rio: extract from 2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md
- Source: inbox/archive/2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md - Domain: internet-finance - Extracted by: headless extraction cron (worker 4) Pentagon-Agent: Rio <HEADLESS>
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@ -82,6 +82,12 @@ Futardio cult launch (2026-03-03 to 2026-03-04) demonstrates MetaDAO's platform
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(challenge) Areal's failed Futardio launch ($11,654 raised of $50K target, REFUNDING status) demonstrates that futarchy-governed fundraising does not guarantee capital formation success. The mechanism provides credible exit guarantees through market-governed liquidation and governance quality through conditional markets, but market participants still evaluate project fundamentals and team credibility. Futarchy reduces rug risk but does not eliminate market skepticism of unproven business models or early-stage teams.
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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The Meta-PoW proposal (passed 2025-11-10) demonstrates MetaDAO's expansion beyond simple fundraising into complex economic mechanism design. COAL's Meta-PoW implements a multi-token system (COAL, ORE, INGOT, WOOD) with dynamic pricing, decay mechanics, and treasury management—all governed through futarchy. The proposal explicitly allows 'parameters to be slightly adjusted by the core team before launch, upon feedback from the community,' showing how futarchy governance extends into implementation details, not just binary funding decisions. This represents MetaDAO enabling not just capital formation but entire economic protocol design through prediction markets.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -32,6 +32,12 @@ The connection to futarchy governance is important. Since [[MetaDAOs Autocrat pr
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- If performance metrics are poorly chosen, dynamic minting could be more inflationary than fixed schedules, diluting holders during periods of metric gaming
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- Without robust oracle or futarchy verification of performance claims, this reduces to governance theater with extra steps
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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Meta-PoW implements a hybrid emission model that combines fixed halving bands with dynamic access control. COAL has a fixed max supply of 25,000,000 with emissions halving every 5% of supply added (R_t = R_0 * 2^(-k_t), starting at 11,250 COAL/day). However, access to these emissions is gated by pickaxe ownership, and pickaxe crafting costs scale dynamically with the ORE/COAL price ratio through the license fee c(y) = 200 * (y/50)^3. This creates a system where total emissions are predetermined but distribution is performance-based: only players who can economically justify the crafting cost and maintain their tools receive emissions. The proposal states: 'When COAL strengthens, crafting scales up, more picks come online... If COAL weakens, crafting slows without breaking the system.' This demonstrates how fixed emission schedules can be combined with dynamic access gating to achieve performance-based distribution without changing the total supply curve.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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---
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type: claim
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domain: internet-finance
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description: "COAL's Meta-PoW uses 4% daily decay and repair costs 82% cheaper than recrafting to incentivize tool maintenance over churn"
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confidence: experimental
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source: "Futardio proposal G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg, Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol, 2025-11-07"
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created: 2026-03-11
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---
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# Meta-PoW implements evergreen tool economics where repair cost is cheaper than recrafting creating stable demand for INGOT and ORE treasury inflow
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COAL's Meta-PoW protocol introduces "evergreen" pickaxe mechanics where tools never permanently break but decay by 4% per day if not repaired. The daily repair cost is calibrated at 0.082643 INGOT plus 0.3 WOOD, which is significantly cheaper than the full crafting cost of 1 INGOT plus 8 WOOD plus a dynamic COAL license fee c(y).
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This cost differential creates a strong economic incentive for rational players to maintain existing tools rather than constantly recrafting. The proposal explicitly states: "Tools are evergreen and cheaper to repair than to recraft, so players maintain their gear instead of churning it."
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The evergreen design serves two strategic purposes:
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**1. Stable treasury inflow**: Because each fully maintained pickaxe is calibrated to drive approximately 1 ORE per day of smelting demand into the COAL treasury, and players maintain rather than churn tools, the number of active picks becomes a stable state variable that predicts ORE accumulation. The proposal notes: "In equilibrium: ORE per day to the treasury is approximately equal to the number of active, fully repaired picks."
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**2. Reduced system volatility**: By making repair the dominant strategy, the protocol avoids boom-bust cycles of mass crafting and abandonment that would create unpredictable swings in INGOT demand and ORE treasury flows.
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The 4% daily decay rate is carefully chosen: it's steep enough to require regular maintenance (creating consistent INGOT demand) but gradual enough that players who skip a few days can catch up by paying accumulated repair costs rather than losing the tool entirely. The proposal states: "If you decide to repair later, you pay the accumulated repair cost (INGOT + WOOD for each missed day) to restore full power. This makes tools evergreen (no permanent break)."
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This represents a novel approach to tokenomic stability in proof-of-work systems, where the economic incentive structure creates predictable resource flows without requiring hard caps or arbitrary lockups.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]]
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- [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]]
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Topics:
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- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
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---
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type: claim
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domain: internet-finance
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description: "All ORE enters COAL treasury exclusively through INGOT smelting at rate μ ≈ 12.10 ORE per INGOT with zero ORE charged at craft or repair"
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confidence: experimental
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source: "Futardio proposal G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg, Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol, 2025-11-07"
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created: 2026-03-11
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---
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# Meta-PoW separates ORE payment to smelting only creating single choke point for treasury inflow measurement and governance
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COAL's Meta-PoW protocol concentrates all ORE treasury inflows at a single point: INGOT smelting. The proposal explicitly states: "ORE enters only at smelt. No ORE is charged at craft or repair."
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The smelting process requires:
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- Burn 100 COAL
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- Pay μ ORE to the COAL treasury (currently calibrated at μ ≈ 12.10 ORE per INGOT)
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- Receive 1 INGOT
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This architectural choice creates several strategic advantages:
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**1. Transparent treasury accounting**: Because ORE only enters through one mechanism, the total ORE inflow is directly measurable as total INGOT minted × μ. There are no hidden flows or complex multi-path accounting. The proposal notes: "INGOT is the on-chain proof of COAL burn plus ORE fee."
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**2. Single governance parameter**: The treasury inflow rate can be adjusted by changing μ alone, rather than coordinating changes across multiple fee structures. The proposal states: "μ is chosen so a fully maintained pick maps to roughly 1 ORE/day of smelt-driven inflow."
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**3. Predictable demand modeling**: Since INGOT is consumed by tool crafting and repair at known rates, and tools decay predictably, the protocol can estimate future ORE inflows based on the number of active pickaxes and axes. The proposal calibrates the system so that "each active, fully repaired pick is designed to support approximately 1 ORE per day of inflow to the treasury" through the repair cost of 0.082643 INGOT/day.
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**4. Clean separation of concerns**:
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- COAL license fees (c(y)) regulate activity through burn, not revenue
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- ORE fees (μ) fund the treasury
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- INGOT serves as on-chain proof of both COAL burn and ORE payment
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This represents a novel approach to treasury design in tokenomic systems, where concentrating value capture at a single choke point enables simpler governance and more reliable forecasting than distributed fee structures.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]]
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- [[ownership coin treasuries should be actively managed through buybacks and token sales as continuous capital calibration not treated as static war chests]]
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Topics:
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- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
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---
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type: claim
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domain: internet-finance
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description: "License fee c(y) = 200 * (y/50)^3 clamped between 1-300 COAL makes pickaxe crafting expensive when COAL weakens and cheap when COAL strengthens"
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confidence: experimental
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source: "Futardio proposal G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg, Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol, 2025-11-07"
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created: 2026-03-11
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---
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# Meta-PoW uses dynamic COAL license fees as macro throttle where crafting cost scales with ORE-COAL price ratio creating self-regulating treasury inflow
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COAL's Meta-PoW protocol implements a dynamic pickaxe crafting license fee that automatically adjusts based on the ORE/COAL price ratio, creating a self-regulating mechanism that throttles mining activity in response to market conditions.
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The license fee formula is:
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- c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^p
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- Where y = P_ORE / P_COAL (using EMA-smoothed TWAP)
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- Default parameters: c0 = 200 COAL, y_ref = 50, p = 3
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- Clamped between c_min = 1 and c_max = 300 COAL
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This creates asymmetric economic pressure:
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**When COAL strengthens relative to ORE (y decreases):**
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- License fee drops (potentially to the 1 COAL floor)
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- Pickaxe crafting becomes economically attractive
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- More players craft tools and enter mining
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- Increased INGOT demand drives more smelting
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- More ORE flows into the treasury
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**When COAL weakens relative to ORE (y increases):**
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- License fee rises (potentially to the 300 COAL cap)
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- Pickaxe crafting becomes prohibitively expensive
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- New player entry slows
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- INGOT demand stabilizes around existing tool maintenance
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- ORE inflow naturally throttles without breaking the system
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The proposal states: "When COAL strengthens, crafting scales up, more picks come online, more INGOT gets smelted, and more ORE flows into the treasury. If COAL weakens, crafting slows without breaking the system."
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The cubic exponent (p = 3) creates strong sensitivity to price movements, making the throttle responsive while the clamps prevent extreme values that could completely halt or flood the system.
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Critically, the license fee is burned COAL, not sent to the treasury. The proposal states: "The license is paid in COAL only. That COAL is burned, not sent to the treasury. It is a control parameter, not a revenue stream." This means the mechanism regulates activity through cost rather than extracting value, and the ORE treasury inflow comes entirely from smelting fees, not from the license.
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This represents a novel approach to tokenomic stability where the protocol uses price-responsive costs to create negative feedback loops that stabilize treasury inflows across market cycles.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]]
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- [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]]
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Topics:
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- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
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---
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type: entity
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entity_type: decision_market
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name: "COAL: Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol"
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domain: internet-finance
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status: passed
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parent_entity: "[[futardio]]"
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platform: "futardio"
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proposer: "coal project team"
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proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg"
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proposal_date: 2025-11-07
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resolution_date: 2025-11-10
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category: "mechanism"
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summary: "Introduces Meta-PoW economic model with evergreen tools, dynamic crafting costs, and ORE treasury accumulation through INGOT smelting"
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tracked_by: rio
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created: 2026-03-11
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---
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# COAL: Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol
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## Summary
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The Meta-PoW proposal establishes COAL's core economic model by introducing a multi-token system (COAL, ORE, INGOT, WOOD) where mining power resides in pickaxes rather than direct computation. The system creates a deterministic loop: players forge INGOT using COAL and ORE, craft pickaxes using COAL, INGOT, and WOOD, then mine COAL with those pickaxes. All ORE payments flow exclusively through INGOT smelting into the COAL treasury at a rate of approximately 12.10 ORE per INGOT.
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The proposal implements "evergreen" tool mechanics where pickaxes decay by 4% per day if not repaired but can always be restored by paying accumulated repair costs. Repair is calibrated to be significantly cheaper than recrafting (0.082643 INGOT/day vs 1 INGOT upfront), incentivizing tool maintenance over churn.
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A dynamic license fee c(y) = 200 * (y/50)^3 (clamped 1-300 COAL) scales pickaxe crafting costs with the ORE/COAL price ratio, creating a self-regulating throttle: when COAL strengthens, crafting becomes cheaper and more ORE flows into the treasury; when COAL weakens, crafting slows without breaking the system.
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## Market Data
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- **Outcome:** Passed
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- **Proposer:** coal project team
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- **Proposal Account:** G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg
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- **DAO Account:** 3LGGRzLrgwhEbEsNYBSTZc5MLve1bw3nDaHzzfJMQ1PG
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- **Completed:** 2025-11-10
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## Significance
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This proposal represents a novel approach to proof-of-work tokenomics where:
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1. **Treasury inflow is deterministic**: Each fully maintained pickaxe is calibrated to drive approximately 1 ORE/day into the treasury through repair-driven INGOT demand
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2. **Price-responsive throttling**: The dynamic license fee creates negative feedback loops that stabilize activity across market cycles without requiring governance intervention
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3. **Single choke point accounting**: Concentrating all ORE payments at smelting enables transparent treasury tracking and simple governance parameter tuning
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4. **Evergreen tool economics**: Making repair cheaper than recrafting creates stable demand patterns and reduces system volatility
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The proposal explicitly allows "parameters to be slightly adjusted by the core team before launch, upon feedback from the community," showing how futarchy governance extends into implementation details.
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## Relationship to KB
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- [[futardio]] - governance decision
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- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]]
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- [[dynamic performance-based token minting replaces fixed emission schedules by tying new token creation to measurable outcomes creating algorithmic meritocracy in token distribution]]
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@ -46,6 +46,8 @@ MetaDAO's token launch platform. Implements "unruggable ICOs" — permissionless
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- **2026-03-07** — Areal DAO launch: $50K target, raised $11,654 (23.3%), REFUNDING status by 2026-03-08 — first documented failed futarchy-governed fundraise on platform
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- **2026-03-04** — [[seekervault]] fundraise launched targeting $75,000, closed next day with only $1,186 (1.6% of target) in refunding status
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- **2025-11-07** — [[coal-meta-pow-ore-treasury-protocol]] proposed: Meta-PoW economic model with evergreen tools and ORE treasury accumulation
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- **2025-11-10** — [[coal-meta-pow-ore-treasury-protocol]] passed: COAL adopts Meta-PoW as core economic model
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## Competitive Position
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- **Unique mechanism**: Only launch platform with futarchy-governed accountability and treasury return guarantees
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- **vs pump.fun**: pump.fun is memecoin launch (zero accountability, pure speculation). Futardio is ownership coin launch (futarchy governance, treasury enforcement). Different categories despite both being "launch platforms."
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@ -6,9 +6,15 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuA
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date: 2025-11-07
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domain: internet-finance
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format: data
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status: unprocessed
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status: processed
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tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
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event_type: proposal
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processed_by: rio
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processed_date: 2026-03-11
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claims_extracted: ["meta-pow-implements-evergreen-tool-economics-where-repair-cost-is-cheaper-than-recrafting-creating-stable-demand-for-ingot-and-ore-treasury-inflow.md", "meta-pow-uses-dynamic-coal-license-fees-as-macro-throttle-where-crafting-cost-scales-with-ore-coal-price-ratio-creating-self-regulating-treasury-inflow.md", "meta-pow-separates-ore-payment-to-smelting-only-creating-single-choke-point-for-treasury-inflow-measurement-and-governance.md"]
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enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md", "dynamic performance-based token minting replaces fixed emission schedules by tying new token creation to measurable outcomes creating algorithmic meritocracy in token distribution.md"]
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extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
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extraction_notes: "Extracted 3 mechanism design claims about evergreen tool economics, dynamic license fees, and single-choke-point treasury architecture. Created decision_market entity for the proposal itself. Enriched existing claims about MetaDAO's platform capabilities and dynamic emission models. The proposal demonstrates futarchy governance extending into complex economic protocol design, not just binary funding decisions."
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---
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## Proposal Details
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@ -265,3 +271,19 @@ Vote NO – keep the current model unchanged.
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- Autocrat version: 0.3
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- Completed: 2025-11-10
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- Ended: 2025-11-10
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## Key Facts
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- COAL max supply: 25,000,000 tokens
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- COAL halving bands: every 5% of max supply (1,250,000 COAL)
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- Initial daily emissions: 11,250 COAL/day
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- INGOT smelting cost: 100 COAL + 12.10 ORE
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- Pickaxe crafting: 1 INGOT + 8 WOOD + c(y) COAL license
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- Daily pickaxe repair: 0.082643 INGOT + 0.3 WOOD
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- Tool decay rate: 4% per day if not repaired
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- License fee formula: c(y) = 200 * (y/50)^3, clamped 1-300 COAL
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- Axe crafting: 1 INGOT + 6 WOOD
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- Daily axe repair: 0.082643 INGOT + 0.25 WOOD
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- Proposal account: G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg
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- DAO account: 3LGGRzLrgwhEbEsNYBSTZc5MLve1bw3nDaHzzfJMQ1PG
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- Autocrat version: 0.3
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