rio: extract claims from 2026-03-05-futardio-launch-insert-coin-labs.md
- Source: inbox/archive/2026-03-05-futardio-launch-insert-coin-labs.md - Domain: internet-finance - Extracted by: headless extraction cron Pentagon-Agent: Rio <HEADLESS>
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Teleo Agents
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@ -64,6 +64,12 @@ Raises include: Ranger ($6M minimum, uncapped), Solomon ($102.9M committed, $8M
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**Three-tier dispute resolution:** Protocol decisions via futarchy (on-chain), technical disputes via review panel, legal disputes via JAMS arbitration (Cayman Islands). The layered approach means on-chain governance handles day-to-day decisions while legal mechanisms provide fallback. Since [[MetaDAOs three-layer legal hierarchy separates formation agreements from contractual relationships from regulatory armor with each layer using different enforcement mechanisms]], the governance and legal structures are designed to work together.
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2026-03-05-futardio-launch-insert-coin-labs]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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Insert Coin Labs launched on Futard.io (MetaDAO ecosystem platform) on 2026-03-05, attempting to raise $50K minimum. The launch committed only $2,508 and entered refunding status, demonstrating that the platform enforces minimum viability thresholds automatically. This is a live example of the 'unruggable ICO' mechanism in production: the raise failed to meet its minimum, and the platform automatically refunded investors rather than allowing an undercapitalized launch. The project had already shipped a live game (Domin8: 232 games played, 55.1 SOL volume, audited by Excalead) before attempting the raise, showing that Futard.io is being used by teams with demonstrated traction and shipped products, not just speculative projects.
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -38,6 +38,12 @@ Three credible voices arrived at this framing independently in February 2026: @c
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- Permissionless capital formation without investor protection is how scams scale — since [[futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent]], the protection mechanisms are still early and unproven at scale
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- The "solo founder" era may be temporary — as AI tools mature, team formation may re-emerge as the bottleneck shifts from building to distribution
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2026-03-05-futardio-launch-insert-coin-labs]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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Insert Coin Labs is a small web3 gaming studio (team of devs, game designer, concept artist) that launched a permissionless $50K raise on Futard.io with no VC backing. Their pitch explicitly states: 'No VC money. No marketing. No hype. Just a game, deployed, played by real people wagering real SOL.' They had already shipped a live game (Domin8: 232 games, 55.1 SOL volume, audited smart contracts) before attempting the raise. This is a concrete example of a small team using crypto for capital formation to fund continued development (10-month runway at $4K/month burn rate) rather than for payments or store of value. The raise failed to meet its $50K minimum and refunded, but the attempt itself demonstrates the permissionless capital formation use case—a team that would have no access to traditional fundraising channels.
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@ -22,6 +22,12 @@ The Hurupay raise on MetaDAO (Feb 2026) provides direct evidence of these compou
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Yet [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] suggests these barriers might be solvable through better tooling, token splits, and proposal templates rather than fundamental mechanism changes. The observation that [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]] implies futarchy could focus on high-stakes decisions where the benefits justify the complexity.
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2026-03-05-futardio-launch-insert-coin-labs]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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Insert Coin Labs explicitly chose futarchy to avoid the complexity friction they observed in other web3 gaming projects: 'We didn't want complex tokenomics driving our decisions. Futarchy puts the market in charge. If the community thinks a decision is bad for the project, the market says so.' This suggests that for some teams, futarchy is perceived as simpler than alternative governance mechanisms (token voting, multisig, complex tokenomics), not more complex. However, their raise failed to attract sufficient capital ($2,508 vs $50K minimum), which could indicate that the market did not understand or trust the futarchy mechanism, or simply that the project lacked sufficient traction. The friction may be on the investor side (understanding futarchy) rather than the team side (implementing it)—suggesting that adoption friction is primarily informational/educational rather than technical.
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@ -46,6 +46,12 @@ Critically, the proposal nullifies a prior 90-day restriction on buybacks/liquid
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- "Material misrepresentation" is a legal concept being enforced by a market mechanism without legal discovery, depositions, or cross-examination — the evidence standard is whatever the market accepts
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- The 90-day restriction nullification, while demonstrating adaptability, also shows that governance commitments can be overridden — which cuts both ways for investor confidence
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2026-03-05-futardio-launch-insert-coin-labs]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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Insert Coin Labs raise on Futard.io demonstrates a complementary enforcement mechanism: automatic refunds when minimum raise thresholds are not met. The project set a $50K minimum, committed only $2,508, and automatically entered 'Refunding' status. This shows that futarchy platforms enforce credibility at two stages: (1) at the fundraising gate via minimum thresholds with automatic refunds (prevents undercapitalized launches), and (2) post-launch via liquidation markets when teams breach commitments (handles post-launch misrepresentation). The minimum threshold mechanism is a pre-commitment device that eliminates the scenario where a project launches with insufficient capital.
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
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---
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type: claim
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domain: internet-finance
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description: "Futarchy-governed fundraising platforms enforce minimum viability thresholds with automatic refunds, demonstrated by Insert Coin Labs raise on Futard.io"
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confidence: experimental
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source: "Futard.io Insert Coin Labs launch, 2026-03-05"
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created: 2026-03-11
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depends_on: ["futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent"]
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---
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# Futarchy-governed fundraises enable refund mechanisms when minimum thresholds fail, creating credible commitment to viability gates
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Futarchy-based fundraising platforms can implement automatic refund mechanisms tied to minimum viability thresholds, preventing undercapitalized launches and eliminating investor risk of being trapped in failed raises.
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Insert Coin Labs launched on Futard.io with a $50,000 minimum raise target. The project committed only $2,508 (5% of minimum) and automatically entered "Refunding" status when the threshold was not met. The refund was automatic and market-governed rather than requiring team discretion or investor coordination.
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This mechanism operates at the fundraising gate, preventing launches that lack market validation. It is distinct from but complementary to futarchy-governed liquidation (which handles post-raise misrepresentation). The minimum threshold refund prevents the scenario where a project raises some capital but not enough to execute, leaving early investors stranded.
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## Evidence
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- Insert Coin Labs set $50,000 minimum target on Futard.io
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- Total committed: $2,508 (5% of minimum)
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- Status: "Refunding" (launch closed 2026-03-06, one day after opening)
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- No discretionary decision required — threshold mechanism is automatic
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- Project had already shipped live product (Domin8: 232 games played, 55.1 SOL volume) before attempting raise, indicating the platform is used by teams with demonstrated traction
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## Relationship to Existing Claims
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This extends the "unruggable ICO" thesis by showing that futarchy platforms can enforce viability gates at the fundraising stage, not just post-launch accountability.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent]]
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- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]]
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Topics:
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- [[internet-finance]]
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@ -36,6 +36,12 @@ The "Claude Code founders" framing is significant. The solo AI-native builder
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- Since [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]], the friction hasn't been fully eliminated — it's been shifted from gatekeeper access to market participation complexity
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- Survivorship bias risk: we see the successful fast raises, not the proposals that sat with zero commitment
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2026-03-05-futardio-launch-insert-coin-labs]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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Insert Coin Labs launched a $50K raise on Futard.io on 2026-03-05 and closed (in refunding status) by 2026-03-06—a one-day fundraising cycle. The team had already shipped a live product (Domin8 on Solana mainnet: 232 games, 55.1 SOL volume, audited smart contracts) and went directly to market with a public raise. No VC pitches, no roadshow, no gatekeeper approval required. The raise failed to meet its minimum and refunded automatically, but the speed of the cycle (launch to resolution in 24 hours) confirms the compression thesis. The market made a funding decision in one day that would take months in traditional capital markets.
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---
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@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
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---
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type: claim
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domain: internet-finance
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description: "Insert Coin Labs explicitly rejects complex tokenomics to avoid serving the token instead of players"
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confidence: experimental
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source: "Insert Coin Labs fundraise pitch, Futard.io 2026-03-05"
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created: 2026-03-11
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secondary_domains: ["entertainment"]
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---
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# Web3 gaming studios face structural incentive misalignment when token economics become more complex than game mechanics
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Insert Coin Labs identifies a failure mode in web3 gaming: "Most web3 game studios ship tokenomics so complex that the team ends up serving the token, not the players."
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This suggests that token design complexity creates principal-agent problems where studio attention shifts from game quality and player experience to token price management and tokenomics maintenance. The studio becomes accountable to token price rather than to gameplay, inverting the value creation hierarchy.
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Insert Coin Labs' response is architectural: they use futarchy for governance ("We didn't want complex tokenomics driving our decisions. Futarchy puts the market in charge") and make $INSERT represent studio ownership rather than in-game credits. This separates game mechanics from governance mechanics.
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The claim is that complexity itself—not just bad tokenomics—creates the misalignment. When tokenomics require constant tuning and rebalancing, studio attention flows to token management rather than game development.
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## Evidence
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- Insert Coin Labs pitch: "Most web3 game studios ship one game, raise money, and disappear. Or they build tokenomics so complex that the team ends up serving the token, not the players."
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- Their solution: "$INSERT represents ownership of the studio, not in-game credits. Revenue flows back to holders."
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- Governance choice: "We didn't want complex tokenomics driving our decisions. Futarchy puts the market in charge."
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- Demonstrated traction: Domin8 live on mainnet with 232 games played, 55.1 SOL volume, audited smart contracts—shipped before attempting fundraise
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## Limitations
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This is a single team's stated design philosophy, not empirical evidence of the failure mode. The claim that complexity causes misalignment is asserted, not demonstrated. Comparative data on studio outcomes correlated with tokenomics complexity would be needed to validate this.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]]
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- [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]]
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Topics:
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- [[internet-finance]]
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- [[entertainment]]
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@ -6,9 +6,15 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/launch/62Yxd8gLQ2YYmY2TifhChJG4tVdf4b1oAHcMfwTL2WUu"
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date: 2026-03-05
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domain: internet-finance
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format: data
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status: unprocessed
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status: processed
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tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana]
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event_type: launch
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processed_by: rio
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processed_date: 2026-03-11
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claims_extracted: ["futarchy-governed-fundraises-enable-refund-mechanisms-when-minimum-thresholds-fail-creating-credible-commitment-to-viability-gates.md", "web3-gaming-studios-face-structural-incentive-misalignment-when-token-economics-become-more-complex-than-game-mechanics.md"]
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enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md", "futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent.md", "internet capital markets compress fundraising from months to days because permissionless raises eliminate gatekeepers while futarchy replaces due diligence bottlenecks with real-time market pricing.md", "cryptos primary use case is capital formation not payments or store of value because permissionless token issuance solves the fundraising bottleneck that solo founders and small teams face.md", "futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md"]
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extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
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extraction_notes: "Two new claims extracted: (1) futarchy-governed refund mechanisms at minimum threshold gates, and (2) tokenomics complexity creating misalignment in web3 gaming. Five enrichments to existing claims around MetaDAO/futarchy infrastructure, capital formation speed, and adoption friction. The failed raise provides concrete evidence of both the refund mechanism working as designed and potential friction in futarchy adoption (either investor understanding or project traction). The team's explicit rejection of complex tokenomics in favor of futarchy governance is a notable data point on mechanism selection reasoning."
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## Launch Details
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@ -117,3 +123,12 @@ We didn't want complex tokenomics driving our decisions. Futarchy puts the marke
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- Token mint: `32CPstBmwccnLoaUqkqiiMVg1nKrQ3YGcM43vFAimeta`
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- Version: v0.7
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- Closed: 2026-03-06
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## Key Facts
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- Insert Coin Labs raised $2,508 of $50,000 minimum target (2026-03-05)
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- Domin8 game: 232 games played, 55.1 SOL volume, +2.7 SOL house profit
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- Smart contracts audited by Excalead, Honorable Mention at Solana Breakpoint 2025
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- Proposed burn rate: $4K/month ($2.5K team, $1K marketing, $500 ops)
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- Raise allocation: 80% team ($40K), 20% liquidity pool ($10K)
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- Launch closed in refunding status 2026-03-06
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