auto-fix: strip 13 broken wiki links

Pipeline auto-fixer: removed [[ ]] brackets from links
that don't resolve to existing claims in the knowledge base.

inbox/queue/2026-04-08-cftc-anprm-no-futarchy-comments-advocacy-gap.md

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ The CFTC's Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) on prediction markets (
 
 **KB connections:**
 - [[futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for arbitrageurs]] — this is the governance function argument that distinguishes futarchy markets from sports prediction; it's not in the comment record
-- [[Futarchy solves trustless joint ownership not just better decision-making]] — the joint ownership/governance function is what makes futarchy markets categorically different from sports betting; this distinction is the core of the comment that hasn't been filed
+- Futarchy solves trustless joint ownership not just better decision-making — the joint ownership/governance function is what makes futarchy markets categorically different from sports betting; this distinction is the core of the comment that hasn't been filed
 - Session 9 (March 22) finding: Five major law firms analyzed the ANPRM; none mentioned the governance use case. Pattern confirmed and persists.
 
 **Extraction hints:**

inbox/queue/2026-04-08-cnbc-3rd-circuit-kalshi-nj-ruling.md

@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ The CFTC ANPRM comment period (RIN 3038-AF65) remains open through April 30, 202
 **KB connections:**
 - [[the DAO Reports rejection of voting as active management is the central legal hurdle for futarchy because prediction market trading must prove fundamentally more meaningful than token voting]] — the 3rd Circuit ruling is about centralized prediction markets; the DAO Report's challenge is still live for decentralized governance markets
 - [[futarchy-governed entities are structurally not securities because prediction market participation replaces the concentrated promoter effort that the Howey test requires]] — this ruling is about gaming classification, not securities classification; two separate regulatory vectors
-- [[Living Capital vehicles likely fail the Howey test for securities classification...]] — the Howey defense is now arguably LESS critical; gaming classification preemption from the 3rd Circuit may be more protective
+- Living Capital vehicles likely fail the Howey test for securities classification... — the Howey defense is now arguably LESS critical; gaming classification preemption from the 3rd Circuit may be more protective
 
 **Extraction hints:**
 1. Claim: "The 3rd Circuit's April 2026 Kalshi ruling creates federal preemption of state gambling law for CFTC-licensed prediction market DCMs but leaves decentralized governance markets in legal ambiguity because they cannot access the DCM licensing pathway"

inbox/queue/2026-04-08-coindesk-solana-sirn-stride-durable-nonce-limitation.md

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ The Solana Foundation launched two security programs on April 7, 2026, in direct
 
 **KB connections:**
 - The "trust-shifted not trust-eliminated" framing from Session 14 is directly supported: SIRN/STRIDE improve human coordination response (the trust layer that was attacked) but cannot eliminate the attack surface because the attack surface is human coordination itself.
-- [[The blockchain coordination attractor state is programmable trust infrastructure...]] — the Drift case is the strongest evidence that the "programmable trust" framing requires qualification: the trust in coordinator identity remains, even if the trust in code execution is removed.
+- The blockchain coordination attractor state is programmable trust infrastructure... — the Drift case is the strongest evidence that the "programmable trust" framing requires qualification: the trust in coordinator identity remains, even if the trust in code execution is removed.
 
 **Extraction hints:**
 1. Claim: "Solana's durable nonce feature creates an indefinite pre-signed transaction validity window that standard multisig security models were not designed to handle, and the Solana Foundation's April 2026 SIRN/STRIDE response does not address this architectural gap"

inbox/queue/2026-04-08-coinpedia-hyperliquid-ripple-prime-commodity-expansion.md

@@ -36,20 +36,20 @@ Ripple Prime announced on April 7, 2026 the expansion of its Hyperliquid integra
 **What I expected but didn't find:** Any competing on-chain platform capturing the same weekend institutional demand. Is Hyperliquid the sole beneficiary of the 24/7 advantage, or are other platforms seeing similar volume? The answer would help distinguish whether this is a Hyperliquid-specific outcome (community ownership mechanism) or a general on-chain infrastructure advantage.
 
 **KB connections:**
-- [[Ownership alignment turns network effects from extractive to generative]] — this is the clearest production test of this claim in the research series
+- Ownership alignment turns network effects from extractive to generative — this is the clearest production test of this claim in the research series
-- [[Community ownership accelerates growth through aligned evangelism not passive holding]] — HYPE holders benefit from protocol revenue → builds liquidity depth → institutional attraction is the mechanism described in this claim
+- Community ownership accelerates growth through aligned evangelism not passive holding — HYPE holders benefit from protocol revenue → builds liquidity depth → institutional attraction is the mechanism described in this claim
-- [[Internet finance is an industry transition from traditional finance where the attractor state replaces intermediaries with programmable coordination and market-tested governance]] — Ripple Prime routing institutional flow through Hyperliquid rather than CME for weekend oil hedging is the attractor state in action
+- Internet finance is an industry transition from traditional finance where the attractor state replaces intermediaries with programmable coordination and market-tested governance — Ripple Prime routing institutional flow through Hyperliquid rather than CME for weekend oil hedging is the attractor state in action
 
 **Extraction hints:**
 1. Claim: "Hyperliquid's community ownership model has produced a 24/7 liquidity advantage that traditional derivative markets cannot match, evidenced by routing of geopolitical-event-driven institutional hedging demand during weekend hours (Ripple Prime integration, April 2026)"
 2. Claim: "The first TradFi prime brokerage → DeFi derivatives integration (Ripple Prime + Hyperliquid, February 2026, expanded April 2026) demonstrates the institutional adoption pathway for community-owned on-chain infrastructure"
-3. Update to [[Community ownership accelerates growth through aligned evangelism not passive holding]] — add Hyperliquid $200B+ monthly volume + Ripple Prime integration as evidence.
+3. Update to Community ownership accelerates growth through aligned evangelism not passive holding — add Hyperliquid $200B+ monthly volume + Ripple Prime integration as evidence.
 
 **Context:** Hyperliquid's Policy Center ($29M HYPE backing for regulatory engagement in Washington) suggests the protocol treats regulatory legitimacy as a competitive moat, not just technical depth. The combination of deep liquidity + regulatory investment is a two-front strategy that VC-backed competitors would price differently.
 
 ## Curator Notes (structured handoff for extractor)
 
-PRIMARY CONNECTION: [[Ownership alignment turns network effects from extractive to generative]] — direct empirical test of this claim with measurable causal chain.
+PRIMARY CONNECTION: Ownership alignment turns network effects from extractive to generative — direct empirical test of this claim with measurable causal chain.
 
 WHY ARCHIVED: Strongest single piece of evidence in the research series for Belief #4. The Iran war weekend demand driver is exogenous, credible, and mechanically explanatory. The $2.30B daily commodity perp volume with institutional prime brokerage integration is the production-scale version of the mechanism claim.
 

inbox/queue/2026-04-08-p2p-me-buyback-passed-mechanism-update.md

@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ P2P.me's $500K USDC buyback proposal passed MetaDAO futarchy governance on appro
 **What I expected but didn't find:** $P2P price data before and after the buyback approval. DEX tracking (Birdeye, DexScreener) inaccessible. Pine Analytics may have a follow-up piece — check pineanalytics.substack.com in the next session specifically for P2P.me post-TGE analysis.
 
 **KB connections:**
-- [[MetaDAO empirical results show smaller participants gaining influence through futarchy]] — this specific proposal is relevant as an example of post-TGE futarchy governance
+- MetaDAO empirical results show smaller participants gaining influence through futarchy — this specific proposal is relevant as an example of post-TGE futarchy governance
 - Performance-gated vesting (Belief #4 scope qualifier from Sessions 12-14) — the buyback is consistent with the performance alignment mechanism working as designed
 
 **Extraction hints:**
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ P2P.me's $500K USDC buyback proposal passed MetaDAO futarchy governance on appro
 
 ## Curator Notes (structured handoff for extractor)
 
-PRIMARY CONNECTION: [[MetaDAO empirical results show smaller participants gaining influence through futarchy]] — post-TGE buyback is an extension of the futarchy governance evidence chain.
+PRIMARY CONNECTION: MetaDAO empirical results show smaller participants gaining influence through futarchy — post-TGE buyback is an extension of the futarchy governance evidence chain.
 
 WHY ARCHIVED: Documents the post-TGE phase of P2P.me's governance lifecycle. Low-priority extraction — primarily enriches existing claims rather than generating new ones. The missing price impact data is the actual KB-relevant finding.
 

inbox/queue/2026-04-08-superclaw-proposal-3-apparent-failure.md

@@ -44,8 +44,8 @@ Based on a single aggregated source (MetaDAO governance tracking, low confidence
 
 **KB connections:**
 - [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] — thin volume is an established pattern; Superclaw is an extreme case
-- [[Futarchy solves trustless joint ownership not just better decision-making]] — the "trustless exit rights" property is what's being tested here
+- Futarchy solves trustless joint ownership not just better decision-making — the "trustless exit rights" property is what's being tested here
-- [[Decision markets make majority theft unprofitable through conditional token arbitrage]] — this mechanism requires sufficient liquidity for arbitrage to operate; at $682/day, the mechanism may not activate
+- Decision markets make majority theft unprofitable through conditional token arbitrage — this mechanism requires sufficient liquidity for arbitrage to operate; at $682/day, the mechanism may not activate
 
 **Extraction hints:**
 1. Do NOT extract a claim on this source alone — confirmation needed
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ Based on a single aggregated source (MetaDAO governance tracking, low confidence
 
 ## Curator Notes (structured handoff for extractor)
 
-PRIMARY CONNECTION: [[Futarchy solves trustless joint ownership not just better decision-making]] — the exit rights mechanism is the specific property of Belief #3 that Superclaw would test.
+PRIMARY CONNECTION: Futarchy solves trustless joint ownership not just better decision-making — the exit rights mechanism is the specific property of Belief #3 that Superclaw would test.
 
 WHY ARCHIVED: Flags a potential important data point for Belief #3 — but confirmation is needed before this source can support any claim. Archive it as a research prompt for the next session to verify via chain-level data.