auto-fix: strip 23 broken wiki links

Pipeline auto-fixer: removed [[ ]] brackets from links
that don't resolve to existing claims in the knowledge base.

inbox/queue/2026-04-30-bnef-bess-pipeline-cooling-interconnection-binding.md

@@ -55,8 +55,8 @@ Both can be partially true. The most current evidence (EIA 2026 forecast of 24.3
 **What I expected but didn't find:** Expected to find evidence that the pipeline cooling was IRA/tariff driven (policy risk causing developer pullback). Found that interconnection queue congestion is the primary cited reason — which is a more tractable constraint (queue reform, not politics).
 
 **KB connections:**
-- [[knowledge embodiment lag means technology is available decades before organizations learn to use it optimally]] — the grid operator side of this is a real embodiment lag: interconnection processes were designed for large thermal plants, not distributed solar+storage additions
-- [[designing coordination rules is categorically different from designing coordination outcomes]] — FERC interconnection reform is an attempt to redesign the rules, not just the outcomes
+- knowledge embodiment lag means technology is available decades before organizations learn to use it optimally — the grid operator side of this is a real embodiment lag: interconnection processes were designed for large thermal plants, not distributed solar+storage additions
+- designing coordination rules is categorically different from designing coordination outcomes — FERC interconnection reform is an attempt to redesign the rules, not just the outcomes
 
 **Extraction hints:**
 - CLAIM CANDIDATE: "The battery storage interconnection queue has become the binding constraint on US renewable deployment following the cost threshold crossing, with 377 GW queued but only ~20% expected to reach commercial operation on projected timelines"
@@ -66,6 +66,6 @@ Both can be partially true. The most current evidence (EIA 2026 forecast of 24.3
 **Context:** BNEF's Sustainable Energy in America Factbook is their flagship annual US energy report, released in partnership with BCSE (Business Council for Sustainable Energy). It's the primary industry reference for US energy transition data.
 
 ## Curator Notes (structured handoff for extractor)
-PRIMARY CONNECTION: [[the energy transition's binding constraint is storage and grid integration, not generation]] (this is the second half of Belief 9's prediction being confirmed empirically)
+PRIMARY CONNECTION: the energy transition's binding constraint is storage and grid integration, not generation (this is the second half of Belief 9's prediction being confirmed empirically)
 WHY ARCHIVED: Provides the nuanced counterpoint to the EIA deployment record — deployment is accelerating but the future pipeline is showing constraint signals. Together with the EIA archive, this tells the complete story of how threshold crossing triggers deployment then hits the next constraint.
 EXTRACTION HINT: Pair with the EIA 2026 BESS record archive. The claim is: "crossing the storage cost threshold shifted the binding constraint from equipment economics to grid interconnection capacity — exactly as Belief 9's structure predicts."

inbox/queue/2026-04-30-boston-dynamics-atlas-ces2026-hyundai-google-deployment.md

@@ -56,8 +56,8 @@ tags: [Atlas, Boston-Dynamics, humanoid-robots, Hyundai, Google-DeepMind, Gemini
 **What I expected but didn't find:** Expected Google DeepMind to provide Atlas deployment specifics (how many units, what tasks). Their deployment appears to be R&D (integrating Gemini Robotics models) rather than production — so Atlas for Google is a research platform, not an industrial deployment. This is different from Figure/BMW.
 
 **KB connections:**
-- [[three conditions gate AI takeover risk: autonomy, robotics, and production chain control]] — the Gemini Robotics integration with Atlas is the most direct evidence that the robotics condition is being pursued through AI foundation model integration
-- [[knowledge embodiment lag means technology is available decades before organizations learn to use it optimally]] — the 2-year RMAC training gap between "production-ready" and "production-deployed" is a micro-instance of the embodiment lag pattern at the single-robot level
+- three conditions gate AI takeover risk: autonomy, robotics, and production chain control — the Gemini Robotics integration with Atlas is the most direct evidence that the robotics condition is being pursued through AI foundation model integration
+- knowledge embodiment lag means technology is available decades before organizations learn to use it optimally — the 2-year RMAC training gap between "production-ready" and "production-deployed" is a micro-instance of the embodiment lag pattern at the single-robot level
 
 **Extraction hints:**
 - CLAIM CANDIDATE: "The humanoid robotics deployment lag — the gap between 'production-ready hardware' and 'deployed in production' — is 2-3 years, as evidenced by Boston Dynamics Atlas (CES 2026: production-ready; HMGMA deployment: 2028) and Figure AI (commercial agreement 2024; first production deployment 2025)"
@@ -69,6 +69,6 @@ tags: [Atlas, Boston-Dynamics, humanoid-robots, Hyundai, Google-DeepMind, Gemini
 **Context:** Hyundai owns a controlling stake in Boston Dynamics, making the HMGMA deployment a captive customer relationship rather than a competitive arms-length contract. This is a different commercial structure than Figure/BMW (which is a paid external customer). The captive structure reduces deployment risk but limits the commercial signal.
 
 ## Curator Notes (structured handoff for extractor)
-PRIMARY CONNECTION: [[robotics is the binding constraint on AI's physical-world impact]] (Atlas deployment timeline and Gemini Robotics integration are direct evidence of the robotics-AI gap being addressed)
+PRIMARY CONNECTION: robotics is the binding constraint on AI's physical-world impact (Atlas deployment timeline and Gemini Robotics integration are direct evidence of the robotics-AI gap being addressed)
 WHY ARCHIVED: The CES 2026 announcement and Hyundai RMAC timeline provide the most complete picture of Atlas's deployment roadmap. The 2028 production task deployment date (not 2026) is the key data point that grounds the humanoid robotics timeline.
 EXTRACTION HINT: Focus on the 2-year deployment lag (hardware ready → production ready), the three-way competitive structure, and the captive vs. commercial customer distinction (Hyundai owns Boston Dynamics; BMW is independent commercial customer for Figure).

inbox/queue/2026-04-30-eia-bess-24gw-2026-deployment-record.md

@@ -52,8 +52,8 @@ Sources: EIA Today in Energy February 2026; ESS News (BNEF confirmation) Februar
 **What I expected but didn't find:** Expected to find more evidence that the deployment surge was happening IN RESPONSE to the price crossing (causal link). What I found is deployment correlation with the price crossing, but the causal chain requires the BNEF interconnection queue data (separate archive) to show that interconnection — not equipment cost — is now the binding constraint.
 
 **KB connections:**
-- [[power is the binding constraint on all space operations]] — same binding-constraint pattern: as one constraint is lifted (equipment cost), the next one (interconnection) becomes binding
-- [[knowledge embodiment lag means technology is available decades before organizations learn to use it optimally]] — BUT this may be the disconfirmation: deployment IS following the price signal quickly (not with decades of lag)
+- power is the binding constraint on all space operations — same binding-constraint pattern: as one constraint is lifted (equipment cost), the next one (interconnection) becomes binding
+- knowledge embodiment lag means technology is available decades before organizations learn to use it optimally — BUT this may be the disconfirmation: deployment IS following the price signal quickly (not with decades of lag)
 
 **Extraction hints:**
 - CLAIM CANDIDATE: "Battery storage crossed the $100/kWh activation threshold in 2024-2025, triggering a deployment surge that confirms the threshold model: US utility-scale storage additions accelerated from 9 GW (2024) to 15.2 GW (2025) to 24.3 GW planned (2026)"

inbox/queue/2026-04-30-figure-ai-bmw-commercial-model-gate1b-confirmed.md

@@ -57,8 +57,8 @@ BMW Group announced "Center of Competence for Physical AI in Production" — acc
 **What I expected but didn't find:** Expected to find Figure AI disclosing the economics of the BMW engagement more clearly — whether they're making money or losing money at $1,000/month. This remains opaque. The subscription model exists and BMW is paying, but whether it covers cost is undisclosed.
 
 **KB connections:**
-- [[three conditions gate AI takeover risk autonomy robotics and production chain control and current AI satisfies none of them]] — Figure 02's 1,250 hours at BMW shows robotics IS being added to production chain control in unstructured environments
-- [[the atoms-to-bits spectrum positions industries between defensible-but-linear and scalable-but-commoditizable]] — RaaS pricing model is the atoms-to-bits sweet spot: physical robots generate manipulation data, software improves, customers pay recurring fee for software-improved hardware
+- three conditions gate AI takeover risk autonomy robotics and production chain control and current AI satisfies none of them — Figure 02's 1,250 hours at BMW shows robotics IS being added to production chain control in unstructured environments
+- the atoms-to-bits spectrum positions industries between defensible-but-linear and scalable-but-commoditizable — RaaS pricing model is the atoms-to-bits sweet spot: physical robots generate manipulation data, software improves, customers pay recurring fee for software-improved hardware
 
 **Extraction hints:**
 - CLAIM CANDIDATE: "Humanoid robots entered commercial deployment in automotive manufacturing in 2025 with Figure AI's BMW contract ($1,000/robot/month RaaS) establishing the first paid commercial structure — Gate 1b (commercial viability) but not yet Gate 2 (ROI-positive at scale)"
@@ -67,6 +67,6 @@ BMW Group announced "Center of Competence for Physical AI in Production" — acc
 **Context:** Figure AI was founded in 2022 by Brett Adcock. BMW Manufacturing is one of the most sophisticated auto plants in North America. The Spartanburg plant produces all BMW X3, X4, X5, X6, X7 models — it's BMW's largest plant globally by volume. The choice of Spartanburg (not a pilot facility) is significant.
 
 ## Curator Notes (structured handoff for extractor)
-PRIMARY CONNECTION: [[three conditions gate AI takeover risk autonomy robotics and production chain control]] (the inverse — three conditions also gate AI's POSITIVE physical-world impact, and robotics is now beginning to close the gap)
+PRIMARY CONNECTION: three conditions gate AI takeover risk autonomy robotics and production chain control (the inverse — three conditions also gate AI's POSITIVE physical-world impact, and robotics is now beginning to close the gap)
 WHY ARCHIVED: Confirms the commercial structure for humanoid robotics exists (Gate 1b), resolving yesterday's branching point about whether the BMW deployment was a paid commercial contract. The Gate 1b vs Gate 1a distinction matters for when to expect ROI-positive deployment.
 EXTRACTION HINT: Extractor should focus on: (1) commercial structure confirmed (Gate 1b); (2) BMW institutional commitment (follow-on to Leipzig signals category adoption, not experiment); (3) economics still opaque (Gate 2 not yet confirmed).

inbox/queue/2026-04-30-form-energy-iron-air-first-commercial-deployment-2025.md

@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ Installed LDES capacity: 2.4 GW (2024) → forecast 18.5 GW by 2030
 **What I expected but didn't find:** Expected to find Form Energy disclosing the installed cost of the Google/Xcel deployment. The $20/kWh is a TARGET — not confirmed as the deployed cost for this first commercial project. Early commercial deployments are typically priced above target to cover learning curve costs.
 
 **KB connections:**
-- [[the energy transition's binding constraint is storage and grid integration, not generation]] — LDES addresses the long-duration gap that LFP BESS doesn't fill; the constraint on seasonal storage is chemistry + cost, not generation
+- the energy transition's binding constraint is storage and grid integration, not generation — LDES addresses the long-duration gap that LFP BESS doesn't fill; the constraint on seasonal storage is chemistry + cost, not generation
 - Belief 12 (nuclear renaissance + AI demand): Previous session confirmed LDES not competitive with nuclear for AI demand. Form Energy's deployment here is consistent — it's grid support + data center backup, not primary AI training load.
 
 **Extraction hints:**
@@ -69,6 +69,6 @@ Installed LDES capacity: 2.4 GW (2024) → forecast 18.5 GW by 2030
 **Context:** Form Energy raised ~$1B+ since 2021. Google and Xcel are two of the most sophisticated clean energy buyers in the US. Their choice of Form Energy for a real deployment (not just a pilot) is a strong signal, but the first commercial deployment is always the highest-cost and lowest-efficiency point on the learning curve.
 
 ## Curator Notes (structured handoff for extractor)
-PRIMARY CONNECTION: [[the energy transition's binding constraint is storage and grid integration, not generation]]
+PRIMARY CONNECTION: the energy transition's binding constraint is storage and grid integration, not generation
 WHY ARCHIVED: First commercial deployment of multi-day battery storage changes the LDES landscape — this is no longer a theoretical technology. But the economics remain unproven at the scale needed to address seasonal storage or AI demand.
 EXTRACTION HINT: Focus on the technology milestone (first commercial deployment, not a pilot) but scope the claim carefully — iron-air is proven deployable, not proven economic at scale. The VC funding paradox is important context.

inbox/queue/2026-04-30-new-glenn-ng3-be3u-thrust-investigation-ongoing.md

@@ -57,8 +57,8 @@ Despite NG-3 grounding, Blue Origin filed for Cape Canaveral Pad 2 (April 9) and
 **What I expected but didn't find:** Expected Blue Origin to have provided a clearer investigation timeline. The "15 days to 3 months" range for investigation duration is too wide to be useful for planning purposes. The silence on timeline suggests Blue Origin doesn't know how long it will take, which is itself a signal that the root cause is not yet identified.
 
 **KB connections:**
-- [[China is the only credible peer competitor in space]] — NG-3 grounding + Starship IFT-12 delay means BOTH non-SpaceX capable US heavy-lift vehicles are simultaneously constrained
-- [[space governance gaps are widening]] — investigation/grounding dynamics are a governance process; the pattern of simultaneous multi-vehicle groundings creates systemic launch availability risk
+- China is the only credible peer competitor in space — NG-3 grounding + Starship IFT-12 delay means BOTH non-SpaceX capable US heavy-lift vehicles are simultaneously constrained
+- space governance gaps are widening — investigation/grounding dynamics are a governance process; the pattern of simultaneous multi-vehicle groundings creates systemic launch availability risk
 - the ISRU prerequisite chain (multiple prior session archives): BE-3U thrust deficiency affects Blue Moon MK1 timeline, which affects VIPER delivery, which affects lunar water characterization
 
 **Extraction hints:**

inbox/queue/2026-04-30-spacex-ipo-s1-starlink-revenue-margins-ipo-details.md

@@ -57,11 +57,11 @@ tags: [SpaceX, IPO, Starlink, revenue, margins, valuation, subscribers, S-1, fly
 **KB connections:**
 - [[SpaceX vertical integration across launch broadband and manufacturing creates compounding cost advantages that no competitor can replicate piecemeal]] — the $11.4B / 63% margins NUMBER is the empirical confirmation of this claim
 - mega-constellations create a demand flywheel for launch services — Starlink's 160 launches/year demand is now financially quantified: $11.4B revenue requires constant maintenance/expansion
-- [[launch cost reduction is the keystone variable that unlocks every downstream space industry]] — Starlink's margins fund Starship's development; the flywheel is financially self-sustaining
+- launch cost reduction is the keystone variable that unlocks every downstream space industry — Starlink's margins fund Starship's development; the flywheel is financially self-sustaining
 
 **Extraction hints:**
 - CLAIM CANDIDATE: "Starlink's $11.4 billion revenue and 63% gross margins as disclosed in SpaceX's April 2026 S-1 filing provide the financial foundation for the SpaceX flywheel thesis — the satellite constellation generates sufficient recurring revenue to fund launch cost reduction and Starship development without external capital"
-- UPDATE NEEDED: [[SpaceX vertical integration]] claim should be enriched with the $11.4B/63% data point
+- UPDATE NEEDED: SpaceX vertical integration claim should be enriched with the $11.4B/63% data point
 - FLAG: Musk's 79% voting control from 42% equity is a corporate governance risk that amplifies single-player dependency — the concentration risk isn't just technological (SpaceX = only capable provider) but political (Musk = sole decision-maker through super-voting)
 
 **Context:** The S-1 public filing in late April 2026 means IPO is real and imminent (June target). Institutional investors are now doing due diligence. The financial disclosures are audited. $11.4B Starlink revenue is a confirmed number, not an estimate.

inbox/queue/2026-04-30-spacex-xai-merger-orbital-data-center-constellation.md

@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ China already has two operational/pre-operational orbital computing programs (Th
 
 **KB connections:**
 - [[SpaceX vertical integration across launch broadband and manufacturing creates compounding cost advantages that no competitor can replicate piecemeal]] — this claim needs updating: vertical integration now extends to AI models and orbital compute
-- [[the atoms-to-bits spectrum positions industries between defensible-but-linear and scalable-but-commoditizable]] — SpaceX-xAI is the new paradigm case
+- the atoms-to-bits spectrum positions industries between defensible-but-linear and scalable-but-commoditizable — SpaceX-xAI is the new paradigm case
 - China Three-Body and Orbital Chenguang archives (previous sessions) — now explicitly competing programs
 
 **Extraction hints:**

inbox/queue/2026-04-30-spacex-xai-orbital-dc-skeptical-analysis-ipo-narrative.md

@@ -57,9 +57,9 @@ The sequence: FCC filing January 30 → xAI acquisition February 2 → IPO filin
 **What I expected but didn't find:** Expected to find SpaceX or xAI responding to the radiation hardening challenge in technical filings. Found no public response. This silence is notable — either they have a proprietary solution not yet disclosed, or the technical challenges are acknowledged internally as medium-term problems.
 
 **KB connections:**
-- [[SpaceX vertical integration across launch broadband and manufacturing creates compounding cost advantages]] — the skeptical analysis suggests orbital compute is currently NOT within SpaceX's vertical integration moat; it requires capabilities (radiation-hardened chips, thermal management at scale) that SpaceX doesn't possess and can't replicate piecemeal
-- [[orbital debris is a classic commons tragedy]] — 1M satellites dwarfs current Starlink constellation (6,000 active); the debris footprint and astronomy impact are governance problems
-- [[the megastructure launch sequence may be economically self-bootstrapping]] — orbital data centers are a different path to the same "infrastructure that justifies Starship cadence" goal
+- SpaceX vertical integration across launch broadband and manufacturing creates compounding cost advantages — the skeptical analysis suggests orbital compute is currently NOT within SpaceX's vertical integration moat; it requires capabilities (radiation-hardened chips, thermal management at scale) that SpaceX doesn't possess and can't replicate piecemeal
+- orbital debris is a classic commons tragedy — 1M satellites dwarfs current Starlink constellation (6,000 active); the debris footprint and astronomy impact are governance problems
+- the megastructure launch sequence may be economically self-bootstrapping — orbital data centers are a different path to the same "infrastructure that justifies Starship cadence" goal
 
 **Extraction hints:**
 - DIVERGENCE CANDIDATE: "SpaceX-xAI orbital data center constellation represents either (A) the atoms-to-bits sweet spot at planetary scale — space-based AI compute that leverages SpaceX's unique launch cost advantage — or (B) an IPO narrative mechanism that inflates SpaceX's valuation by conflating the acquisition with a business model that faces fundamental unsolved technical challenges (radiation hardening, thermal management, latency)"

inbox/queue/2026-04-30-starship-ift12-may-2026-target-faa-gate.md

@@ -51,8 +51,8 @@ SpaceX holds FCC dual-license covering Flights 12 AND 13, valid through June 28,
 **What I expected but didn't find:** Expected to find confirmation that the FAA investigation is closed. Multiple sources indicate it remains open. The investigation timelines across prior Starship flights ranged from weeks to months, making May 2026 achievable but not certain.
 
 **KB connections:**
-- [[Starship achieving routine operations at sub-100 dollars per kg]] — V3's maiden flight is the first test of this claim's underlying vehicle performance
-- [[the space launch cost trajectory is a phase transition not a gradual decline]] — V3's maiden flight is the next data point on the cost trajectory
+- Starship achieving routine operations at sub-100 dollars per kg — V3's maiden flight is the first test of this claim's underlying vehicle performance
+- the space launch cost trajectory is a phase transition not a gradual decline — V3's maiden flight is the next data point on the cost trajectory
 
 **Extraction hints:**
 - UPDATE to existing IFT-12 archive (2026-04-25): V3 static fires complete, FAA investigation still open as of April 30