diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/cftc-anprm-comment-record-closes-with-1500-submissions-and-zero-governance-market-mentions-suggesting-nprm-will-be-calibrated-to-sports-election-event-contract-patterns.md b/domains/internet-finance/cftc-anprm-comment-record-closes-with-1500-submissions-and-zero-governance-market-mentions-suggesting-nprm-will-be-calibrated-to-sports-election-event-contract-patterns.md
index 79eda0de0..8dbb4b19a 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/cftc-anprm-comment-record-closes-with-1500-submissions-and-zero-governance-market-mentions-suggesting-nprm-will-be-calibrated-to-sports-election-event-contract-patterns.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/cftc-anprm-comment-record-closes-with-1500-submissions-and-zero-governance-market-mentions-suggesting-nprm-will-be-calibrated-to-sports-election-event-contract-patterns.md
@@ -24,3 +24,10 @@ The CFTC ANPRM comment period closed April 30, 2026 with 1,500+ public submissio
 **Source:** Norton Rose Fulbright ANPRM analysis, May 2026
 
 Norton Rose's comprehensive post-SJC regulatory landscape summary covers the ANPRM process and solicits comments on 'public interest implications of gaming and sports competition' but makes no mention of governance markets, futarchy, or decision markets. This confirms the structural gap in the regulatory discourse extends beyond the comment record to the legal analysis layer.
+
+
+## Extending Evidence
+
+**Source:** Congressional Democrats letter timing, April 30 2026
+
+Congressional Democrats' formal letter arrived on the same day the ANPRM comment period closed (April 30, 2026), creating political pressure alongside the formal comment process. The NPRM will now be written in the context of this Congressional demand for economic hedging interest test and prohibition of sports/election contracts. Timing is not coincidental—Democrats are attempting to shape the NPRM through coordinated political pressure.
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/congressional-economic-hedging-test-would-structurally-separate-governance-markets-from-sports-election-contracts.md b/domains/internet-finance/congressional-economic-hedging-test-would-structurally-separate-governance-markets-from-sports-election-contracts.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e268f393d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/congressional-economic-hedging-test-would-structurally-separate-governance-markets-from-sports-election-contracts.md
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: Democrats' proposed test would prohibit event contracts without valid economic hedging interest, creating statutory distinction that governance token holders can satisfy but sports bettors cannot
+confidence: speculative
+source: Congressional Democrats led by Jeff Merkley, April 30 2026 CFTC letter
+created: 2026-05-08
+title: Congressional economic hedging interest test would structurally separate governance markets from sports/election contracts by requiring legitimate hedging purpose
+agent: rio
+sourced_from: internet-finance/2026-04-30-democrats-cftc-restrict-sports-election-contracts-insider-trading.md
+scope: structural
+sourcer: CNBC
+supports: ["cftc-anprm-scope-excludes-governance-markets-through-dcm-external-event-framing"]
+related: ["cftc-anprm-scope-excludes-governance-markets-through-dcm-external-event-framing", "futarchy-governance-markets-risk-regulatory-capture-by-anti-gambling-frameworks-because-the-event-betting-and-organizational-governance-use-cases-are-conflated-in-current-policy-discourse", "metadao-twap-settlement-excludes-event-contract-definition-through-endogenous-price-mechanism"]
+---
+
+# Congressional economic hedging interest test would structurally separate governance markets from sports/election contracts by requiring legitimate hedging purpose
+
+Congressional Democrats formally urged the CFTC to prohibit event contracts on elections, war, sports, and government actions WITHOUT a valid economic hedging interest. This test is legally coherent because it extends existing Commodity Exchange Act precedent for futures markets to event contracts. The critical implication: governance markets have a clear hedging argument (governance token holders hedge proposal risk), while sports/election contracts (90% of current DCM volume per Congressional Research Service) would fail this test. Democrats explicitly want to preserve 'the intent of prediction markets' as information aggregation tools while eliminating gambling products. The timing is strategic—this Congressional pressure arrived on the same day the ANPRM comment period closed, attempting to shape the NPRM through political pressure alongside formal comments. If enacted, this would create a three-way category split: (1) prohibited sports/election gambling, (2) permitted hedging-motivated governance markets, (3) offshore/unregulated prediction markets.
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/prediction-market-boom-is-primarily-a-sports-gambling-boom-which-weakens-the-information-aggregation-narrative.md b/domains/internet-finance/prediction-market-boom-is-primarily-a-sports-gambling-boom-which-weakens-the-information-aggregation-narrative.md
index b1e86ee6d..6e3089a12 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/prediction-market-boom-is-primarily-a-sports-gambling-boom-which-weakens-the-information-aggregation-narrative.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/prediction-market-boom-is-primarily-a-sports-gambling-boom-which-weakens-the-information-aggregation-narrative.md
@@ -122,3 +122,10 @@ CFTC's enforcement priorities list 'insider trading in prediction markets' as pr
 **Source:** CNBC/Bank of America, April 2026
 
 Bank of America data cited by CNBC shows sports make up approximately 90% of Kalshi's trading volume as of April 2026, making the sports event contract question 'existentially important for Kalshi's business.' This confirms sports gambling, not information aggregation, drives prediction market adoption.
+
+
+## Supporting Evidence
+
+**Source:** Congressional Democrats letter citing CRS data, April 30 2026
+
+Congressional Research Service data shows sports contracts are 90% of Kalshi's betting volume for the year ending February 2026. Democrats argue these sports contracts are 'virtually indistinguishable from products available on DraftKings and FanDuel.' CFTC Chair Selig appeared unable to distinguish between an unlabeled sports bet and an unlabeled event contract on the same baseball game in live testimony at April 17 hearing.
diff --git a/inbox/queue/2026-04-30-democrats-cftc-restrict-sports-election-contracts-insider-trading.md b/inbox/archive/internet-finance/2026-04-30-democrats-cftc-restrict-sports-election-contracts-insider-trading.md
similarity index 98%
rename from inbox/queue/2026-04-30-democrats-cftc-restrict-sports-election-contracts-insider-trading.md
rename to inbox/archive/internet-finance/2026-04-30-democrats-cftc-restrict-sports-election-contracts-insider-trading.md
index 14e6aab59..a09a896f6 100644
--- a/inbox/queue/2026-04-30-democrats-cftc-restrict-sports-election-contracts-insider-trading.md
+++ b/inbox/archive/internet-finance/2026-04-30-democrats-cftc-restrict-sports-election-contracts-insider-trading.md
@@ -7,10 +7,13 @@ date: 2026-04-30
 domain: internet-finance
 secondary_domains: []
 format: article
-status: unprocessed
+status: processed
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2026-05-08
 priority: high
 tags: [cftc, congress, prediction-markets, sports-betting, insider-trading, event-contracts, regulation]
 intake_tier: research-task
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
 ---
 
 ## Content