auto-fix: strip 10 broken wiki links

Pipeline auto-fixer: removed [[ ]] brackets from links
that don't resolve to existing claims in the knowledge base.

domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ This evidence has direct implications for governance design. It suggests that [[
 
 
 ### Additional Evidence (challenge)
-*Source: [[2025-06-12-optimism-futarchy-v1-preliminary-findings]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
+*Source: 2025-06-12-optimism-futarchy-v1-preliminary-findings | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
 
 Optimism's futarchy experiment achieved 5,898 total trades from 430 active forecasters (average 13.6 transactions per person) over 21 days, with 88.6% being first-time Optimism governance participants. This suggests futarchy CAN attract substantial engagement when implemented at scale with proper incentives, contradicting the limited-volume pattern observed in MetaDAO. Key differences: Optimism used play money (lower barrier to entry), had institutional backing (Uniswap Foundation co-sponsor), and involved grant selection (clearer stakes) rather than protocol governance decisions. The participation breadth (10 countries, 4 continents, 36 new users/day) suggests the limited-volume finding may be specific to MetaDAO's implementation or use case rather than a structural futarchy limitation.
 

domains/internet-finance/token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance.md

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - [[gamified contribution with ownership stakes aligns individual sharing with collective intelligence growth]] -- the token emission model is the investment-domain version of this incentive alignment
 - [[futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders]] -- the governance framework within which token economics operates
 
-- [[the create-destroy discipline forces genuine strategic alternatives by deliberately attacking your initial insight before committing]] -- token-locked voting with outcome-based emissions forces a create-destroy discipline on investment decisions: participants must stake tokens (create commitment) and face dilution if wrong (destroy poorly-judged positions), preventing the anchoring bias that degrades traditional fund governance
+- the create-destroy discipline forces genuine strategic alternatives by deliberately attacking your initial insight before committing -- token-locked voting with outcome-based emissions forces a create-destroy discipline on investment decisions: participants must stake tokens (create commitment) and face dilution if wrong (destroy poorly-judged positions), preventing the anchoring bias that degrades traditional fund governance
 
 Topics:
 - [[livingip overview]]

domains/internet-finance/treasury-buyback-model-creates-constant-buy-pressure-by-converting-revenue-to-governance-token-purchases.md

@@ -39,10 +39,10 @@ The proposal passed MetaDAO governance but represents a single implementation wi
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:
-- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md]]
-- [[ownership coin treasuries should be actively managed through buybacks and token sales as continuous capital calibration not treated as static war chests.md]]
-- [[futarchy-daos-require-mintable-governance-tokens-because-fixed-supply-treasuries-exhaust-without-issuance-authority-forcing-disruptive-token-architecture-migrations.md]]
+- MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md
+- ownership coin treasuries should be actively managed through buybacks and token sales as continuous capital calibration not treated as static war chests.md
+- futarchy-daos-require-mintable-governance-tokens-because-fixed-supply-treasuries-exhaust-without-issuance-authority-forcing-disruptive-token-architecture-migrations.md
 
 Topics:
-- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
-- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]
+- domains/internet-finance/_map
+- core/mechanisms/_map

entities/internet-finance/deans-list.md

@@ -33,20 +33,20 @@ Services DAO on Solana providing professional user feedback, QA, marketing, and
 Dean's List is interesting not as a standalone company but as an adoption data point. It demonstrates that futarchy governance can be adopted by organizations outside of MetaDAO's direct ecosystem — a services DAO using market-based governance for operational decisions. If more existing DAOs migrate from Snapshot/token voting to futarchy, that validates the governance evolution thesis.
 
 ## Relationship to KB
-- [[DAO governance degenerates into political capture because proposal processes select for coalition-building skill over operational competence and the resulting bureaucracy creates structural speed disadvantages against focused competitors]] — Dean's List moved from token voting to futarchy to escape this
+- DAO governance degenerates into political capture because proposal processes select for coalition-building skill over operational competence and the resulting bureaucracy creates structural speed disadvantages against focused competitors — Dean's List moved from token voting to futarchy to escape this
 - [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]] — Dean's List may use futarchy selectively for high-stakes decisions
 
 ---
 
 Relevant Entities:
-- [[metadao]] — governance platform
+- metadao — governance platform
 
 Topics:
 - [[internet finance and decision markets]]
 
 ## Timeline
 
-- **2024-12-19** — [[deans-list-implement-3-week-vesting]] passed: 3-week linear vesting for DAO payments to reduce sell pressure from 80% immediate liquidation to 33% weekly rate, projected 15%-25% valuation increase
+- **2024-12-19** — deans-list-implement-3-week-vesting passed: 3-week linear vesting for DAO payments to reduce sell pressure from 80% immediate liquidation to 33% weekly rate, projected 15%-25% valuation increase
 
 - **2024-07-18** — [[deans-list-enhancing-economic-model]] proposed: transition from USDC payments to $DEAN token distributions funded by systematic buybacks (20% treasury tax in USDC, 80% used for market purchases)
 - **2024-07-22** — [[deans-list-enhancing-economic-model]] passed: economic model restructure approved via futarchy governance, implementing USDC-to-DEAN buyback mechanism with projected 5.33% FDV increase