proposal_date: 2024-06-08
resolution_date: 2024-06-11
category: "grants"
summary: "Allocate 1M $DEAN tokens ($1,300 USDC equivalent) to University of Waterloo Blockchain Club to attract 200 student contributors with 5% FDV increase condition"
tracked_by: rio
created: 2026-03-11
---
# IslandDAO: Reward the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club with 1 Million $DEAN Tokens
## Summary
Proposal to allocate 1 million $DEAN tokens (equivalent to $1,300 USDC at time of proposal) to the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club's 200 members. The proposal was structured as a conditional grant requiring a 5% increase in The Dean's List DAO's fully diluted valuation (from $115,655 to $121,438) measured over a 5-day trading period. The proposal passed, indicating market confidence that student engagement would drive sufficient value creation.
## Market Data
- **Outcome:** Passed
- **Proposer:** HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz
- **Trading Period:** 5 days (2024-06-08 to 2024-06-11)
- **Grant Amount:** 1,000,000 $DEAN tokens ($1,300 USDC equivalent)
- **Success Condition:** 5% FDV increase ($5,783 increase required)
- **Target Participants:** 200 University of Waterloo Blockchain Club members
- **Estimated ROI:** $4.45 benefit per dollar spent (based on proposal model)
## Significance
This proposal demonstrates futarchy-governed talent acquisition and community grants. Rather than a simple token distribution, the proposal structured the grant as a conditional bet on whether university partnership would increase DAO valuation. The pass condition required measurable market impact (5% FDV increase) within a defined timeframe, making the grant accountable to token price performance rather than subjective governance approval.
The proposal's economic model calculated that each of 200 students needed to contribute activities worth ~$28.92 in FDV increase to justify the $1,300 investment. The market's decision to pass suggests traders believed student engagement (dApp reviews, testing, social promotion, development) would exceed this threshold.
This represents an early experiment in using futarchy for partnership and grant decisions, where traditional DAOs would use token-weighted voting without price accountability.
## Relationship to KB
- [[deans-list]] - parent organization making the grant decision
- [[futardio]] - platform enabling the conditional market governance
- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] - mechanism used for this decision

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@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Services DAO on Solana providing professional user feedback, QA, marketing, and
Dean's List is interesting not as a standalone company but as an adoption data point. It demonstrates that futarchy governance can be adopted by organizations outside of MetaDAO's direct ecosystem — a services DAO using market-based governance for operational decisions. If more existing DAOs migrate from Snapshot/token voting to futarchy, that validates the governance evolution thesis.
## Relationship to KB
- [[DAO governance degenerates into political capture because proposal processes select for coalition-building skill over operational competence and the resulting bureaucracy creates structural speed disadvantages against focused competitors]] — Dean's List moved from token voting to futarchy to escape this
- DAO governance degenerates into political capture because proposal processes select for coalition-building skill over operational competence and the resulting bureaucracy creates structural speed disadvantages against focused competitors — Dean's List moved from token voting to futarchy to escape this
- [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]] — Dean's List may use futarchy selectively for high-stakes decisions
---

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@ -6,9 +6,13 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/7KkoRGyvzhvzKjxuPHjyxg77a52MeP6axyx7aywpGbd
date: 2024-06-08
domain: internet-finance
format: data
status: unprocessed
status: processed
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
event_type: proposal
processed_by: rio
processed_date: 2026-03-11
extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
extraction_notes: "Factual proposal data extracted to decision_market entity. No novel claims about futarchy mechanisms beyond what's already captured in existing KB claims about MetaDAO's Autocrat implementation and futarchy-governed grants. The proposal's economic model ($4.45 benefit per dollar) is self-reported projection, not verified outcome data."
---
## Proposal Details
@ -106,3 +110,11 @@ This proposal to allocate 1 million `$DEAN` tokens to the University of Waterloo
- Autocrat version: 0.3
- Completed: 2024-06-11
- Ended: 2024-06-11
## Key Facts
- The Dean's List DAO FDV was $115,655 at proposal time (2024-06-08)
- 1 million $DEAN tokens equaled $1,300 USDC at proposal time
- University of Waterloo Blockchain Club had 200 student members
- Proposal required 5% FDV increase ($5,783) over 5-day trading period
- Proposal passed on 2024-06-11