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+---
+type: source
+source_type: x-tweet
+title: "@01resolved — shared via Telegram by @m3taversal"
+author: "@01resolved"
+url: "https://x.com/01resolved/status/2037550467316847015?s=46"
+date: 2026-03-27
+domain: internet-finance
+format: social-media
+status: processed
+proposed_by: "@m3taversal"
+contribution_type: source-submission
+tags: ['telegram-shared', 'x-tweet', 'futarchy', 'ownership-coins', 'governance']
+---
+
+# @01resolved — Tweet/Thread
+
+Shared by @m3taversal via Telegram.
+Source URL: https://x.com/01resolved/status/2037550467316847015?s=46
+
+## Content
+
+This is exactly the type of early stage governance risk we wrote about recently. Our view is that sensitive treasury proposals should be subject to project specific guardrails and post-ICO timing windows, rather than becoming immediately eligible.
+
+The @P2Pdotme ICO currently live on @MetaDAOProject appears to already reflect some of this thinking. In the ICO details, community governance proposals are only enabled 7-9 months after funding.
+
+Our “Permissionless Proposals for MetaDAO Decision Markets” introduces a framework for proposal classes, timing windows, and other guardrails here:
+ https://t.co/WQAbjKff1A