From 710539bf2babbd257f1a9e95579cb08460a218df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Teleo Agents Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2026 11:10:51 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] rio: extract from 2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme.md - Source: inbox/archive/2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme.md - Domain: internet-finance - Extracted by: headless extraction cron (worker 5) Pentagon-Agent: Rio --- ...d average price over a three-day window.md | 6 ++ ...trading volume in uncontested decisions.md | 6 ++ ...ken-locking-demand-through-status-games.md | 54 ++++++++++++++++++ ...l complexity and liquidity requirements.md | 6 ++ ...option-friction-beyond-market-mechanics.md | 51 +++++++++++++++++ .../deans-list-thailanddao-event-promotion.md | 56 +++++++++++++++++++ entities/internet-finance/deans-list.md | 3 + ...motion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme.md | 18 +++++- 8 files changed, 199 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 domains/internet-finance/dao-event-incentives-as-governance-power-competition-create-token-locking-demand-through-status-games.md create mode 100644 domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposal-failure-despite-favorable-economics-reveals-adoption-friction-beyond-market-mechanics.md create mode 100644 entities/internet-finance/deans-list-thailanddao-event-promotion.md diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md b/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md index 4d7b92bb2..339a9876a 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md @@ -53,6 +53,12 @@ Autocrat is MetaDAO's core governance program on Solana -- the on-chain implemen **Limitations.** [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] -- when proposals are clearly good or clearly bad, few traders participate because the expected profit from trading in a consensus market is near zero. This is a structural feature, not a bug: contested decisions get more participation precisely because they're uncertain, which is when you most need information aggregation. But it does mean uncontested proposals can pass or fail with very thin markets, making the TWAP potentially noisy. + +### Additional Evidence (extend) +*Source: [[2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5* + +Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO proposal (DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM) used Autocrat v0.3 with 3-day TWAP settlement requiring 3% FDV increase to pass. Proposal structure: proposal account DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM, DAO account 9TKh2yav4WpSNkFV2cLybrWZETBWZBkQ6WB6qV9Nt9dJ, proposer HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz. Proposal #2 for Dean's List DAO. Completed 2024-06-25 with failure outcome. The proposal demonstrates Autocrat's conditional market mechanism in practice: traders could bet on whether the ThailandDAO event would drive sufficient token locking to achieve 3% FDV increase, with settlement via TWAP over the 3-day window. Despite favorable economics ($15K cost vs projected $1.9M FDV increase), the market voted fail, providing evidence of how Autocrat's TWAP settlement mechanism functions in low-liquidity environments. + --- Relevant Notes: diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md b/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md index 7e557c94f..7ed8890a0 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md @@ -23,6 +23,12 @@ This evidence has direct implications for governance design. It suggests that [[ Optimism's futarchy experiment achieved 5,898 total trades from 430 active forecasters (average 13.6 transactions per person) over 21 days, with 88.6% being first-time Optimism governance participants. This suggests futarchy CAN attract substantial engagement when implemented at scale with proper incentives, contradicting the limited-volume pattern observed in MetaDAO. Key differences: Optimism used play money (lower barrier to entry), had institutional backing (Uniswap Foundation co-sponsor), and involved grant selection (clearer stakes) rather than protocol governance decisions. The participation breadth (10 countries, 4 continents, 36 new users/day) suggests the limited-volume finding may be specific to MetaDAO's implementation or use case rather than a structural futarchy limitation. + +### Additional Evidence (confirm) +*Source: [[2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5* + +Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO proposal (DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM) failed futarchy vote despite favorable economics: $15K cost versus projected $1.9M FDV increase, requiring only 3% TWAP increase ($3,698) to pass. The 3-day trading period on Autocrat v0.3 did not generate sufficient volume to price the proposal, suggesting low liquidity environments struggle to aggregate information even when economic stakes are clear and the math is favorable. Proposal completed 2024-06-25 with failure outcome. Current FDV $123,263 indicates extremely thin market depth. + --- Relevant Notes: diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/dao-event-incentives-as-governance-power-competition-create-token-locking-demand-through-status-games.md b/domains/internet-finance/dao-event-incentives-as-governance-power-competition-create-token-locking-demand-through-status-games.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8c61ddd1b --- /dev/null +++ b/domains/internet-finance/dao-event-incentives-as-governance-power-competition-create-token-locking-demand-through-status-games.md @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +--- +type: claim +domain: internet-finance +description: "Leaderboard-based event perks convert governance participation into status competition where token locking becomes the mechanism for ranking, creating positional goods that drive supply reduction" +confidence: speculative +source: "Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO proposal design (DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM, failed 2024-06-25), futard.io 2024-06-22" +created: 2024-06-22 +processed_date: 2024-06-22 +--- + +# DAO event incentives as governance power competition create token locking demand through status games + +The Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO proposal designed a governance incentive mechanism that converted event access into a competitive status game: a real-time leaderboard ranking members by governance power, with top 5 receiving travel and accommodation ($10K), and top 50 receiving event invitations and partner airdrops ($5K). Governance power increased through token deposits or time-locked staking with multipliers. + +This architecture transforms governance participation from abstract voting rights into concrete, rivalrous rewards: + +**Mechanism design elements:** +- **Visible ranking**: Real-time leaderboard creates social proof and competitive pressure +- **Tiered rewards**: Top 5 versus top 50 creates multiple aspiration levels, allowing members at different wealth levels to compete for achievable positions +- **Lock-up mechanics**: Governance power multipliers incentivize longer token locks (members could "lock them for a multiplier to increase your governance power") +- **Supply reduction**: Competition for leaderboard position removes tokens from circulation as members lock them to compete +- **Prize transferability**: Winners could pass prizes to other leaderboard members, creating secondary markets for positions + +The proposal projected this mechanism would drive FDV from $123,263 to >$2,000,000 through supply shock—a 16x increase from approximately 50 participants locking tokens to compete for ranking. The mechanism relied on the assumption that status competition would overcome the coordination problem of getting 50 members to simultaneously lock capital. + +**Distinction from traditional governance incentives**: This differs from conventional DAO engagement (voting rewards, delegation fees) by making participation a positional good rather than a compensated activity. In traditional models, rewards are proportional to participation. Here, rewards are zero-sum—only top 5 get travel, only top 50 get events. This creates competitive pressure that may drive higher participation than proportional rewards. + +**Evidence of mechanism viability**: The proposal was submitted to futarchy governance, suggesting the proposers believed the mechanism was credible enough to stake capital on. The detailed specification of leaderboard mechanics, prize tiers, and lock-up multipliers indicates serious mechanism design rather than casual speculation. + +**Evidence of mechanism failure**: The proposal failed futarchy vote (2024-06-25), suggesting markets did not find the mechanism credible or the economics compelling. This could indicate: (1) skepticism that 50 members would actually lock tokens for event access, (2) projection skepticism (16x FDV from 50 participants seemed unrealistic), (3) insufficient liquidity to price the conditional markets, or (4) complexity deterring participation. + +The mechanism remains a testable hypothesis for future implementations, but the failure provides evidence about the limits of status-game-based governance incentives in low-liquidity environments. + +## Evidence + +- Leaderboard structure: Top 5 (travel + accommodation for 12 days), Top 50 (events + airdrops) +- Governance power mechanics: Token deposits or time-locked staking with multipliers +- Event details: ThailandDAO Sept 25 - Oct 25, Koh Samui, accommodation in communal villa +- Projected participation: ~50 members competing for leaderboard positions +- Projected FDV impact: $123,263 → >$2,000,000 (16x) +- Actual outcome: Proposal failed 2024-06-25 +- Platform: Dean's List DAO via Futardio Autocrat v0.3 +- Prize transferability: "Winners can pass their prizes to anyone on the leaderboard if they choose not to claim them" +- Delegation permitted: "Delegation is permitted, transferring governance power to the delegatee, not the original holder" + +--- + +Relevant Notes: +- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md]] +- [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles.md]] + +Topics: +- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]] +- [[core/mechanisms/_map]] diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md index cea44c3fa..927cc7b2b 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md @@ -34,6 +34,12 @@ MycoRealms implementation reveals operational friction points: monthly $10,000 a Optimism futarchy achieved 430 active forecasters and 88.6% first-time governance participants by using play money, demonstrating that removing capital requirements can dramatically lower participation barriers. However, this came at the cost of prediction accuracy (8x overshoot on magnitude estimates), revealing a new friction: the play-money vs real-money tradeoff. Play money enables permissionless participation but sacrifices calibration; real money provides calibration but creates regulatory and capital barriers. This suggests futarchy adoption faces a structural dilemma between accessibility and accuracy that liquidity requirements alone don't capture. The tradeoff is not merely about quantity of liquidity but the fundamental difference between incentive structures that attract participants vs incentive structures that produce accurate predictions. + +### Additional Evidence (confirm) +*Source: [[2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5* + +Concrete failure case: Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO proposal presented 16x FDV growth projection ($123K → $2M) with clear supply reduction mechanics (token locking for governance power competition), yet failed futarchy vote. The proposal required understanding: (1) token locking mechanics with multipliers, (2) governance power calculations, (3) real-time leaderboard dynamics, (4) conditional market settlement via TWAP, (5) the relationship between supply reduction and price appreciation. This cognitive load likely deterred participation despite favorable economics. Additionally, the projection credibility gap—markets may have dismissed the 16x growth claim as unrealistic despite mechanically sound supply reduction—confirms that token price psychology creates adoption friction independent of economic merit. Proposal account DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM, failed 2024-06-25. + --- Relevant Notes: diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposal-failure-despite-favorable-economics-reveals-adoption-friction-beyond-market-mechanics.md b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposal-failure-despite-favorable-economics-reveals-adoption-friction-beyond-market-mechanics.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..682bbc37d --- /dev/null +++ b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposal-failure-despite-favorable-economics-reveals-adoption-friction-beyond-market-mechanics.md @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +--- +type: claim +domain: internet-finance +description: "Dean's List DAO proposal failed despite $15K cost versus projected $1.9M FDV increase, showing futarchy adoption barriers extend beyond economic rationality to include liquidity, complexity, and credibility thresholds" +confidence: experimental +source: "Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO proposal (DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM, failed 2024-06-25), futard.io" +created: 2024-06-22 +processed_date: 2024-06-22 +--- + +# Futarchy proposal failure despite favorable economics reveals adoption friction beyond market mechanics + +The Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO event proposal failed futarchy governance despite presenting seemingly favorable economics: $15,000 in costs against a projected FDV increase from $123,263 to over $2,000,000 (16x growth), requiring only a 3% TWAP increase ($3,698) to pass over a 3-day trading window on Autocrat v0.3. + +The proposal offered concrete incentives designed to drive token locking and reduce circulating supply: travel and accommodation for top 5 governance power holders ($10K), and events/airdrops for top 50 ($5K). The mechanism was sound—members would lock tokens to increase governance power and compete for leaderboard positions, reducing circulating supply and creating upward price pressure. + +Yet the proposal failed, suggesting futarchy adoption faces barriers beyond pure economic calculation: + +**1. Projection credibility gap**: The 16x FDV growth projection may have been dismissed as unrealistic despite the supply reduction mechanics being mechanically sound. Markets appear to discount promotional campaign claims even when the underlying mechanism is theoretically valid, suggesting a "show me" threshold for belief in token appreciation narratives. + +**2. Liquidity and participation thresholds**: With Dean's List DAO's extremely low liquidity environment (current FDV $123,263), the 3-day trading period may not have attracted sufficient market participation to price the proposal accurately. The conditional market may have lacked the depth needed to aggregate information from even a small number of traders. + +**3. Complexity tax**: The proposal required understanding multiple interacting systems: (1) token locking mechanics with multipliers, (2) governance power calculations, (3) real-time leaderboard dynamics, (4) conditional market settlement via TWAP, (5) the relationship between supply reduction and price appreciation. This cognitive load likely deterred participation even among economically rational actors who might have otherwise traded on favorable odds. + +**4. Execution risk**: The proposal depended on 50+ members actually locking tokens and competing for positions. If markets doubted participation would materialize, the projected FDV increase would be discounted accordingly. + +This case provides concrete evidence that futarchy adoption barriers are not primarily economic—the math was favorable—but rather structural: low liquidity environments, proposal complexity, and credibility gaps between projections and outcomes create friction independent of whether the underlying mechanism is sound. + +## Evidence + +- Proposal account: DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM +- DAO account: 9TKh2yav4WpSNkFV2cLybrWZETBWZBkQ6WB6qV9Nt9dJ +- Current FDV: $123,263 (2024-06-22) +- Proposal budget: $15,000 ($10K travel for top 5, $5K events for top 50) +- Required TWAP increase: 3% ($3,698 absolute) +- Projected FDV: >$2,000,000 (16x growth) +- Trading period: 3 days +- Autocrat version: 0.3 +- Outcome: Failed (2024-06-25) +- Projected participants: ~50 members competing for leaderboard positions + +--- + +Relevant Notes: +- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md]] +- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md]] +- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md]] + +Topics: +- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]] +- [[core/mechanisms/_map]] diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/deans-list-thailanddao-event-promotion.md b/entities/internet-finance/deans-list-thailanddao-event-promotion.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b94806f52 --- /dev/null +++ b/entities/internet-finance/deans-list-thailanddao-event-promotion.md @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +--- +type: entity +entity_type: decision_market +name: "Dean's List: ThailandDAO Event Promotion to Boost Governance Engagement" +domain: internet-finance +status: failed +parent_entity: "[[deans-list]]" +platform: "futardio" +proposer: "HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz" +proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM" +proposal_account: "DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM" +dao_account: "9TKh2yav4WpSNkFV2cLybrWZETBWZBkQ6WB6qV9Nt9dJ" +proposal_date: 2024-06-22 +resolution_date: 2024-06-25 +autocrat_version: "0.3" +category: "grants" +summary: "Promotional campaign offering travel and event perks to top governance power holders to drive token locking and FDV growth" +key_metrics: + budget: "$15,000" + current_fdv: "$123,263" + projected_fdv: ">$2,000,000" + required_twap_increase: "3% ($3,698)" + trading_period: "3 days" + top_5_reward: "Airplane fares + 12 days accommodation at ThailandDAO" + top_50_reward: "IRL event invitations + partner airdrops" +tracked_by: rio +created: 2026-03-11 +--- + +# Dean's List: ThailandDAO Event Promotion to Boost Governance Engagement + +## Summary + +Proposal to create a promotional campaign for Dean's List DAO members tied to the ThailandDAO event (Sept 25 - Oct 25, Koh Samui). The campaign would establish a real-time governance power leaderboard with tiered rewards: top 5 members receive travel and accommodation ($10K), top 50 receive event invitations and partner airdrops ($5K). Members increase governance power through token deposits or time-locked staking with multipliers. The proposal projected this mechanism would drive FDV from $123,263 to >$2,000,000 (16x growth) through supply reduction as members locked tokens to compete for leaderboard positions. + +## Market Data + +- **Outcome:** Failed +- **Proposer:** HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz +- **Platform:** Futardio (Autocrat v0.3) +- **Trading Period:** 3 days +- **Required TWAP Increase:** 3% ($3,698 absolute) +- **Resolution:** 2024-06-25 + +## Significance + +This proposal represents a novel DAO engagement mechanism: converting governance participation into a competitive status game where IRL event access is the prize and token locking is the competitive mechanism. The failure despite seemingly favorable economics ($15K cost vs $1.9M projected FDV increase) provides evidence about futarchy adoption barriers—either the projection lacked credibility, liquidity was insufficient to price the conditional markets, or complexity deterred participation. + +The proposal design itself is notable: leaderboard-based competition, tiered rewards, and governance power multipliers through time-locked staking. This differs from traditional governance incentives (voting rewards, delegation fees) by making participation a positional good rather than a compensated activity. + +## Relationship to KB + +- [[deans-list]] - parent DAO governance decision +- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] - failure case confirming adoption barriers +- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] - low liquidity environment struggled to price proposal +- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] - implementation details diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/deans-list.md b/entities/internet-finance/deans-list.md index b25e8caa6..f1d498b44 100644 --- a/entities/internet-finance/deans-list.md +++ b/entities/internet-finance/deans-list.md @@ -47,3 +47,6 @@ Topics: ## Timeline - **2024-12-19** — [[deans-list-implement-3-week-vesting]] passed: 3-week linear vesting for DAO payments to reduce sell pressure from 80% immediate liquidation to 33% weekly rate, projected 15%-25% valuation increase + +- **2024-06-22** — [[deans-list-thailanddao-event-promotion]] proposed: $15K promotional campaign for ThailandDAO event with leaderboard-based rewards for top governance power holders, projected 16x FDV growth +- **2024-06-25** — [[deans-list-thailanddao-event-promotion]] failed: ThailandDAO event proposal rejected despite favorable economics, revealing futarchy adoption barriers in low-liquidity environments \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/inbox/archive/2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme.md b/inbox/archive/2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme.md index 568cc553d..6531b14c2 100644 --- a/inbox/archive/2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme.md +++ b/inbox/archive/2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM date: 2024-06-22 domain: internet-finance format: data -status: unprocessed +status: processed tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance] event_type: proposal processed_by: rio @@ -14,6 +14,12 @@ processed_date: 2024-06-22 enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md", "futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md", "MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md"] extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5" extraction_notes: "Extracted 2 claims about futarchy market failure modes and DAO incentive mechanisms. Both claims are experimental/speculative due to single-case evidence. Proposal failed despite seemingly favorable economics, which itself is evidence about futarchy adoption barriers. Enriched 3 existing claims with concrete implementation data and failure case confirmation." +processed_by: rio +processed_date: 2026-03-11 +claims_extracted: ["futarchy-proposal-failure-despite-favorable-economics-reveals-adoption-friction-beyond-market-mechanics.md", "dao-event-incentives-as-governance-power-competition-create-token-locking-demand-through-status-games.md"] +enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md", "futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md", "MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md"] +extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5" +extraction_notes: "Extracted 2 claims about futarchy market failure modes and DAO incentive mechanisms. Both claims are experimental/speculative due to single-case evidence. Proposal failed despite seemingly favorable economics, which itself is evidence about futarchy adoption barriers. Created decision_market entity for the proposal with full market data. Enriched 3 existing claims with concrete implementation data and failure case confirmation." --- ## Proposal Details @@ -182,3 +188,13 @@ This proposal to create a promotional event at ThailandDAO, incentivizing govern - Proposal completed: 2024-06-25 - Required TWAP increase: 3% ($3,698 absolute) - Trading period: 3 days + + +## Key Facts +- Dean's List DAO FDV: $123,263 (2024-06-22) +- ThailandDAO event: Sept 25 - Oct 25, Koh Samui Thailand +- Proposal budget: $15K ($10K travel top 5, $5K events top 50) +- Required TWAP increase: 3% ($3,698) +- Autocrat version: 0.3 +- Proposal account: DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM +- DAO account: 9TKh2yav4WpSNkFV2cLybrWZETBWZBkQ6WB6qV9Nt9dJ