diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/amm-futarchy-bootstraps-liquidity-through-high-fee-incentives-and-required-proposer-initial-liquidity-creating-self-reinforcing-depth.md b/domains/internet-finance/amm-futarchy-bootstraps-liquidity-through-high-fee-incentives-and-required-proposer-initial-liquidity-creating-self-reinforcing-depth.md
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@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: "Proposer-locked initial liquidity plus 3-5% LP fees create incentive for liquidity provision that grows over proposal duration"
+confidence: experimental
+source: "MetaDAO AMM proposal by joebuild, 2024-01-24"
+created: 2024-01-24
+---
+
+# AMM futarchy bootstraps liquidity through high fee incentives and required proposer initial liquidity creating self-reinforcing depth
+
+The proposed AMM futarchy design solves the cold-start liquidity problem through two mechanisms:
+
+1. **Proposer commitment**: "These types of proposals would also require that the proposer lock-up some initial liquidity, and set the starting price for the pass/fail markets."
+
+2. **High fee LP incentives**: 3-5% swap fees that "encourage LPs" to provide additional liquidity
+
+The expected liquidity trajectory is: "Liquidity would start low when the proposal is launched, someone would swap and move the AMM price to their preferred price, and then provide liquidity at that price since the fee incentives are high. Liquidity would increase over the duration of the proposal."
+
+This creates a self-reinforcing cycle where:
+- Initial proposer liquidity enables first trades
+- High fees from those trades attract additional LPs
+- Increased liquidity makes manipulation more expensive (see liquidity-weighted pricing)
+- More liquidity attracts more trading volume
+- Higher volume generates more fee revenue for LPs
+
+The mechanism addresses the "lack of liquidity" problem identified with CLOBs, where "estimating a fair price for the future value of MetaDao under pass/fail conditions is difficult, and most reasonable estimates will have a wide range. This uncertainty discourages people from risking their funds with limit orders near the midpoint price."
+
+Rated experimental because this is a proposed design not yet deployed. The liquidity bootstrapping logic is sound but requires real-world validation.
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md
+- futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md
+- MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md
+
+Topics:
+- domains/internet-finance/_map
+- core/mechanisms/_map
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/amm-futarchy-reduces-state-rent-costs-from-135-225-sol-annually-to-near-zero-by-replacing-clob-market-pairs.md b/domains/internet-finance/amm-futarchy-reduces-state-rent-costs-from-135-225-sol-annually-to-near-zero-by-replacing-clob-market-pairs.md
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+++ b/domains/internet-finance/amm-futarchy-reduces-state-rent-costs-from-135-225-sol-annually-to-near-zero-by-replacing-clob-market-pairs.md
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: "AMM architecture eliminates the 3.75 SOL per market pair state rent cost that CLOBs require, reducing annual costs from 135-225 SOL to near-zero"
+confidence: proven
+source: "MetaDAO proposal by joebuild, 2024-01-24"
+created: 2024-01-24
+---
+
+# AMM futarchy reduces state rent costs from 135-225 SOL annually to near-zero by replacing CLOB market pairs
+
+MetaDAO's CLOB-based futarchy implementation incurs 3.75 SOL in state rent per pass/fail market pair, which cannot be recouped under the current system. At 3-5 proposals per month, this creates annual costs of 135-225 SOL ($11,475-$19,125 at January 2024 prices). AMM implementations cost "almost nothing in state rent" because they use simpler state structures.
+
+This cost reduction is structural, not marginal—the CLOB architecture requires order book state that scales with market depth, while AMMs only track pool reserves and cumulative metrics. The proposal notes that state rent can be recouped by "permissionlessly closing the AMMs and returning the state rent SOL once there are no positions," creating a complete cost recovery mechanism unavailable to CLOBs.
+
+The 94-99% cost reduction (from 135-225 SOL to near-zero) makes futarchy economically viable at higher proposal frequencies, removing a constraint on governance throughput.
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md
+- MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md
+
+Topics:
+- domains/internet-finance/_map
+- core/mechanisms/_map
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-solves-futarchy-manipulation-through-wash-trading-costs-because-high-fees-make-price-movement-expensive.md b/domains/internet-finance/liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-solves-futarchy-manipulation-through-wash-trading-costs-because-high-fees-make-price-movement-expensive.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..9dd266b6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-solves-futarchy-manipulation-through-wash-trading-costs-because-high-fees-make-price-movement-expensive.md
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: "3-5% swap fees combined with liquidity-weighted averaging make wash trading prohibitively expensive as a manipulation mechanism in futarchy AMMs"
+confidence: experimental
+source: "MetaDAO AMM proposal by joebuild, 2024-01-24"
+created: 2024-01-24
+---
+
+# Liquidity-weighted price over time solves futarchy manipulation through wash trading costs because high fees make price movement expensive
+
+MetaDAO's proposed AMM futarchy uses "liquidity-weighted price over time" as the settlement metric, where "the more liquidity that is on the books, the more weight the current price of the pass or fail market is given." This is paired with 3-5% swap fees that "aggressively discourage wash-trading and manipulation."
+
+The mechanism works because:
+1. Moving price requires swaps that pay the high fee
+2. The liquidity weighting means manipulation attempts when liquidity is high are both expensive (large swaps needed) and heavily weighted in the final calculation
+3. The fee revenue accrues to LPs, creating a natural defender class that profits from manipulation attempts
+
+The proposal explicitly contrasts this with CLOB vulnerabilities: "With CLOBs there is always a bid/ask spread, and someone with 1 $META can push the midpoint towards the current best bid/ask" and "VWAP can be manipulated by wash trading."
+
+This is rated experimental rather than proven because the mechanism has not yet been deployed or tested against real manipulation attempts. The theoretical argument is sound but requires empirical validation.
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders.md
+- MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md
+- optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles.md
+
+Topics:
+- domains/internet-finance/_map
+- core/mechanisms/_map
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/seyf-futardio-fundraise-raised-200-against-300000-target-signaling-near-zero-market-traction-for-ai-native-wallet-concept.md b/domains/internet-finance/seyf-futardio-fundraise-raised-200-against-300000-target-signaling-near-zero-market-traction-for-ai-native-wallet-concept.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..12600732
--- /dev/null
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/seyf-futardio-fundraise-raised-200-against-300000-target-signaling-near-zero-market-traction-for-ai-native-wallet-concept.md
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: "The Seyf AI wallet raised $200 (0.07% of target) on MetaDAO's futardio platform before refunding in under 24 hours, providing market-priced evidence of weak demand for the concept at this stage"
+confidence: experimental
+source: "Rio via futard.io launch data; 2026-03-05 Seyf launch on futardio platform"
+created: 2026-03-12
+depends_on:
+  - "seyf-demonstrates-intent-based-wallet-architecture-where-natural-language-replaces-manual-defi-navigation"
+  - "MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale"
+challenged_by:
+  - "Single data point; launch community reach and marketing effort are unknown variables"
+secondary_domains:
+  - mechanisms
+---
+
+# Seyf's futardio fundraise raised $200 against a $300,000 target, signaling near-zero market traction for the AI-native wallet concept on MetaDAO in March 2026
+
+Seyf, which describes itself as "the first AI-native wallet for Solana," launched a fundraise on MetaDAO's futardio platform on 2026-03-05. The raise closed the following day (2026-03-06) with $200.00 committed against a $300,000 target — 0.07% of the funding goal. Status: Refunding.
+
+This outcome is notable because:
+
+1. **The same platform produced dramatically different results for other projects.** The Cult meme coin launched on futardio and raised $11.4M in a single day. The delta between near-zero and $11.4M on the same infrastructure in the same ecosystem isolates the product concept as the key variable.
+
+2. **The futarchy mechanism functions as a market pricing signal.** Futardio's ownership-coin model means participants had financial stakes in the decision. The near-zero commitment is not a click-through survey — it reflects actual capital allocation behavior, which is the strongest available demand signal.
+
+3. **The fundraise failed despite a plausible market narrative.** Seyf's pitch — AI abstraction over DeFi complexity, intent-based UX, no manual transaction construction — is coherent and addresses a real friction. The failure does not disprove the underlying UX problem; it suggests either insufficient product evidence at launch, weak community distribution, or market skepticism about AI wallet execution risk at this stage.
+
+## Context
+
+- Funding target: $300,000 (note: pitch describes a $500K raise; $300K may reflect the minimum viable threshold)
+- Total committed: $200.00
+- Launch date: 2026-03-05; Closed: 2026-03-06
+- Platform: futard.io (MetaDAO)
+- Token: Ggc
+
+## Limitations
+
+This is a single data point. The fundraise may reflect distribution failure rather than concept failure — if the launch was not promoted to the Solana DeFi community, near-zero commitment says more about reach than demand. No evidence exists about marketing effort at launch.
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- [[seyf-demonstrates-intent-based-wallet-architecture-where-natural-language-replaces-manual-defi-navigation]] — the product architecture that failed to attract commitments
+- [[futardio-cult-raised-11-4-million-in-one-day-through-futarchy-governed-meme-coin-launch]] — contrast: what succeeded on same platform same period
+- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]] — the platform infrastructure
+
+Topics:
+- [[_map]]
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/treasury-buyback-model-creates-constant-buy-pressure-by-converting-revenue-to-governance-token-purchases.md b/domains/internet-finance/treasury-buyback-model-creates-constant-buy-pressure-by-converting-revenue-to-governance-token-purchases.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..481c3564
--- /dev/null
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/treasury-buyback-model-creates-constant-buy-pressure-by-converting-revenue-to-governance-token-purchases.md
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: "Dean's List DAO model demonstrates how USDC revenue converted to token buybacks creates net positive price pressure despite citizen sell-offs"
+confidence: experimental
+source: "futard.io, Dean's List DAO economic model proposal, 2024-07-18"
+created: 2024-07-18
+---
+
+# Treasury buyback model creates net buy pressure by converting stablecoin revenue to governance token purchases despite distributed token sell-offs
+
+The Dean's List DAO economic model demonstrates a treasury mechanism where client revenue in USDC is systematically converted to governance token ($DEAN) purchases, creating structural buy pressure that the proposal claims exceeds sell pressure from token distributions. The model charges clients in USDC, allocates 20% to treasury as tax, and uses the remaining 80% to purchase $DEAN tokens from the market. These tokens are then distributed to DAO citizens as payment for work.
+
+In the documented example, a 2,500 USDC service generates 2,000 USDC in token purchases (buying 560k $DEAN), while DAO citizens sell approximately 80% of received tokens (448k $DEAN), creating net buy pressure of 112k $DEAN per cycle. The proposal states this creates "always positive" price action where "the price will always achieve a higher low on each cycle."
+
+The model projects that introducing 400 USDC daily buy volume (80% increase over baseline 500 USDC daily volume) would generate 24% upward price pressure, partially offset by 15% downward pressure from citizen sell-offs, resulting in net 5.33% FDV increase. This exceeds the MetaDAO TWAP 3% threshold requirement.
+
+The mechanism addresses a core DAO treasury problem: how to create sustainable token demand without depleting native token reserves. By maintaining the treasury tax in stablecoins while converting operational spending to market purchases, the model hedges against token price volatility while generating buy pressure.
+
+## Evidence
+- Dean's List DAO charges 2,500 USDC per dApp review
+- 20% (500 USDC) allocated to treasury in stablecoins
+- 80% (2,000 USDC) used for $DEAN market purchases
+- Citizens sell approximately 80% of received tokens
+- Net buy pressure claimed: 560k purchased - 448k sold = 112k $DEAN per cycle
+- Baseline daily volume: 500 USDC
+- Proposed daily buy volume: 400 USDC (80% increase)
+- Current $DEAN price at proposal: $0.00337
+- Current FDV at proposal: $337,074
+- Projected FDV after implementation: $355,028 (5.33% increase)
+- Proposal passed futarchy governance on 2024-07-22
+
+## Challenges
+
+The model assumes consistent service demand (6 dApp reviews per month) and stable sell-off ratios (80%). If citizen sell pressure increases or service demand decreases, the net buy pressure advantage disappears. The price impact calculations (24% up, 15% down) are estimates without empirical validation or citation of methodology. The model does not account for market depth changes as volume increases—slippage could reduce actual buy pressure effectiveness.
+
+The proposal passed MetaDAO governance but represents a single implementation without long-term performance data. The 80% sell-off assumption is stated as "assumption" in the proposal itself, not empirically validated. No mechanism prevents citizens from selling more than 80% if they face liquidity pressure.
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md
+- ownership coin treasuries should be actively managed through buybacks and token sales as continuous capital calibration not treated as static war chests.md
+- futarchy-daos-require-mintable-governance-tokens-because-fixed-supply-treasuries-exhaust-without-issuance-authority-forcing-disruptive-token-architecture-migrations.md
+
+Topics:
+- domains/internet-finance/_map
+- core/mechanisms/_map
diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/coal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md b/entities/internet-finance/coal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md
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index 00000000..7a35d1a6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/entities/internet-finance/coal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: decision_market
+name: "COAL: Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol"
+domain: internet-finance
+status: passed
+parent_entity: "coal"
+platform: "futardio"
+proposer: "futard.io"
+proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg"
+proposal_date: 2025-11-07
+resolution_date: 2025-11-10
+category: "mechanism"
+summary: "Introduces Meta-PoW economic model moving mining power into pickaxes and establishing deterministic ORE treasury accumulation through INGOT smelting"
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# COAL: Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol
+
+## Summary
+The Meta-PoW proposal establishes a new economic model for COAL that creates a mechanical loop accumulating ORE in the treasury. The system moves mining power into pickaxes (tools), makes INGOT the universal crafting input, and forces all INGOT creation through smelting that burns COAL and pays ORE to the treasury. A dynamic license fee c(y) based on the COAL/ORE price ratio acts as an automatic supply throttle.
+
+## Market Data
+- **Outcome:** Passed
+- **Proposer:** futard.io
+- **Created:** 2025-11-07
+- **Completed:** 2025-11-10
+- **Proposal Account:** G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg
+
+## Mechanism Design
+The protocol introduces four tokens (COAL, ORE, INGOT, WOOD) with specific roles:
+- **COAL:** Mineable with 25M max supply, halving-band emissions, burned for smelting and licenses
+- **ORE:** External hard asset, paid only at smelting, 100% goes to COAL treasury
+- **INGOT:** Crafting unit, minted only by burning 100 COAL + paying μ ORE (~12.10 ORE)
+- **WOOD:** Tool maintenance input, produced by axes
+
+Pickaxes gate access to COAL emissions and require 1 INGOT + 8 WOOD + c(y) COAL license to craft. Tools are evergreen with 4% daily decay if not repaired. Daily repair costs 0.082643 INGOT + 0.3 WOOD, calibrated so maintaining a pick is cheaper than recrafting and drives ~1 ORE/day to treasury.
+
+The dynamic license c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^p (with c0=200, y_ref=50, p=3, clamped 1-300) creates countercyclical supply response: when COAL strengthens, license cost falls and more picks come online; when COAL weakens, license cost rises and crafting slows.
+
+## Significance
+This proposal demonstrates sophisticated economic mechanism design governed through futarchy. Rather than simple parameter adjustments, Meta-PoW introduces a multi-token system with algorithmic supply controls, deterministic treasury accumulation, and automatic market-responsive throttling. The design creates structural coupling between mining activity and treasury inflow without relying on transaction fees or arbitrary tax rates.
+
+The proposal also shows MetaDAO's evolution from fundraising platform to complex protocol economics coordinator. The level of economic calibration (specific INGOT costs, repair rates, license formulas) would be difficult to achieve through traditional governance.
+
+## Relationship to KB
+- coal - parent entity, economic model redesign
+- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]] - governance platform
+- [[dynamic performance-based token minting replaces fixed emission schedules by tying new token creation to measurable outcomes creating algorithmic meritocracy in token distribution]] - related mechanism design pattern
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/deans-list-enhancing-economic-model.md b/entities/internet-finance/deans-list-enhancing-economic-model.md
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index 00000000..b3ed9c30
--- /dev/null
+++ b/entities/internet-finance/deans-list-enhancing-economic-model.md
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: decision_market
+name: "IslandDAO: Enhancing The Dean's List DAO Economic Model"
+domain: internet-finance
+status: passed
+parent_entity: "[[deans-list]]"
+platform: "futardio"
+proposer: "futard.io"
+proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/5c2XSWQ9rVPge2Umoz1yenZcAwRaQS5bC4i4w87B1WUp"
+proposal_date: 2024-07-18
+resolution_date: 2024-07-22
+category: "treasury"
+summary: "Transition from USDC payments to $DEAN token distributions funded by systematic USDC-to-DEAN buybacks"
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# IslandDAO: Enhancing The Dean's List DAO Economic Model
+
+## Summary
+The proposal restructured Dean's List DAO's payment model to create constant buy pressure on $DEAN tokens. Instead of paying citizens directly in USDC, the DAO now uses 80% of client revenue to purchase $DEAN from the market and distributes those tokens as payment. The 20% treasury tax remains in USDC to hedge against price volatility. The model projects net positive price pressure because citizens sell only ~80% of received tokens, creating 112k $DEAN net buy pressure per 2,500 USDC service cycle.
+
+## Market Data
+- **Outcome:** Passed
+- **Proposer:** futard.io
+- **Resolution:** 2024-07-22
+- **Platform:** Futardio (MetaDAO Autocrat v0.3)
+
+## Mechanism Details
+- Service fee: 2,500 USDC per dApp review
+- Treasury allocation: 20% (500 USDC) in stablecoins
+- Buyback allocation: 80% (2,000 USDC) for $DEAN purchases
+- Projected citizen sell-off: 80% of received tokens
+- Net buy pressure: 20% of purchased tokens retained
+- Projected FDV impact: 5.33% increase (from $337,074 to $355,028)
+- Target: 6 dApp reviews per month (400 USDC daily buy volume)
+
+## Significance
+This proposal represents an operational treasury mechanism using futarchy governance to implement systematic token buybacks as a compensation model. Unlike simple buyback-and-burn programs, this model converts operational expenses into buy pressure while maintaining stablecoin reserves for volatility protection. The detailed financial modeling (FDV projections, volume analysis, price impact estimates) demonstrates how complex treasury decisions can navigate futarchy governance when backed by quantitative scenarios.
+
+The 80% sell-off assumption acknowledges that DAO workers need liquid compensation, creating a hybrid model between pure equity alignment and fee-for-service payments.
+
+## Relationship to KB
+- [[deans-list]] - treasury mechanism change
+- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] - governance platform
+- [[treasury-buyback-model-creates-constant-buy-pressure-by-converting-revenue-to-governance-token-purchases]] - mechanism claim
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/joebuild.md b/entities/internet-finance/joebuild.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..7c25851e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/entities/internet-finance/joebuild.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: person
+name: "joebuild"
+domain: internet-finance
+status: active
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# joebuild
+
+## Overview
+Solana developer and MetaDAO contributor who proposed and led the AMM migration for MetaDAO's futarchy implementation. Primary technical architect for the Autocrat program upgrades.
+
+## Timeline
+- **2024-01-24** — Proposed [[metadao-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]], comprehensive AMM replacement for CLOB-based futarchy markets
+- **2024-01-29** — AMM proposal passed; responsible for program changes (400 META upfront, 800 META on completion)
+
+## Relationship to KB
+- metadao.md — core contributor
+- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] — technical architect for mechanism evolution
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/metadao-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy.md b/entities/internet-finance/metadao-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..06484c3b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/entities/internet-finance/metadao-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy.md
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: decision_market
+name: "MetaDAO: Develop AMM Program for Futarchy?"
+domain: internet-finance
+status: passed
+parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
+platform: "futardio"
+proposer: "joebuild"
+proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG"
+proposal_date: 2024-01-24
+resolution_date: 2024-01-29
+category: "mechanism"
+summary: "Proposal to replace CLOB-based futarchy markets with AMM implementation to improve liquidity and reduce state rent costs"
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# MetaDAO: Develop AMM Program for Futarchy?
+
+## Summary
+Proposal to develop an Automated Market Maker (AMM) program to replace the existing Central Limit Order Book (CLOB) implementation in MetaDAO's futarchy system. The AMM would use liquidity-weighted price over time as the settlement metric, charge 3-5% swap fees to discourage manipulation and incentivize LPs, and reduce state rent costs from 135-225 SOL annually to near-zero.
+
+## Market Data
+- **Outcome:** Passed
+- **Proposer:** joebuild
+- **Created:** 2024-01-24
+- **Completed:** 2024-01-29
+- **Budget:** 400 META on passing, 800 META on completed migration
+- **Timeline:** 3 weeks development + 1 week review
+
+## Technical Scope
+**Program changes:**
+- Write basic AMM tracking liquidity-weighted average price over lifetime
+- Incorporate AMM into autocrat + conditional vault
+- Feature to permissionlessly pause AMM swaps and return positions after verdict
+- Feature to permissionlessly close AMMs and return state rent SOL
+- Loosen time restrictions on proposal creation (currently 50 slots)
+- Auto-revert to fail if proposal instructions don't execute after X days
+
+**Frontend integration:**
+- Majority of work by 0xNalloK
+- Mainnet testing on temporary subdomain before migration
+
+## Significance
+This represents a fundamental mechanism upgrade for MetaDAO's futarchy implementation, addressing three core problems with the CLOB approach:
+
+1. **Liquidity:** Wide bid/ask spreads and price uncertainty discouraged limit orders near midpoint
+2. **Manipulation resistance:** CLOBs allowed 1 META to move midpoint; VWAP vulnerable to wash trading
+3. **Economic sustainability:** 3.75 SOL state rent per market pair (135-225 SOL annually) vs near-zero for AMMs
+
+The proposal explicitly prioritizes simplicity and cost reduction over theoretical purity, noting that "switching to AMMs is not a perfect solution, but I do believe it is a major improvement over the current low-liquidity and somewhat noisy system."
+
+The liquidity-weighted pricing mechanism is novel in futarchy implementations—it weights price observations by available liquidity rather than using simple time-weighted averages, making manipulation expensive when liquidity is high.
+
+## Relationship to KB
+- metadao.md — core mechanism upgrade
+- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] — mechanism evolution from TWAP to liquidity-weighted pricing
+- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — addresses liquidity barrier
+- [[futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders]] — implements explicit fee-based defender incentives
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/metadao-execute-creation-of-spot-market-for-meta.md b/entities/internet-finance/metadao-execute-creation-of-spot-market-for-meta.md
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+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: decision_market
+name: "MetaDAO: Execute Creation of Spot Market for META?"
+domain: internet-finance
+status: passed
+parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
+platform: "futardio"
+proposer: "UuGEwN9aeh676ufphbavfssWVxH7BJCqacq1RYhco8e"
+proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/HyA2h16uPQBFjezKf77wThNGsEoesUjeQf9rFvfAy4tF"
+proposal_date: 2024-02-05
+resolution_date: 2024-02-10
+category: "treasury"
+summary: "Authorized 4,130 META transfer to 4/6 multisig to execute spot market creation through participant sale and liquidity pool establishment"
+key_metrics:
+  meta_allocated: "4,130 META"
+  sale_allocation: "3,100 META"
+  lp_allocation: "1,000 META"
+  usdc_paired: "35,000 USDC"
+  initial_price: "35 USDC/META"
+  multisig_compensation: "30 META (5 per member)"
+  target_raise: "75,000 USDC"
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# MetaDAO: Execute Creation of Spot Market for META?
+
+## Summary
+This proposal authorized the transfer of 4,130 META tokens to a 4/6 multisig to execute the creation of a spot market for META tokens. The execution plan involved coordinating a private sale to raise 75,000 USDC, then using 1,000 META paired with 35,000 USDC to create a liquidity pool on Meteora, setting an initial spot price of 35 USDC per META.
+
+## Market Data
+- **Outcome:** Passed
+- **Proposer:** UuGEwN9aeh676ufphbavfssWVxH7BJCqacq1RYhco8e
+- **Proposal Number:** 5
+- **Completed:** 2024-02-10
+- **Autocrat Version:** 0.1
+
+## Execution Structure
+The proposal established a 4/6 multisig containing Proph3t, Dean, Nallok, Durden, Rar3, and BlockchainFixesThis to execute a multi-step process:
+
+1. Collect demand through Google form
+2. Proph3t determines allocations
+3. Participants transfer USDC (Feb 5-7 deadline)
+4. Backfill unmet demand from waitlist (Feb 8)
+5. Multisig distributes META to participants, creates LP, and disbands (Feb 9)
+
+Token allocation breakdown:
+- 3,100 META to sale participants
+- 1,000 META paired with 35,000 USDC for liquidity pool
+- 30 META as multisig member compensation (5 META each)
+
+## Significance
+This proposal demonstrates the operational scaffolding required for futarchy-governed treasury operations. The proposal explicitly acknowledged "no algorithmic guarantee" of execution, instead relying on reputational incentives: "it's unlikely that 4 or more of the multisig members would be willing to tarnish their reputation in order to do something different."
+
+The execution model shows futarchy DAOs using human-operated multisigs with social enforcement for operational tasks even when the governance decision itself is market-determined. This represents a pragmatic hybrid between algorithmic governance and traditional operational execution.
+
+## Relationship to KB
+- [[metadao]] - parent entity, treasury operation
+- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] - governance mechanism
+- [[futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate governance scaffolding for treasury operations because market mechanisms alone cannot provide operational security and legal compliance]] - operational pattern
+- [[meteora]] - liquidity pool platform
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diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/seyf.md b/entities/internet-finance/seyf.md
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+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: company
+name: Seyf
+domain: internet-finance
+status: failed
+founded: 2026
+platform: solana
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+key_metrics:
+  funding_target: "$300,000"
+  total_committed: "$200"
+  launch_date: "2026-03-05"
+  close_date: "2026-03-06"
+  outcome: "refunding"
+  platform: "futardio"
+---
+
+# Seyf
+
+**Seyf** was an AI-native wallet for Solana that attempted to replace manual DeFi navigation with natural language intent-based interaction. The project raised through Futardio's futarchy-governed launch platform but failed to meet its $300K funding target, collecting only $200 before entering refunding status.
+
+The product vision centered on converting user intents like "Swap 20 SOL to USDC" or "Trade tonight from 2:00–6:00 AM with moderate risk" into secure on-chain transactions, with AI handling protocol selection, slippage configuration, and execution routing while requiring explicit user confirmation.
+
+## Timeline
+
+- **2026-03-05** — Launched $300K fundraise on Futardio with intent-based wallet architecture for Solana
+- **2026-03-06** — Fundraise closed in refunding status with only $200 committed (0.07% of target)
+
+## Relationship to KB
+
+- [[futardio]] — launch platform
+- MetaDAO — futarchy governance infrastructure
+- Related to intent-based DeFi interaction patterns and AI wallet architecture
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