rio: Drift + Sanctum decision records — full text backfill + new records (#1750)
Co-authored-by: Theseus <theseus@agents.livingip.xyz> Co-committed-by: Theseus <theseus@agents.livingip.xyz>
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@ -57,3 +57,91 @@ This represents Drift's strategic investment in the emerging AI x DeFi sector, u
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- [[drift]] - parent entity, treasury allocation
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- [[drift]] - parent entity, treasury allocation
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- [[futardio]] - governance platform
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- [[futardio]] - governance platform
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- MetaDAO - futarchy implementation reference
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- MetaDAO - futarchy implementation reference
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## Full Proposal Text
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### Drift AI Agents RFG
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### Abstract
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This proposal requests to create a Drift AI Agents Grants program, a Decision Committee and to allocate 50,000 DRIFT towards the program and committee's discretion.
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### Motivation
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AI agents have recently attracted significant attention, capital, and talent. While their intersection with DeFi is still nascent, Drift believes in the sector's potential and considers it an important area for investment.
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The Drift AI Agents Request for Grants (RFG) aims to:
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* Foster growth in the AI x DeFi sector.
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* Encourage teams to build on Drift.
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* Signal Drift's focus on developing this emerging space.
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### Specifications
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#### Qualifying Grants
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**What Is a DeFi Agent?**
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To differentiate a DeFi agent from a traditional bot or managed strategy, consider the following guidelines:
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* Should operate with autonomy to manage assets.
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* Should utilise multiple strategies or tools.
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* Should exist off-chain but can interact on-chain.
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* Should be able to communicate with, and execute objectives for, an agent manager.
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*Note: This is not a comprehensive definition. Drift welcomes all interpretations of what constitutes an "agent."*
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**Target Areas:**
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* **Trading Agents:** Integrating with Drift Perps to trade or execute position strategies on behalf of managers.
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* **Yield Agents:** Managing capital through multiple yield opportunities available on Drift.
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* **Information Agents:** Surfacing on-chain information or raising awareness about Drift.
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* **Social Agents:** Build a cult following around Drift, be a reply guy or KOL, etc.
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This list is not exhaustive. Any agent application relevant to Drift is encouraged.
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**Grant Amount**
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A total of up to 50,000 DRIFT is available in grants.
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* Grant amounts may range from 10,000–20,000 DRIFT, depending on the proposal.
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* Grants will be approved by the decision council and awarded upon milestone completion.
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#### Application Process
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1. **Proposal:**
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* Complete the application form: [Link](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSdmqXph2f6EGSkN_79oeaQLfxRkzUqXZl5dK4_S4UMqE_eIbw/viewform?usp=sf_link)
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* If applicable, a Drift Ecosystem team member will reach out to help formalize the proposal.
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2. **Review:**
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* The formalized proposal will be reviewed by the decision council.
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**Timeline**
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* Applications are open upon approval of the RFG.
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* Applications are open until March 1st, 2025.
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* Applications may be approved and grants awarded on a rolling basis.
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* Proposals will be reviewed and grantees notified by the decision council.
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* The deadline for approval is March 1st, Any unused grants will be returned to the foundation.
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* Deployment of grants will happen within 2 weeks of approval. Deployment may be dependent on KYC for regulatory compliance.
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**Decision Council**
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All grant decisions are at the discretion of the decision council and any such decisions made by the decision council are final.
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**Questions** For inquiries about the request for grants or the application process, contact **@airtightsquid** on Telegram.
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### Benefits / Risks
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#### Benefits
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- Additional users for DRIFT product suite
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- Additional product lines leveraging DRIFT product suite
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- Engaging community to drive utility of DRIFT within AI agents
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- Supporting nascent industry
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#### Risks
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- Emerging sector carries unknowns
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- Inefficient use of DRIFT
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- Teams time that could be used in other ways
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### Outcome
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From this proposal passing success would be the creation of the committee, publishing of the RFG, evaluating applicants and the awarding of up to 50k DRIFT tokens to eligible grantees.
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### Cost Summary
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This comes at a cost of 50k DRIFT tokens to the foundation.
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194
decisions/internet-finance/drift-fund-artemis-labs-dashboards.md
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194
decisions/internet-finance/drift-fund-artemis-labs-dashboards.md
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@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
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---
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type: decision
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entity_type: decision_market
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name: "Drift: Fund Artemis Labs Data and Analytics Dashboards"
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domain: internet-finance
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status: failed
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parent_entity: "[[drift]]"
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platform: "futardio"
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proposer: "Artemis Labs"
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proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/G95shxDXSSTcgi2DTJ2h79JCefVNQPm8dFeDzx7qZ2ks"
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proposal_date: 2024-07-01
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resolution_date: 2024-07-04
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category: "grants"
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summary: "Artemis Labs proposed building comprehensive Drift protocol analytics dashboards for $50K in DRIFT tokens over 12 months — rejected by futarchy markets"
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tracked_by: rio
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created: 2026-03-24
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---
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# Drift: Fund Artemis Labs Data and Analytics Dashboards
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## Summary
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Artemis Labs proposed a 12-month engagement to build and maintain comprehensive data and analytics dashboards for the Drift protocol, integrating Drift metrics into the Artemis Terminal platform used by institutional investors (Grayscale, Franklin Templeton, Vaneck), liquid token funds (Pantera, Modular Capital), and retail investors. The proposal requested $50K USD in DRIFT tokens (max cap 115K DRIFT) paid linearly over 12 months, with a 6-month opt-out clause. The proposal failed to pass the futarchy market.
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## Market Data
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- **Outcome:** Failed
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- **Proposer:** Artemis Labs
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- **Proposal Account:** G95shxDXSSTcgi2DTJ2h79JCefVNQPm8dFeDzx7qZ2ks
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- **Created:** 2024-07-01
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- **Resolved:** ~2024-07-04
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## Proposed Deliverables
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- **Perp Protocol Metrics:** Open interest, fees, revenue, average fees/trade, funding rate (annualized)
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- **Unique Trader Metrics:** Exchange volume/trader, unique number of traders
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- **Liquidity Metrics:** Per-market +2%/-2% liquidity, price fill (effective price of 100K order)
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- **Deposit Metrics:** Average deposit size, deposit trends, lending rates
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- **Higher fidelity data refresh:** 6-hour intervals vs Drift's existing 24-hour S3 datalake refresh
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- **Independent research piece** shared with Artemis community
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- **Open source dashboards** free for community use
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## Significance
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This is the first Drift futarchy proposal from an external analytics vendor — a service procurement decision governed by conditional markets. The failure is notable because the proposal was well-structured with clear deliverables, institutional credibility (team from Venmo, Messari, Coinbase, BlackRock), and a reasonable 6-month cancellation clause. The market's rejection likely reflected either: (1) insufficient value-add relative to existing Drift analytics, (2) the $50K price point being too high for the perceived benefit, or (3) low market participation leading to unfavorable price dynamics. This case demonstrates futarchy's ability to reject proposals that would pass traditional committee-based grants processes, where vendor credibility and institutional relationships carry disproportionate weight.
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## Relationship to KB
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- [[drift]] - parent entity, governance decision on analytics spending
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- [[futardio]] - governance platform
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- [[artemis-labs]] - proposing entity
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- [[futarchy-markets-can-reject-solutions-to-acknowledged-problems-when-the-proposed-solution-creates-worse-second-order-effects-than-the-problem-it-solves]] - market rejected a plausible vendor proposal
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- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] - failure may reflect participation dynamics rather than genuine market opposition
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## Full Proposal Text
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### Simple Summary
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Artemis Labs is set to transform how the crypto community accesses Drift metrics and data via this proposal. By integrating detailed Drift protocol metrics onto Artemis, the whole suite of Artemis users which include top liquid token funds (Panetera, Modular Capital), retail investors, developers, and institutional investors (Grayscale, Vaneck, Franklin Templeton) will be able to access Drift metrics for the first time. Artemis's commitment to transparency and community engagement, with open-source dashboards and regular updates, ensures that Drift metrics are accessible and audited for the entire crypto community to digest and share however they want.
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The proposal is for a grant of $50k USD in Drift Tokens with a max cap of 115k Drift Tokens (whichever is lower) over 12 months.
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### Who is Artemis Labs:
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Artemis Labs is a software company building the unified platform for all of crypto data. We are in the business of enabling **anyone** in the crypto space to dive deep on any protocol whether they are familiar with on crypto data or not. With two core products: excel / google sheets plugin and Artemis Terminal, we surface key metrics for a robust set of users including:
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- institutional investors such as Grayscale, Franklin Templeton, and Vaneck
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- liquid token funds such as Modular Capital, Pantera Capital, and CoinFund
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- retail investors with over 20k+ twitter followers and 20k+ subscribers to our weekly newsletter
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- developers from Wave Wallet, Quicknode, and Bridge.xyz
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Our team consist of top engineers from companies such as Venmo, Messari, Coinbase, Facebook and top HFs / Investment Firms such as Holocene, Carlyle Group, Blackrock, and Whale Rock. We are a blend of top engineering and traditional finance talent allowing us to build + surface metrics that actually matter to markets.
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#### Company Values:
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Our mission is to **surface key metrics** to anyone that cares about crypto in whatever way is most intuitive to them. Whether its a dashboard, an excel plugin, or an api, we empower retail traders, large liquid token funds, and developers in this space to make informed bets on the market with their capital and time.
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- **Transparency**: We take transparency very seriously, which is why we took great effort to become open source earlier this year. If there are any metrics the broader crypto community is concerned about, anyone can make a github issue and we will resolve in a timely manner.
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- **Build with the community:** We are **open source** and will work directly with Drift Labs and the community to surface metrics that matter to Drift users, developers, investors, and token holders. We have worked with the Drift Lab team to come up with an initial set of metrics that will be valuable to the both the Artemis and Drift community.
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### Why 3rd Party Verified Data is important
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Open and trusted fundamental metrics are an important tool for everyone in crypto. Developers use it to determine what ecosystem to build on and capital allocators use it to make informed bets on projects. But as the crypto space grows and matures, more people are asking fundamental questions that require deeper metrics to answer. The crypto space is becoming more sophisticated and there isn't a single go to source for all Drift metrics that matter.
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Artemis proposal aims to solve 3 key issues in the space right now:
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- No clear benchmarking of Drift's Protocol Health
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- No place to get all the metrics of Drift in one place and compare with other perpetual trading protocols
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- No way to start tracking historical changes of Drift Liquidity over time
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- No place to get deeper metrics on drift users such as average deposit size, exchange volume / user, etc.
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Artemis will provide to the community:
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- Reliable benchmarking of the Drift Protocols with other protocols
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- Deeper metrics on Drift not just high level numbers like TVL and Exchange Volume
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- Neutral 3rd party verified metrics
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- Wider audience of institutional investors and builders looking at key Drift Metrics
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### Proposal
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Working with Drift Labs these are the core dashboard Artemis Labs will build out and maintain for the community over the 12 month period.
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Deeper Perp Protocol Metrics:
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- Open Interest
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- Fees
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- Revenue
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- Average Fees / Trade
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- Funding Rate (Annualized)
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Unique Trader Metrics:
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- Exchange Volume / Trader
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- Unique Number of Traders
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Liquidity Metrics:
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- Liquidity metrics by perp market
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- +2% / -2% liquidity
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- Price Fill (effective price of a 100k Order)
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Deposit Metrics:
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- Average Deposit Size
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- Deposit Trends
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- Lending Rates
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### Community Engagement
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#### Independent Research
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As part of our commitment to being community focused, we will dive deep into the Drift Perps Protocol to highlight key metrics and the project. This will be done in the form of an independent research piece. We will then share this piece with the Artemis community the make up of which was described earlier in the proposal. This research piece will be made publicly available for anyone to read.
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#### Open Source Dashboards
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All of the dashboards and metrics we build for Drift will be open sourced and free for the community to screenshot and used for whatever they need.
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#### Updates
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We will also commit to a bi-monthly update post focusing on both works complete and ongoing as determined by the community.
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### Longer Term Relationship
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As has been stated above, we are a software company. We're building a platform that empowers anyone in crypto to make informed discussions with their time and capital. While this engagement is focus on building for the Drift Community and surfacing key metrics for the broader crypto community as it relates to Drift, we hope to continue to onboard more stakeholders in the crypto community to our platform. Our hope is that anyone who wants to do anything in crypto will at some point touch the Artemis platform and suite of products.
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### Success Criteria
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The successful completion of the Drift protocol's objectives will be measured against KPIs that will be derived from the specific objectives agreed upon between Drift and Artemis Labs. On top of those, We will also look to measure things such as:
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- Usage:
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- Number of Tweet
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- Page Views
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- Metrics Calls on our plugin
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- Product Deliverables (Drift Metrics on Artemis)
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### Pricing and timing
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- 12 month engagement w/ option to cancel engagement after an initial 6 month period
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- the Drift DAO will have the opportunity to terminate the relationship if it finds Artemis Labs' deliverables unsatisfactory (outlined above).
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- $50k USD value in Drift Tokens paid out linearly over 12 months.
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- Drift token price would be a trailing 7-d average based on coingecko prices
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- So at time of proposal that would be roughly **115,000 tokens** distributed out from a multisig where Drift Labs + Artemis Labs will be the signer over a 12 month period.
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- Start of engagement will begin once proposal is passed
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### Special Thanks
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- Big Z for reviewing and giving feedback!
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### On why Artemis think this is valuable
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- Artemis serves as a direct link to major capital allocators like Grayscale and Fidelity.
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- Ex: A liquid token fund manager managing (8-9 million dollar) asked Artemis about Drift specific metrics. They can't find any deep metrics about Drift on Artemis and do not feel comfortable with other sources or frankly does not know where to look. Other platforms like the ones mentioned above are too complicated for them to navigate and do not allow them to digest data in their favorite platform where they do all their work: excel / google sheets.
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- Traders from platforms like dYdX, Hyperliquid, etc rely on Artemis for critical trading data and insights to determine where they should trade.
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- Ex: a dYdX engineer came into the Artemis discord looking to confirm dYdX unique traders because traders were pinging them. These traders were using Artemis to determine what platform to allocate capital.
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### In terms of the coverage of metrics we expect to surface in addition to liquidity metrics
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- Granular insights on user behavior across Drift's products (e.g., insurance fund, lending, perp trading).
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1. top users across drift's many products such as the insurance fund, lending, perp trading every week historically
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- Answering questions like why Drift usage is going up or who makes up the user base of Drift
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2. Break out exchange volume, deposits, and fees paid by users.
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- Answering questions such as how much volume is done by 10, 100, 1000 traders etc.
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3. Liquidity and averages fees historically
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- Answering questions such as how much does it cost to use Drift as a trader
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4. Revenue across all of Drift product lines
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- Answering questions like how much money does Drift make and which revenue driver is growing the fastest
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- Providing sensible multiples for capital allocators (P/S, P/E)
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- Higher fidelity refresh rates for order book data / on chain data
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1. Currently, Drift refreshes its public S3 datalake every 24hours, we can do it every 6 hours (so 4 times a day)
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2. This would be shared to the Drift Labs team and public for free consumptions
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### Compensation and Implementation Questions
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- We would need to manually integrate new data pipelines, process the data into metrics and then build + design intuitive dashboards on our terminal which requires weeks of data science, engineering, product, and design hours.
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- These dashboard have always been and continue to be free to use. The rest of our product is also free to use with very generous restrictions and the vast majority of our users are NOT paying customers.
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- **Propose compensation Changes:** 115k DRIFT or $50k USD (whichever is lower) over 12 months.
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- We believe this is a fair value for the work we plan to do for Drift and the value add we bring to the community.
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We ultimately think that we are providing a unique service and we want to build a long term relationship with the Drift Community. If the DAO feels like we did not bring in enough value it has the power to cancel the contract after 6 months.
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@ -36,3 +36,29 @@ Represents an early futarchy-governed marketing/grants decision where a protocol
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- [[drift]] - parent protocol governance decision
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- [[drift]] - parent protocol governance decision
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- [[futardio]] - governance platform used
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- [[futardio]] - governance platform used
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- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] - may relate to why this failed
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- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] - may relate to why this failed
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## Full Proposal Text
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[Drift](https://docs.drift.trade/) is the largest open-sourced perpetual futures exchange built on Solana. Recently, Drift announced B.E.T, Solana's first capital efficient prediction market.
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To celebrate the launch of B.E.T. this proposal would fund a collection of bounties called "Drift Protocol Creator Competition".
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- The Drift Foundation Grants Program would fund a total prize pool of $8,250.
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- The outcome of the competition will serve in educating the community on and accelerating growth of B.E.T. through community engagement and creative content generation.
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If the proposal passes the competition would be run through [Superteam Earn](https://earn.superteam.fun/) and funded in DRIFT token distributed by the Drift Foundation Grants Program.
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This proposed competition offers three distinct bounty tracks as well as a grand prize, each with its own rewards:
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* Grand prize ($3,000)
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||||||
|
* Make an engaging video on B.E.T ($1,750)
|
||||||
|
* Twitter thread on B.E.T ($1,750)
|
||||||
|
* Share Trade Ideas on B.E.T ($1,750)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Each individual contest will have a prize structure of:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- 1st place: $1000
|
||||||
|
- 2nd place: $500
|
||||||
|
- 3rd place: $250
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Link to campaign details and evaluation criteria: [Link](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1QB0hPT0R_NvVqYh9UcNwRnf9ZE_ElWpDOjBLc8XgBAc/edit?usp=sharing)
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -54,3 +54,54 @@ Demonstrates futarchy-governed community grants for ecosystem development. The w
|
||||||
- [[drift]] - parent entity receiving governance decision
|
- [[drift]] - parent entity receiving governance decision
|
||||||
- [[futardio]] - platform hosting the futarchy decision
|
- [[futardio]] - platform hosting the futarchy decision
|
||||||
- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] - governance mechanism used
|
- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] - governance mechanism used
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Full Proposal Text
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Success guidelines:**
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Creation of new and engaging community initiatives
|
||||||
|
* Increased level of engagement with Drift across various channels
|
||||||
|
* Higher engagement across X (i.e impressions, replies, etc.)
|
||||||
|
* Increase community participation in Discord
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Proposal:** This proposal is to fund a community-run Working Group. The proposal requests 50,000 DRIFT for funding the initial set-up and 3 months of operation.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Proposal Overview
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Drift would like to establish a working group called the Drift Working Group, following successful models in the Solana ecosystem. The working group model is designed to create a **self-sustaining ecosystem** of engagement, education, and growth for Drift. The working group will operate independently, with initial collaboration with the Drift core team during formation.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
This is an experimental initiative with plans to growth based on the program's success. The DWG will be led by a community member with a proven track record. The DWG will undergo a 3-month trial period before we build up learnings and next steps.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Key Activities
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* **Content Creation:** Develop high-quality content through different mediums like tweets and videos, to inform and engage the community about Drift's offerings.
|
||||||
|
* **Community Activation:** Implement initiatives ("Community Rituals") to boost community participation, such as live-streamed trading sessions and community takeovers.
|
||||||
|
* **Education Development:** Create comprehensive educational materials to guide new users and breakdown more complex features of Drift.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Leadership & Structure
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The DWG will be led by Socrates, bringing 3+ years of crypto marketing expertise and technical background. His focus spans user acquisition, content strategy, and brand awareness. He has supported notable brands such as Brave, Sui, Helio, Shaga, and Streamflow. The initial team will be composed of Anay and 4 working group members, with a total monthly budget of 15,400 DRIFT.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Budget**
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* The total budget for the working group is 50,000 DRIFT tokens. This amounts to 15,400 per month for three consecutive months as trial, with 3,800 DRIFT allocated for additional initiatives.
|
||||||
|
* Any unused budget will be returned to the DAO.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Monthly Budget Breakdown**
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Working Group Lead: 5,000 DRIFT
|
||||||
|
* Team Members: 2,600 DRIFT
|
||||||
|
* Initial team size: Lead + 4 members
|
||||||
|
* **Additional Sponsorship**: Allocated budget for community initiatives
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Timeline & Urgency
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Launch Target: End of February 2024
|
||||||
|
* Market Context: The current competitive landscape necessitates swift action to attract and retain talent, as similar initiatives are emerging.
|
||||||
|
* Governance: DAO approval is required prior to the formation of the DWG.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Operational Framework
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* **Weekly Reporting**: The working group lead will provide regular updates to the Drift team.
|
||||||
|
* **Performance Tracking**: Metrics will include individual KOL deliverables, community sentiment analysis, and internal feedback collection.
|
||||||
|
* **Fund Management**: Funds will be managed through a 2/3 multisig wallet, comprising the working group lead and two members of the Drift team.
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -43,3 +43,65 @@ This proposal demonstrates that futarchy implementations require explicit incent
|
||||||
- [[metadao]] - source of participant data via Dune dashboard
|
- [[metadao]] - source of participant data via Dune dashboard
|
||||||
- MetaDAOs-Autocrat-program-implements-futarchy-through-conditional-token-markets-where-proposals-create-parallel-pass-and-fail-universes-settled-by-time-weighted-average-price-over-a-three-day-window - mechanism context
|
- MetaDAOs-Autocrat-program-implements-futarchy-through-conditional-token-markets-where-proposals-create-parallel-pass-and-fail-universes-settled-by-time-weighted-average-price-over-a-three-day-window - mechanism context
|
||||||
- MetaDAOs-futarchy-implementation-shows-limited-trading-volume-in-uncontested-decisions - participation bootstrapping challenge
|
- MetaDAOs-futarchy-implementation-shows-limited-trading-volume-in-uncontested-decisions - participation bootstrapping challenge
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Full Proposal Text
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Overview
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
This proposal requests **50,000 DRIFT** to carry out an early Drift Futarchy incentive program (max of 10 proposals / 3 months).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
This proposal is meant to signal rewards for strong forecasters in futarchic markets by:
|
||||||
|
- Rewarding early and active participants of MetaDAO with tokens to participate in Drift Futarchy (via the ["endowment effect"](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Endowment_effect))
|
||||||
|
- Incentivizing future well-formulated proposals and activity for Drift Futarchy
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
This proposal's outline is fulfilled over months by the executor group, acting as a 2/3 multisig, defined below.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Implementation
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#### Retroactive Reward:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Using the following dune dashboard data as reference: https://dune.com/metadaohogs/themetadao (with May 19th, 2024 UTC as a cutoff date)
|
||||||
|
- [METADAO activity](https://gist.github.com/0xbigz/3ddbe2a21e721326d151ac957f96da20)
|
||||||
|
- [META token holdings](https://gist.github.com/0xbigz/f461ed8accc6f86181d3e9a2c164f810)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Among those who interacted with metadao's conditional vaults on at least 5 occassions over more period of 30 days, will recieve a retroactive reward as follows:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- < 1 META, 100 DRIFT
|
||||||
|
- >= 1 META, 200 DRIFT
|
||||||
|
- >= 10 META, 400 DRIFT
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
This [code](https://gist.github.com/0xbigz/a67d75f138c1c656353ab034936108fe) produces the following list of 32 MetaDAO participants who are qualified:
|
||||||
|
https://gist.github.com/0xbigz/056d3f7780532ffa5662410bc49f7215
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**(9,600 DRIFT)**
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Additionally, all MetaDAO AMM swapers interacters https://dune.com/queries/3782545 who aren't included above should split remaining.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
crude snapshot: https://gist.github.com/0xbigz/adb2020af9ef0420b9026514bcb82eab
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**(2,400 DRIFT)**
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#### Future Incentive:
|
||||||
|
*The following applies to the lengthlier of next 10 proposals or 3 month time frame*
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Additionally, excluding this instance, passing proposal that are honored by security council can earn up to 5000 DRIFT for the proposer(s), each claimable after 3 months after.
|
||||||
|
(*if successful proposals exceed two, executor group can decide top N proposals to split*)
|
||||||
|
**(10,000 DRIFT)**
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
For accounts sufficiently active during the period, a pool of 20,000 DRIFT will be split and claimable after 3 months. To filter for non organic activity, the exact criteria for this shall be finalized by the execution group.
|
||||||
|
**(25,000 DRIFT)**
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#### Execution Group:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
A 2/3 multisig to escrow and distribute funds based on outline. After successful completion of this proposal, they can distribute their allocation as they see fit.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
In the event of uncertainty or excess budget, funds shall be returned to originating wallet or Drift Futarchy DAO treasury.
|
||||||
|
**(3,000 DRIFT)**
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- [metaprophet](https://x.com/metaproph3t)
|
||||||
|
- [Sumatt](https://x.com/quantrarianism)
|
||||||
|
- [Lmvdzande](https://x.com/Lmvdzande)
|
||||||
|
|
@ -45,3 +45,94 @@ The program's design addresses a common DAO challenge: how to efficiently alloca
|
||||||
- [[drift]] - governance decision establishing grants infrastructure
|
- [[drift]] - governance decision establishing grants infrastructure
|
||||||
- [[futardio]] - platform hosting the proposal and larger grant decisions
|
- [[futardio]] - platform hosting the proposal and larger grant decisions
|
||||||
- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] - mechanism used for large grant approvals
|
- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] - mechanism used for large grant approvals
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Full Proposal Text
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Summary
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
This proposal requests 100,000 DRIFT to carry out the initial iteration of the Drift Grants Program.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The funds will be managed by 2/3 multi sig governed by the Decision Council.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The proposal is designed to kickstart the foundation grants program with the goal of helping efficiently allocate capital and figure out the best process and structure for a more robust grants program going forward.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Overview
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
A robust ecosystem can serve as a key competitive advantage in the DeFi space. Given the relatively undifferentiated products and open-source culture, a strong community and ecosystem are both crucial for a protocol's sustained success. The launch of DRIFT token will enable the foundation to accelerate ecosystem growth and fortify the Drift community through grants. The purpose of this proposal is to initialise the process of creating a grants system that effectively aligns and supports Drift's community and ecosystem.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Objectives
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#### Supporting Community Initiatives
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- Short-term: Short term the objective is to increase community engagement and help grow the size of the community by providing easy and open access to community members to lead community initiatives.
|
||||||
|
- Vision: Long term it is about aligning incentives in a way fosters a robust and active community.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#### Developing Ecosystem
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- Short-term: Over the next two months we want to start to push integration and figure out a process to source and support teams building on top of drift. We want this proposal to serve to help support people looking to build on Drift.
|
||||||
|
- Vision: The long-term vision is to have Drift become a foundational layer that supports a flourishing ecosystem of projects.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#### Answer key questions about the Grants program
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- Do people want small grants?
|
||||||
|
- Figuring out if there is demand for smaller grant sizes that may not make sense for Futarchic markets and figure out if the proposed proposal structure makes sense to handle them.
|
||||||
|
- Do we need to source?
|
||||||
|
- The current structure is passive/supporting, is there enough quality inbound where this model works, or do we need to scale up the grant program to support sourcing.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#### What does success look like?
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- Supporting Community initiatives: Figure out a system to evaluate and support initiatives.
|
||||||
|
- Developing Ecosystem: Figure out the best way to support projects going through the futarchic system.
|
||||||
|
- Testing Grants program: Answer the two objective questions.
|
||||||
|
- Overall: Have a clearer vision for direction of the Foundation Grants Program and have confidence drafting and supporting a more substantial future proposal.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#### Review
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
At the end of the 2 month period the analyst will put together a comprehensive report reviewing all activities done by the team, all grants funded/proposed and come up with a recommendation for the program moving forward. The report will include an evaluation of how the grants program completed all objectives, where it fell short and how it should be changed. Ultimate goal is to be able to use learnings from the initial program to draft a more substantial follow up proposal.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Details
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Timeframe:** 2 months, starting on July 1st ending on August 31st.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Looking at other protocols grants programs, we believe it is important to commit heavily in effort and capital. The goal of the initial program is to quickly get started and experiment in design, operations, and best practices so that we can figure out what works best in order to iterate and commit with conviction for v2.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Initiation:** This proposal will be decided on through the Futarchic markets.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Team:** 4 People
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Ultimately, to have a successful grant program you need a strong and representative team to drive it. Part of the goal for the initial proposal is to figure out the workload/workflow for team members.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- Decision Council: The decision council consists of 3 people and votes on the approval of small proposals. Expectations for the council include voting on each proposal, describing their reasoning behind their vote and working with the analyst to help create a brief summary report analysing each proposal. Expected commitment 0-6hrs per week. The members of the decision council will not be able to vote on proposals in which they are direct beneficiaries from in order to prevent conflicts of interest.
|
||||||
|
- Members: Personal info is hidden for privacy, all members are active community members that the team has vetted.
|
||||||
|
- Spidey
|
||||||
|
- Maskara
|
||||||
|
- James
|
||||||
|
- Analyst: The analyst will be a team member responsible for managing inbound, helping teams draft proposals, supporting throughout the proposal process. The analyst will also be responsible for creating a summary report for each proposal and a final report reviewing success of the initial grants program along with recommendations for the next iteration. To start, Squid from the Drift ecosystem team will do the analyst role to help better explore what are the requirements for the role and the next steps program overall.
|
||||||
|
- There will be 1 analyst initially. Depending on how the initial proposal goes there may need to be more analysts for future iterations of the grant program depending on the amount of work and the importance of sourcing.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The initial member selection for this proposal was done by looking for contributors and core community members who are motivated and have the skills to excel in their respective positions. Part of the reason for doing a shorter trial grant period was to test run the team and help us figure out what to select for going forward.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#### Compensation
|
||||||
|
The majority of the work will fall onto the analyst and since Squid already works with Drift no compensation is necessary. Given the initial iteration of the grants program is designed to test requirements demand and workflows, the initial workload for the Decision Council is uncertain. For the initial grants program there will be no compensation for the Decision Council.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- Note: We expect the initial grants program to give clarity on workload and flush out expectations for roles. If the grants program is continued or scaled up it is expected that both Analyst and Decision Council roles will be compensated.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Amount:** 100,000 DRIFT
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
We believe 100,000 DRIFT (~$40,000) will be enough to support the upside scenario of grant interest in the next two months. Any Drift not distributed will be returned to the DAO.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#### Use of funds
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- Up to 100,000 Drift will be used to fund proposals supporting the community and ecosystem.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#### Process
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The initial creation of the grants program will be decided upon in the futarchal markets. If passed, the process of approving grants will depend on the size of the grant.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- Community Initiative (Defined as <10,000 DRIFT)
|
||||||
|
- The approval will be fully decided by the Decision Council to retain operational efficiency.
|
||||||
|
- Project (Defined as >10,000 DRIFT)
|
||||||
|
- The approval will be decided by pushing the grant as a proposal in the futarchic markets.
|
||||||
|
- The Decision Council will vote to support these proposals. If supported the Analyst will work to help draft, market and support the proposal through the futarchic markets.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
In both scenarios the team would be responsible for fulfilling the grant commitment and would be expected to support the grantee post approval.
|
||||||
|
|
@ -49,3 +49,51 @@ This represents Drift's first documented use of futarchy for token listing decis
|
||||||
- [[futardio]] - platform hosting the decision market
|
- [[futardio]] - platform hosting the decision market
|
||||||
- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] - this proposal passed with minimal market activity
|
- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] - this proposal passed with minimal market activity
|
||||||
- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] - liquidity concerns explicitly noted as risk factor
|
- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] - liquidity concerns explicitly noted as risk factor
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Full Proposal Text
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Proposal Type**
|
||||||
|
Token Listing Application
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Author(s)**
|
||||||
|
Nallok, Divide
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Preamble**
|
||||||
|
Drift is evaluating the use of futarchy for token listing. Futarchy is a process by which speculative markets make decisions, because markets aggregate information better, reduce bias, and incentivize accuracy versus a standard voting process. Or simply - markets make better decisions.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The goals of the futarchic listing process are i/ to empower the community to surface listings for Drift, ii/ better utilize governance, and iii/ to create a repeatable, lightweight process that will lead to more optimal use of Drift's development and listing resources.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Should this proposal pass, the META token will be prioritised to be listed on Drift for Spot and Perp trading. It will also serve as an experiment to help develop a decentralised listing process using futarchy.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Overview**
|
||||||
|
META is the tokenized representation of MetaDAO, the world's first market-governed organization. This mechanism is called Futarchy and was first created by George Mason University Economist Robin Hanson in 2001. Futarchy, which was first implemented onchain by MetaDAO, is designed to improve governance participation and incentivize more optimal decision-making, leading to better outcomes. The basic idea at the core of futarchy is that speculative markets are better decision-makers than voters. The advantage of using markets compared to traditional voting is that markets aggregate information better, reduce bias, and incentivize accuracy
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Token Utility**
|
||||||
|
META is traded in conditional markets for decision making of the DAO. For every proposal, there's a pass market, where people speculate on what the value of the DAO would be if the proposal passed, and a fail market, where people speculate on what the value of the DAO would be if the proposal failed. Decisions are made based on the prices of these two markets. If the value of META is higher in the pass market than in the fail market, it means the market thinks that the proposal adds value. So it should pass. If the pass market is lower than the fail market, it means the market believes it destroys value. So it should fail.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Why Prioritize This Listing**
|
||||||
|
Historically, governance participation among token holders has been low and the processes to govern have not been user-friendly. To overcome these challenges, MetaDAO uses markets to make decisions, anything that can improve market utilization such as higher liquidity and perpetuals will allow for more information to be encoded into the decision making process. If traders have the ability to go long or short META they will have more capacity to trade the decision markets creating a flywheel between Drift Perps Markets and MetaDAO Decision Markets, ultimately creating more volume, more trades, new users, and better user retention.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Risks**
|
||||||
|
This token has low onchain liquidity and low trading volume. It has limited CEX exposure (only on CoinEX) and it is uncertain if there will be any increase in volume. Therefore, it can be highly volatile and susceptible to price manipulation, which poses a significant risk when offering futures or when used as collateral.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Liquidity Incentives or Programs**
|
||||||
|
If passed and listed, Drift would commit to a 1x multiplier for FUEL in the markets for spot deposits.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Additional Information**
|
||||||
|
MetaDAO is a novel approach to governance that has the potential to reshape how decisions are made on and off chain.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Details**
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
| Token Name | META |
|
||||||
|
| :---- | :---- |
|
||||||
|
| Token Address | METADDFL6wWMWEoKTFJwcThTbUmtarRJZjRpzUvkxhr |
|
||||||
|
| Website | https://metadao.fi |
|
||||||
|
| X Account | MetaDAOProject |
|
||||||
|
| 7d Average Daily Trade Volume | $199.7k |
|
||||||
|
| 30D Volume | $7.4M |
|
||||||
|
| Fully Diluted Value (FDV) | $79.9M |
|
||||||
|
| Markets Requested | Spot, Perps |
|
||||||
|
| Team Doxed | Partially |
|
||||||
|
| Token Launch Date | 2023-11-07 (past) |
|
||||||
|
| Mint Authority Revoked | Yes |
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
113
decisions/internet-finance/sanctum-build-mobile-app-wonder.md
Normal file
113
decisions/internet-finance/sanctum-build-mobile-app-wonder.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
|
||||||
|
---
|
||||||
|
type: decision
|
||||||
|
entity_type: decision_market
|
||||||
|
name: "Sanctum: Should Sanctum build a Sanctum Mobile App (Wonder)?"
|
||||||
|
domain: internet-finance
|
||||||
|
status: failed
|
||||||
|
parent_entity: "[[sanctum]]"
|
||||||
|
platform: "futardio"
|
||||||
|
proposer: "Sanctum team"
|
||||||
|
proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/2frDGSg1frwBeh3bc6R7XKR2wckyMTt6pGXLGLPgoota"
|
||||||
|
proposal_date: 2025-03-28
|
||||||
|
resolution_date: 2025-03-31
|
||||||
|
category: "strategy"
|
||||||
|
summary: "Sanctum proposed building mobile app 'Wonder' as crypto consumer onboarding product — team reserved discretion but put strategic direction to futarchy vote. Failed."
|
||||||
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
|
created: 2026-03-24
|
||||||
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# Sanctum: Should Sanctum build a Sanctum Mobile App (Wonder)?
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Summary
|
||||||
|
Sanctum proposed building a mobile app codenamed "Wonder" — a consumer-facing crypto onboarding product targeting non-speculative users who want yield, community, and a delightful UX. Despite not involving community CLOUD funds, the team put this product direction to futarchy vote as "the largest product decision ever made by the Sanctum team." Core features: automatic yield on assets, gasless trades, fiat offramps, curated project discovery (including potential MetaDAO launchpad integration). Revenue models: AUM fees, swap fees, subscription fees. The proposal failed, suggesting the market preferred the team focus on core B2B staking infrastructure.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Market Data
|
||||||
|
- **Outcome:** Failed
|
||||||
|
- **Proposer:** Sanctum team
|
||||||
|
- **Proposal Account:** 2frDGSg1frwBeh3bc6R7XKR2wckyMTt6pGXLGLPgoota
|
||||||
|
- **Duration:** 2025-03-28 to ~2025-03-31
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Strategic Context
|
||||||
|
- **Opportunity cost acknowledged:** Building mobile app diverts resources from core B2B staking business and institutional liquid staking
|
||||||
|
- **Competitive reference:** Phantom ($3B valuation), Jupiter ($1.7B market cap / $6.2B FDV), MetaMask ($320M swap fees, Consensys $2.3B secondary)
|
||||||
|
- **Target users:** "Good (agentic, integrous, open-minded, earnest) people" — not memecoin traders
|
||||||
|
- **Go-to-market:** Closed beta with top CLOUD stakers (by staking score), invite codes, iterate to find killer feature
|
||||||
|
- **Team reserved discretion** to modify features and go-to-market
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Significance
|
||||||
|
This is the most consequential use of futarchy for strategic product direction rather than treasury allocation. The team explicitly chose to put a major strategic pivot to market vote despite having no obligation to do so ("this is not a proposal that involves community CLOUD funds"). The failure demonstrates futarchy's ability to override team preferences on strategic direction — the market effectively told the team to stay focused on core infrastructure. This supports the claim that [[coin price is the fairest objective function for asset futarchy]] since token holders optimized for protocol value by rejecting a risky pivot.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The "curate the best, most aligned projects — MetaDAO launchpad integration?" bullet is particularly notable as an early signal of Sanctum exploring the MetaDAO ecosystem as a distribution channel.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Relationship to KB
|
||||||
|
- [[sanctum]] — product strategy governance decision
|
||||||
|
- [[coin price is the fairest objective function for asset futarchy]] — market rejected team's strategic preference
|
||||||
|
- [[futarchy-markets-can-reject-solutions-to-acknowledged-problems-when-the-proposed-solution-creates-worse-second-order-effects-than-the-problem-it-solves]] — opportunity cost of pivot outweighed potential
|
||||||
|
- [[sanctum-wonder-mobile-app-proposal-failed-futarchy-vote-march-2025]] — existing claim about this event
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Full Proposal Text
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
*Source: futard.io, tabled 2025-03-28*
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### tl;dr
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
This proposal would empower the Sanctum team to build a Sanctum mobile app, codenamed "Wonder".
|
||||||
|
Even though this is not a proposal that involves community CLOUD funds, this is going to be the largest product decision ever made by the Sanctum team, so we want to put it up to governance vote. We're excited about this direction but still want to gut check with the community.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### what
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Our goal is to onboard more good (agentic, integrous, open-minded, earnest) people onto the magical new world of crypto. Wonder would be a mobile app that maximally serves these users.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Why would these users want to be on chain? They are unlikely to want to trade memecoins. But they would be interested in earning/raising money on crypto to fund their ambitions, holding assets with long-term real yield, and participating, belonging, and interacting with other like-minded people.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Core goals of Wonder:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* to make the new user UX safe and easy (no seed phrases)
|
||||||
|
* to put people first (profiles, not wallet addresses), and
|
||||||
|
* to maximise love, fun, and delight
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(potential) core product features:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* automatically gives you great yields on your assets
|
||||||
|
* shows you how much money you've made from your yield-bearing assets (SOL, JUP, CLOUD, USDC)
|
||||||
|
* gasless trades/transfers
|
||||||
|
* lets you spend and offramp your money via card or bank transfer
|
||||||
|
* curates the best, most aligned projects so you can participate or invest in them
|
||||||
|
* MetaDAO launchpad integration?
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
potential monetisation models:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* AUM fees on deposits
|
||||||
|
* swap fees
|
||||||
|
* subscription fees
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### why
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The Business Case:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* There's immense value in products that touch the end-user. Google, Netflix, Amazon, Zillow, and Expedia all capture substantial value through being "the place the user comes to when they want to explore." Wonder would do the same for crypto.
|
||||||
|
* Abnormal profits come from pricing power. And pricing power comes from consumers having a reason not to switch to alternatives. Consumers, especially in financial services, are sticky and prefer to stick to what they already know.
|
||||||
|
* The market has recognized this opportunity. Phantom recently raised at a $3B valuation. Jupiter trades at a $1.7B market cap and $6.2B FDV. MetaMask made $320M in swap fees and is one of the reasons why Consensys is worth $2.3B in secondary markets.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Team:
|
||||||
|
We have a track record of making things fun, building delightful products, simplifying very complex concepts. We made futarchy fun and accessible. I mean we made liquid staking fun for gods sake.
|
||||||
|
At the same time, we have a reputation for competence and safety — today, Sanctum safeguards over 1B in funds.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Personal:
|
||||||
|
A month ago I saw my 17 year old cousin open up his phone. He was trading TRUMP on Moonshot, looking at his portfolio go from $6 to $4.60 (lol). I was really happy that crypto has conclusively come to the mainstream, but also sad that that was his first experience with crypto.
|
||||||
|
Crypto has a lot more to offer than trading memecoins, but it seems like everyone is focused on building apps for that. I want to build the right introduction to crypto: the app we all deserve, but no one is building.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### go-to-market
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The goal is to build out a minimally delightful product with just one killer feature — but some iteration will be required to find that feature.
|
||||||
|
To get our first users, we'll run a very intimate, high-touch closed beta with our best cloudmen (probably initiated by staking score) — each of them would have some small numbers of invite codes. We'll use that to iterate on the product and find that killer feature.
|
||||||
|
Once we are sure we have a compelling product and hook, we'll look to distribute to the broader crypto audience.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### considerations
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The largest consideration here is opportunity cost. Building this mobile app will require significant resources and will affect to some degree our focus on scale the core business. The alternative is to stay the course and focus solely on growing Sanctum as a B2B staking business or going into institutional liquid staking (more CEXes, building out custodial products, locked SOL, etc.)
|
||||||
|
Other considerations include: building mobile consumer apps is notoriously hard, and value capture is not completely clear, especially if we don't focus on capturing the users which have max trading volumes.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### discretion
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The Sanctum core team reserves the right to change details of the prospective features or go-to-market if we deem it better for the product.
|
||||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
|
||||||
|
---
|
||||||
|
type: decision
|
||||||
|
entity_type: decision_market
|
||||||
|
name: "Sanctum: Should Sanctum change its logo on its website and socials?"
|
||||||
|
domain: internet-finance
|
||||||
|
status: passed
|
||||||
|
parent_entity: "[[sanctum]]"
|
||||||
|
platform: "futardio"
|
||||||
|
proposer: "Sanctum team"
|
||||||
|
proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/7FY4dgYDX8xxwCczrgstUwuNEC9NMV1DWXz31rMnGNTv"
|
||||||
|
proposal_date: 2025-02-03
|
||||||
|
resolution_date: 2025-02-06
|
||||||
|
autocrat_version: "0.3"
|
||||||
|
category: "community"
|
||||||
|
summary: "Fun governance experiment — temporarily change Sanctum logo for one week to familiarize community with futarchy voting UI"
|
||||||
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
|
created: 2026-03-24
|
||||||
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# Sanctum: Should Sanctum change its logo on its website and socials?
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Summary
|
||||||
|
Sanctum's inaugural futarchy proposal (CLOUD-0) — explicitly framed as a "fun proposal" to onboard the community to futarchy governance mechanics. If passed, Sanctum would temporarily change its logo on website and socials to a community-edited version for one week. The proposal passed on 2025-02-06, serving as a low-stakes test of the governance UI before higher-stakes proposals.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Market Data
|
||||||
|
- **Outcome:** Passed
|
||||||
|
- **Proposal Account:** 7FY4dgYDX8xxwCczrgstUwuNEC9NMV1DWXz31rMnGNTv
|
||||||
|
- **Proposal Number:** CLOUD-0 (Sanctum's zeroth governance proposal)
|
||||||
|
- **Duration:** 2025-02-03 to 2025-02-06 (3 days deliberation + 3 days voting)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Significance
|
||||||
|
This proposal is the futarchy equivalent of a "hello world" — a deliberately low-stakes decision designed to teach the community how the governance UI works before real treasury decisions are tabled. The explicit framing ("This is a fun proposal, meant to get people familiar with the Governance UI") demonstrates Sanctum's staged adoption strategy: start with trivial decisions to build muscle memory, then escalate to consequential ones. This mirrors the pattern seen in [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]].
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Relationship to KB
|
||||||
|
- [[sanctum]] — first governance decision (CLOUD-0)
|
||||||
|
- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — deliberate low-stakes onboarding to reduce adoption friction
|
||||||
|
- [[futardio]] — governance platform
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Full Proposal Text
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
*Source: Sanctum governance forum, tabled 2025-02-03*
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
This is a fun proposal, meant to get people familiar with the Governance UI and how Sanctum Governance will work. All proposals have a deliberation process before officially tabled up to governance. This proposal has the following timeline:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- 3 days deliberation
|
||||||
|
- 3 days voting
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CLOUD-0: Should Sanctum change its logo on its website and socials?
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
This proposal would approve the temporary change of the Sanctum logo on its website and socials to the following logo for one week after the successful conclusion of the vote.
|
||||||
|
|
@ -59,3 +59,34 @@ The 30M CLOUD allocation (3% of supply) is substantial, indicating Sanctum's com
|
||||||
- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — explicitly acknowledges and manages adoption friction
|
- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — explicitly acknowledges and manages adoption friction
|
||||||
- staking-lockups-mitigate-keynesian-beauty-contest-in-futarchy-by-forcing-long-term-holder-participation — mechanism rationale
|
- staking-lockups-mitigate-keynesian-beauty-contest-in-futarchy-by-forcing-long-term-holder-participation — mechanism rationale
|
||||||
- active-staking-rewards-incentivize-futarchy-participation-by-compensating-governance-effort-with-token-distributions — mechanism rationale
|
- active-staking-rewards-incentivize-futarchy-participation-by-compensating-governance-effort-with-token-distributions — mechanism rationale
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Full Proposal Text
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
*Source: Sanctum governance forum, tabled 2025-02-06*
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
This proposal would approve the implementation of CLOUD staking and 30M CLOUD (3% of total supply) to fund rewards for staked CLOUD, conditional upon active governance participation ("active staking rewards").
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Why staking?
|
||||||
|
The primary potential failure mode of futarchy is the "Keynesian beauty contest". There is a danger that traders predict not whether the proposal is net positive, but whether or not other people think the proposal is net positive. This can create a self-reinforcing cycle disconnected from reality — leading to a dangerous outcome where policies are passed based on momentum and narrative, not actual value.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
One very promising solution is to use staking; that is, to use staked CLOUD (sCLOUD) as the base asset to participate in the futarchic markets. This staked CLOUD will have a 30 day linearly vesting lockup (linearly vesting means that if you unstake 100 sCLOUD, you will be able to claim ~3.3 CLOUD every day), which will incentivise long-term holders to participate. We believe this will significantly mitigate the Keynesian beauty contest problem.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CLOUD staking could also be used as a separating mechanism to preferentially reward long-term holders in the future. But that's outside the scope of this proposal.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Why active staking rewards?
|
||||||
|
Governance requires time and effort, especially something new like futarchy. By rewarding those who spend their time and effort to participate, we will encourage more participation, which means better decisions overall due to the wisdom of the crowds.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### How would active staking rewards be implemented?
|
||||||
|
We propose to use 30M CLOUD to fund rewards for active governance participants over the next six months.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Voters would get a pro rata share of CLOUD equal to your overall staking score (staked CLOUD amount * time) multiplied by the number of votes you participated in after this proposal. To be counted as participating in a proposal, one must have a minimum trading volume of at least 10 USDC in each proposal, regardless of if it passes or fails.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
We propose to split this 30M CLOUD into two tranches of 15M each and distribute CLOUD quarterly. We plan to distribute the first tranche ~3 months after the passing of this proposal.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### What will happen if this proposal passes?
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
If this proposal passes, we will implement staking and start tracking staked CLOUD balances. Starting from CLOUD-2 (the next proposal after this), voting participation will also be tracked for the purposes of ASR.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
We will eventually transition voting from CLOUD/USDC to sCLOUD/USDC, but whilst governance is still new and confusing for most, we will hold off on this transition for now. We will take a temperature check after a couple of votes and transition once people are comfortable.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
We aim to run new proposals every two weeks, with a one week deliberation period + 3 day voting period.
|
||||||
|
|
@ -45,3 +45,19 @@ Demonstrates futarchy application to treasury-funded growth initiatives where th
|
||||||
- [[sanctum]] - treasury allocation decision
|
- [[sanctum]] - treasury allocation decision
|
||||||
- MetaDAOs-Autocrat-program-implements-futarchy-through-conditional-token-markets-where-proposals-create-parallel-pass-and-fail-universes-settled-by-time-weighted-average-price-over-a-three-day-window - mechanism used
|
- MetaDAOs-Autocrat-program-implements-futarchy-through-conditional-token-markets-where-proposals-create-parallel-pass-and-fail-universes-settled-by-time-weighted-average-price-over-a-three-day-window - mechanism used
|
||||||
- MetaDAOs-futarchy-implementation-shows-limited-trading-volume-in-uncontested-decisions - exemplifies pattern
|
- MetaDAOs-futarchy-implementation-shows-limited-trading-volume-in-uncontested-decisions - exemplifies pattern
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Full Proposal Text
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
*Source: Sanctum governance forum, tabled 2025-03-05*
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
INF has been one of the best SOL-based assets for a long time now. It just slightly underperforms the best available LST on the market but outperforms the two most popular LSTs on Solana, mSOL and jitoSOL.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Despite INF's strong performance, the INF-SOL liquidity isn't deep enough currently. This is a concern for large depositors who wish to exit INF in size. Additionally, If INF is to become the liquidity nexus of Solana for all LSTs, it will require a deep pool of SOL native liquidity. We therefore wish to grow SOL native liquidity by incentivising INF-SOL Kamino vaults.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Why Kamino vaults? More than 95% of existing xSOL-SOL liquidity on AMMs comes from Kamino managed vaults which suggests that users aren't keen to provide liquidity unless their positions are managed by a third-party, and automatically rebalanced.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The INF-SOL Kamino vault strategy has been a great place to park your INF. In fact, the INF-SOL vault has outperformed a 100% INF HODL strategy, most likely because of the very high capital velocity (high trading volume relative to TVL).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The industry standard is to offer LPs a 15% combined (fees + incentives combined) annual yield. To incentivise initial liquidity even more, we propose to offer LPs a 20% yield for the first month, then dropping to 15% henceforth. Depending on TVL increase/decrease and price of CLOUD, the Kamino team will be in charge of guaranteeing a 15% APY on up to $2.5M TVL, or until 2.5M CLOUD is exhausted, whichever comes first.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Assuming the $2.5M TVL cap is reached, incentives should last 6 months at least.
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -42,3 +42,52 @@ This proposal represents a test case for futarchy-governed treasury management w
|
||||||
- [[defiance-capital]] - proposing entity
|
- [[defiance-capital]] - proposing entity
|
||||||
- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] - governance mechanism used
|
- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] - governance mechanism used
|
||||||
- [[futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate governance scaffolding for treasury operations because market mechanisms alone cannot provide operational security and legal compliance]] - treasury management pattern
|
- [[futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate governance scaffolding for treasury operations because market mechanisms alone cannot provide operational security and legal compliance]] - treasury management pattern
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Full Proposal Text
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
*Source: futard.io, tabled 2025-10-22*
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**TLDR**
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DeFiance Capital proposes to purchase 5% (13.7m CLOUD) of the CLOUD community reserve tokens. As a long-term strategic partner since 2021, we aim to deepen our commitment to Sanctum while continuing to provide strategic value through our extensive network in both crypto and TradFi sectors.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Summary**
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
This proposal outlines DeFiance Capital's intention to purchase CLOUD tokens directly from the Sanctum community reserve. Our multi-year partnership has consistently delivered value through capital deployment, strategic introductions, and ecosystem development. This acquisition represents a natural progression of our relationship and aligns our interests further with the Sanctum community's long-term success.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**About DeFiance Capital**
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Founded by Arthur Cheong (@Arthur_0x), DeFiance Capital is a prominent crypto investment firm with a strong footprint globally. The firm specializes in liquid token investments with high growth potential, driven by a thesis-based, fundamentally grounded approach.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Background & Partnership History**
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DeFiance Capital and Sanctum have maintained a strong strategic partnership since 2021. Our relationship began with our initial investment in Sanctum, where we not only provided capital but also leveraged our network to connect the team with other major funds, helping to establish Sanctum's position in the ecosystem.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**On-going Contributions**
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* **LST Partnership Development**: Facilitated key introductions between Sanctum and various Solana DATs (Digital Asset Treasuries), enabling strategic LST partnerships.
|
||||||
|
* **Market Exposure**: Actively encouraged the team to present CLOUD at industry events and worked collaboratively to refine their pitch.
|
||||||
|
* **Strategic Advisory**: Ongoing guidance on positioning and growth strategy within the Solana ecosystem.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Future Value Addition**
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1. **Institutional Promotion**: Active promotion of Sanctum's products to extensive network of crypto funds and traditional finance institutions.
|
||||||
|
2. **DAT Integration**: Facilitate seamless integration with all major DATs.
|
||||||
|
3. **Strategic Advisory**: Continue providing strategic guidance on product development, partnerships, and market positioning.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Acquisition Terms**
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* **Amount**: 13.7M CLOUD (5% of Community Reserve supply)
|
||||||
|
* **Price**: $0.12 (30-day TWAP at proposal submission)
|
||||||
|
* **Payment Currency:** USDC
|
||||||
|
* **Payment to**: Sanctum Community Reserve
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Use of Proceeds**
|
||||||
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|
||||||
|
The cash raised will be transferred to Sanctum's Community Reserve to accelerate ecosystem development and strengthen operational capabilities.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Transparency & Governance**
|
||||||
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|
||||||
|
* All transactions executed fully on-chain
|
||||||
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* Complete transparency of token acquisition and holdings
|
||||||
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* Adherence to all governance processes established by Sanctum
|
||||||
|
|
@ -37,3 +37,15 @@ This proposal represents an alternative approach to the token vesting hedgeabili
|
||||||
- [[time-based-token-vesting-is-hedgeable-making-standard-lockups-meaningless-as-alignment-mechanisms-because-investors-can-short-sell-to-neutralize-lockup-exposure-while-appearing-locked]] - alternative mechanism to hedging
|
- [[time-based-token-vesting-is-hedgeable-making-standard-lockups-meaningless-as-alignment-mechanisms-because-investors-can-short-sell-to-neutralize-lockup-exposure-while-appearing-locked]] - alternative mechanism to hedging
|
||||||
- [[futarchy-adoption-faces-friction-from-token-price-psychology-proposal-complexity-and-liquidity-requirements]] - demonstrates complexity friction
|
- [[futarchy-adoption-faces-friction-from-token-price-psychology-proposal-complexity-and-liquidity-requirements]] - demonstrates complexity friction
|
||||||
- [[MetaDAOs-futarchy-implementation-shows-limited-trading-volume-in-uncontested-decisions]] - low volume uncontested decision pattern
|
- [[MetaDAOs-futarchy-implementation-shows-limited-trading-volume-in-uncontested-decisions]] - low volume uncontested decision pattern
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Full Proposal Text
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
*Source: futard.io, tabled 2025-08-20*
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
9% of token supply from investors is currently unlocking monthly for next 24 months.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
This proposal would empower the Sanctum Team to offer investors immediate unlocks of their vesting CLOUD, forfeiting 35% of their CLOUD to the Team Reserve (which the team undertakes not to redistribute for at least the next 24 months).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The net result would be an increase of up to 27 million additional CLOUD to the Team Reserve & a decreased token overhang.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Read the full proposal here https://research.sanctum.so/t/cloud-005-should-sanctum-offer-investors-early-unlocks-of-their-cloud-under-deliberation/1793
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
7
inbox/queue/2026-01-13-nasaa-clarity-act-concerns.md
Normal file
7
inbox/queue/2026-01-13-nasaa-clarity-act-concerns.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
|
||||||
|
---
|
||||||
|
title: NASAA Clarity Act Concerns
|
||||||
|
domain: internet-finance
|
||||||
|
extraction_notes: ""
|
||||||
|
enrichments_applied: []
|
||||||
|
...
|
||||||
|
---
|
||||||
Loading…
Reference in a new issue