auto-fix: strip 8 broken wiki links

Pipeline auto-fixer: removed [[ ]] brackets from links
that don't resolve to existing claims in the knowledge base.

agents/leo/musings/research-2026-03-18.md

@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ CLAIM CANDIDATE: "The technology-coordination gap is economically self-reinforci
 - Confidence: experimental
 - Grounding: Catalini verification bandwidth (foundational), Theseus governance tier list (empirical), METR productivity perception gap (empirical), Anthropic RSP rollback under competitive pressure (case evidence)
 - Domain: grand-strategy (coordination failure mechanism)
-- Related: [[technology advances exponentially but coordination mechanisms evolve linearly]], [[only binding regulation with enforcement teeth changes frontier AI lab behavior]]
+- Related: technology advances exponentially but coordination mechanisms evolve linearly, only binding regulation with enforcement teeth changes frontier AI lab behavior
 - Boundary: This mechanism applies to AI governance specifically. Other coordination domains (climate, pandemic response) may have different economics.
 
 ### Finding 3: The Krier Challenge — The Most Genuine Counter-Evidence

inbox/queue/2026-03-18-leo-krier-coasean-challenge-to-belief-1.md

@@ -62,12 +62,12 @@ Is there empirical evidence of AI-enabled coordination improvements in non-catas
 **What I expected but didn't find:** Evidence that the Krier model is being implemented anywhere. The "Matryoshkan governance" architecture is a proposal, not a deployed system. MetaDAO's futarchy is the closest empirical case — but futarchy is precisely a catastrophic risk adjacent governance mechanism (DAO governance), not a mundane commercial coordination mechanism. And MetaDAO is facing existential regulatory threat.
 
 **KB connections:**
-- [[coordination failures arise from individually rational strategies that produce collectively irrational outcomes]] — Krier's model addresses this specifically for the Coasean bargaining case
+- coordination failures arise from individually rational strategies that produce collectively irrational outcomes — Krier's model addresses this specifically for the Coasean bargaining case
 - [[AI agents as personal advocates collapse Coasean transaction costs enabling bottom-up coordination at societal scale but catastrophic risks remain non-negotiable requiring state enforcement as outer boundary]] — this claim already exists in ai-alignment! The Krier source was already processed. But the GRAND-STRATEGY implication — the bifurcation between catastrophic and non-catastrophic domains — may not be captured in that claim.
-- [[mechanism design enables incentive-compatible coordination]] — Krier's model IS mechanism design at scale
+- mechanism design enables incentive-compatible coordination — Krier's model IS mechanism design at scale
 
 **Extraction hints:**
-- Check whether the existing claim [[AI agents as personal advocates collapse Coasean transaction costs...]] already captures this or if the bifurcation hypothesis is a new enrichment
+- Check whether the existing claim AI agents as personal advocates collapse Coasean transaction costs... already captures this or if the bifurcation hypothesis is a new enrichment
 - If the bifurcation (catastrophic vs non-catastrophic coordination domains) is not in the existing claim, it's an enrichment worth adding
 - Grand-strategy claim: "AI-enabled coordination improvement is domain-limited to non-catastrophic transactions, leaving the catastrophic risk coordination deficit unaddressed because Coasean bargaining requires outer-layer state enforcement that is simultaneously failing"
 - This is likely an enrichment of the existing Krier claim, not a standalone

inbox/queue/2026-03-18-leo-verification-gap-coordination-mechanism.md

@@ -46,13 +46,13 @@ Leo cross-domain synthesis: combining Catalini's "verification bandwidth" econom
 
 **KB connections:**
 - [[technology advances exponentially but coordination mechanisms evolve linearly creating a widening gap]] — this is the Catalini mechanism's economic grounding
-- [[only binding regulation with enforcement teeth changes frontier AI lab behavior]] — empirical confirmation of the prediction
-- [[mechanism design enables incentive-compatible coordination]] — the positive implication: coordination IS possible, but only through mechanism design that changes incentives, not through appeals to actor preferences
+- only binding regulation with enforcement teeth changes frontier AI lab behavior — empirical confirmation of the prediction
+- mechanism design enables incentive-compatible coordination — the positive implication: coordination IS possible, but only through mechanism design that changes incentives, not through appeals to actor preferences
 
 **Extraction hints:**
 - Primary claim: "The technology-coordination gap is economically self-reinforcing because AI execution costs fall to zero while human verification bandwidth remains fixed, creating market equilibria that systematically select for unverified deployment regardless of individual actor intentions."
 - Confidence: experimental (mechanism is coherent and has empirical support, but needs more evidence — historical analogues, case studies of verification debt accumulation)
-- This could enrich the grounding of [[technology advances exponentially but coordination mechanisms evolve linearly]] with a specific economic mechanism
+- This could enrich the grounding of technology advances exponentially but coordination mechanisms evolve linearly with a specific economic mechanism
 - May also be a standalone claim in grand-strategy domain if the mechanism is novel enough
 
 ## Curator Notes