teleo/teleo-codex
8
0
Fork 0
Code Issues 22 Pull requests 11 Projects Releases Packages Wiki Activity Actions 1

auto-fix: strip 2 broken wiki links

Browse source 
Pipeline auto-fixer: removed [[ ]] brackets from links
that don't resolve to existing claims in the knowledge base.
This commit is contained in:
Teleo Agents 2026-03-16 13:01:15 +00:00
parent ee187021c9
commit 5bade0082e
2 changed files with 2 additions and 2 deletions
Show stats Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

2
domains/internet-finance/Polymarket vindicated prediction markets over polling in 2024 US election.md
View file

@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ This empirical proof connects to [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limite
### Additional Evidence (extend)
*Source: [[2026-01-20-polymarket-cftc-approval-qcx-acquisition]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
*Source: 2026-01-20-polymarket-cftc-approval-qcx-acquisition | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
Post-election vindication translated into sustained product-market fit: monthly volume hit $2.6B by late 2024, recently surpassed $1B in weekly trading volume (January 2026), and the platform is targeting a $20B valuation. Polymarket achieved US regulatory compliance through a $112M acquisition of QCX (a CFTC-regulated DCM and DCO) in January 2026, establishing prediction markets as federally-regulated derivatives rather than state-regulated gambling. However, Nevada Gaming Control Board sued Polymarket in late January 2026 over sports prediction contracts, creating a federal-vs-state jurisdictional conflict that remains unresolved. To address manipulation concerns, Polymarket partnered with Palantir and TWG AI to build surveillance systems detecting suspicious trading patterns, screening participants, and generating compliance reports shareable with regulators and sports leagues. The Block reports the prediction market space 'exploded in 2025,' with both Polymarket and Kalshi (the two dominant platforms) targeting $20B valuations.

2
inbox/archive/2026-02-00-cftc-prediction-market-rulemaking.md
View file

@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ Sidley Austin analysis (February 2026):
**Why this matters:** CFTC rulemaking is the most promising near-term resolution to the state-federal prediction market crisis. If the CFTC establishes clear rules encompassing governance prediction markets, futarchy can operate under a single federal framework.
**What surprised me:** The speed — imminent rulemaking signal in Feb 2026, while litigation is still ongoing. The CFTC is trying to establish facts on the ground before courts resolve the jurisdiction question.
**What I expected but didn't find:** Specific scope of proposed rulemaking — does it cover all event contracts or only specific categories? The distinction matters enormously for futarchy.
**KB connections:** [[Polymarket vindicated prediction markets over polling in 2024 US election]] — Polymarket's success is what triggered both state pushback and CFTC defense. [[Optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]] — regulatory framework determines which mechanisms are legally available.
**KB connections:** [[Polymarket vindicated prediction markets over polling in 2024 US election]] — Polymarket's success is what triggered both state pushback and CFTC defense. Optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles — regulatory framework determines which mechanisms are legally available.
**Extraction hints:** Claim about CFTC rulemaking as resolution path for futarchy regulation.
**Context:** Sidley Austin is a major law firm with strong CFTC practice. Their analysis carries weight.