rio: add 3 claims (Ranger liquidation, futarchy self-correction, corporate scaffolding convergence), enrich 2 claims, archive 3 sources

- What: 3 new claims to domains/internet-finance/:
  1. Futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism for unruggable ICOs
     (Ranger: 97% pass, $581K volume, material misrepresentation evidence)
  2. Futarchy can override prior decisions when evidence changes
     (Ranger nullified 90-day restriction)
  3. Futarchy-governed DAOs converge on corporate governance scaffolding
     (Solomon DP-00001: subcommittees, SOPs, 3 law firms, staged rollout)
  Enriched 2 existing claims:
  - Decision markets majority theft protection — bidirectional (team extraction too)
  - Futarchy trustless joint ownership — strongest production evidence to date
  Archived: Ranger liquidation proposal (full text + tweet), Solomon DP-00001 (full text)

- Why: Ranger liquidation is the watershed moment for the futarchy thesis. The
  "unruggable ICO" mechanism is unrugging in production — investors forcing full
  treasury return via conditional markets without courts or lawyers. 97% pass with
  $581K volume is not a thin market. This is the strongest evidence yet that futarchy
  solves trustless joint ownership. Solomon DP-00001 shows the complementary pattern:
  futarchy handles strategic decisions, corporate structures handle operations.

- Connections:
  - Ranger enriches Belief #3 (futarchy solves trustless joint ownership)
  - Ranger enriches existing majority-theft-protection claim (bidirectional)
  - Solomon DP-00001 enriches "limited volume in uncontested decisions" ($5.79K volume)
  - Solomon pass threshold asymmetry (-300/+300 bps) is implicit trust calibration
  - Both connect to Position #4 (MetaDAO majority of launches) — Ranger liquidation
    is both a feature (mechanism works) and a risk signal (ecosystem churn)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

domains/internet-finance/decision markets make majority theft unprofitable through conditional token arbitrage.md

@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ The mechanism works at any ownership threshold, not just above 50%. MetaDAO prop
 
 This mechanism proof connects to [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]]—the arbitrage protection is strongest for clear-cut value transfers, making futarchy ideal for treasury decisions even when other mechanisms suit different decision types.
 
+**Bidirectional protection (Mar 2026 evidence).** The Ranger Finance liquidation demonstrates that the mechanism works not only to protect minorities from majority theft, but also to protect investors from team extraction. Tokenholders alleged material misrepresentation ($5B volume/$2M revenue claimed vs $2B/$500K actual), and the conditional market priced liquidation at 97% pass with $581K in volume. The team had no viable path to prevent liquidation through market manipulation — the same arbitrage dynamics that protect against majority raids also prevent teams from blocking investor-initiated liquidation. Since [[futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent]], the conditional token arbitrage mechanism is the enforcement layer for the entire "unruggable ICO" thesis.
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 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/futarchy solves trustless joint ownership not just better decision-making.md

@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ Traditional companies uphold joint ownership through shareholder oppression laws
 
 The implication extends beyond governance quality. Since [[ownership alignment turns network effects from extractive to generative]], futarchy becomes the enabling primitive for genuinely decentralized organizations. This connects directly to [[Living Capital vehicles pair Living Agent domain expertise with futarchy-governed investment to direct capital toward crucial innovations]]—the trustless ownership guarantee makes it possible to coordinate capital without centralized control or legal overhead.
 
+**Strongest real-world evidence (Mar 2026).** The Ranger Finance liquidation is the most significant test of trustless joint ownership to date. Investors exercised ownership rights to force full treasury liquidation and IP separation — without courts, without lawyers, without board votes. The conditional market priced the outcome ($581K volume, 97% pass, +9.43% TWAP spread), capital flowed to the answer, and the governance mechanism is executing it. This is what trustless joint ownership looks like in production: strangers who pooled capital into a futarchy-governed vehicle are using that same governance to unwind it when the investment thesis collapsed. Since [[futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent]], the exit mechanism is as important as the entry mechanism for trustless ownership.
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 Relevant Notes: