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domains/internet-finance/optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles.md

@@ -13,11 +13,11 @@ The instinct when designing governance is to find the best mechanism and apply i
 
 The mixed-mechanism approach deploys three complementary tools. Meritocratic voting handles daily operational decisions where speed and broad participation matter and manipulation risk is low. Prediction markets aggregate distributed knowledge for medium-stakes decisions where probabilistic estimates are valuable. Futarchy provides maximum manipulation resistance for critical decisions where the consequences of corruption are severe. Since [[futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders]], reserving it for high-stakes decisions concentrates its protective power where it matters most.
 
-The interaction between mechanisms creates its own value. Each mechanism generates different data: voting reveals community preferences, prediction markets surface distributed knowledge, futarchy stress-tests decisions through market forces. Organizations can compare outcomes across mechanisms and continuously refine which tool to deploy when. This creates a positive feedback loop of governance learning. Since [[recursive improvement is the engine of human progress because we get better at getting better]], mixed-mechanism governance enables recursive improvement of decision-making itself.
+The interaction between mechanisms creates its own value. Each mechanism generates different data: voting reveals community preferences, prediction markets surface distributed knowledge, futarchy stress-tests decisions through market forces. Organizations can compare outcomes across mechanisms and continuously refine which tool to deploy when. This creates a positive feedback loop of governance learning. Since recursive improvement is the engine of human progress because we get better at getting better, mixed-mechanism governance enables recursive improvement of decision-making itself.
 
 
 ### Additional Evidence (extend)
-*Source: [[2025-02-10-futardio-proposal-addy-dao-proposal]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
+*Source: 2025-02-10-futardio-proposal-addy-dao-proposal | Added: 2026-03-16*
 
 Testing proposals that explicitly disable trading represent a third category beyond high-stakes and low-stakes decisions: operational maintenance decisions where market mechanisms provide no value and may create confusion. This suggests optimal governance architectures need non-market pathways for system administration.
 
@@ -31,11 +31,11 @@ The agent notes explicitly connect this to mechanism choice: 'regulatory classif
 
 Relevant Notes:
 - [[futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders]] -- provides the high-stakes layer of the mixed approach
-- [[recursive improvement is the engine of human progress because we get better at getting better]] -- mixed mechanisms enable recursive improvement of governance
+- recursive improvement is the engine of human progress because we get better at getting better -- mixed mechanisms enable recursive improvement of governance
 - [[collective superintelligence is the alternative to monolithic AI controlled by a few]] -- the three-layer architecture requires governance mechanisms at each level
-- [[dual futarchic proposals between protocols create skin-in-the-game coordination mechanisms]] -- dual proposals extend the mixing principle to cross-protocol coordination through mutual economic exposure
-- [[the Vickrey auction makes honesty the dominant strategy by paying winners the second-highest bid rather than their own]] -- the Vickrey auction demonstrates that mechanism design can eliminate strategic computation entirely, illustrating why different mechanisms have different manipulation profiles
-- [[mechanism design changes the game itself to produce better equilibria rather than expecting players to find optimal strategies]] -- the theoretical foundation: optimal governance mixes mechanisms because each mechanism reshapes the game differently for different decision types
+- dual futarchic proposals between protocols create skin-in-the-game coordination mechanisms -- dual proposals extend the mixing principle to cross-protocol coordination through mutual economic exposure
+- the Vickrey auction makes honesty the dominant strategy by paying winners the second-highest bid rather than their own -- the Vickrey auction demonstrates that mechanism design can eliminate strategic computation entirely, illustrating why different mechanisms have different manipulation profiles
+- mechanism design changes the game itself to produce better equilibria rather than expecting players to find optimal strategies -- the theoretical foundation: optimal governance mixes mechanisms because each mechanism reshapes the game differently for different decision types
 - [[governance mechanism diversity compounds organizational learning because disagreement between mechanisms reveals information no single mechanism can produce]] -- extends this note's risk-management framing: beyond matching mechanism to context, mechanism diversity compounds meta-learning about decision-making itself
 
 Topics:

inbox/archive/2026-02-00-prediction-market-jurisdiction-multi-state.md

@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
 **Why this matters:** The circuit split is the clearest signal this reaches SCOTUS. The outcome will determine whether prediction markets (and by extension futarchy governance markets) operate under a single federal framework or 50-state patchwork.
 **What surprised me:** The Tennessee ruling's broad interpretation — even a 3-hour football game qualifies as an "event" under CEA. This expansive reading, if upheld, would clearly encompass futarchy governance proposals.
 **What I expected but didn't find:** Analysis of how this specifically applies to non-sports prediction markets like futarchy governance markets. All litigation focuses on sports contracts. Governance markets may not trigger state gaming commission attention in the same way.
-**KB connections:** [[Optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]] — regulatory classification may end up being the binding constraint on mechanism choice, not manipulation risk.
+**KB connections:** Optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles — regulatory classification may end up being the binding constraint on mechanism choice, not manipulation risk.
 **Extraction hints:** Claim about circuit split and Supreme Court path. Distinction between sports and governance prediction markets.
 **Context:** Multiple law firms (Holland & Knight, Epstein Becker Green, Sidley Austin, Stinson) published analysis in Feb 2026 — this is generating significant legal attention.