diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md
index e8bb5e51..44a57ffd 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md	
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md	
@@ -97,6 +97,12 @@ The MetaDAO governance proposal is described as 'intentionally broad and operati
 
 Proposal 1's incomplete text ('A bribe market already exists, but it\s') suggests documentation and proposal clarity issues in early MetaDAO governance, providing concrete evidence of the proposal complexity friction identified in existing claims.
 
+### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+*Source: [[2026-03-24-tg-shared-unknown-metadao-appoint-nallok-proph3t]] | Added: 2026-03-26*
+
+MetaDAO's decision to appoint temporary dictators was explicitly motivated by the 'costly and time-consuming proposal process' that created execution bottlenecks. The proposal granted authority over 'off-chain proposal process management' among other operational areas, suggesting that the futarchy mechanism itself was creating friction in day-to-day operations. The OKR to 'Execute faster: Complete 10 GitHub issues per week' indicates that the governance process was materially slowing development velocity.
+
+
 
 
 
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate governance scaffolding for treasury operations because market mechanisms alone cannot provide operational security and legal compliance.md b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate governance scaffolding for treasury operations because market mechanisms alone cannot provide operational security and legal compliance.md
index ee073c10..5483065a 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate governance scaffolding for treasury operations because market mechanisms alone cannot provide operational security and legal compliance.md	
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate governance scaffolding for treasury operations because market mechanisms alone cannot provide operational security and legal compliance.md	
@@ -50,6 +50,12 @@ MetaDAO's rejection of ISC treasury diversification shows futarchy markets apply
 
 MetaDAO appointed Proph3t and Nallok as 'Benevolent Dictators For 3 Months' (BDF3M) with authority over retroactive compensation, business operations, contributor compensation, and security improvements. The proposal explicitly stated this was to address 'slow execution speed caused by a costly and time-consuming proposal process' and estimated failure would decrease success probability by over 20%. The three-month term was designed as a bridge until futarchy could function autonomously.
 
+### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+*Source: [[2026-03-24-tg-shared-unknown-metadao-appoint-nallok-proph3t]] | Added: 2026-03-26*
+
+MetaDAO appointed Proph3t and Nallok as 'Benevolent Dictators For 3 Months' (BDF3M) with authority over retroactive compensation, business operations, contributor compensation, and security improvements. The proposal explicitly stated that MetaDAO's 'slow execution speed caused by a costly and time-consuming proposal process' required temporary centralized leadership. The proposers estimated that failure would decrease MetaDAO's success probability by over 20%, framing this as an existential decision point. The three-month term was designed as a bridge until futarchy could function autonomously.
+
+
 
 Relevant Notes:
 - [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]] — extends to operations: markets for strategy, procedures for execution
diff --git a/inbox/queue/2026-03-24-tg-shared-unknown-metadao-appoint-nallok-proph3t.md b/inbox/queue/2026-03-24-tg-shared-unknown-metadao-appoint-nallok-proph3t.md
index 9e3c593a..39f8c3a0 100644
--- a/inbox/queue/2026-03-24-tg-shared-unknown-metadao-appoint-nallok-proph3t.md
+++ b/inbox/queue/2026-03-24-tg-shared-unknown-metadao-appoint-nallok-proph3t.md
@@ -15,6 +15,10 @@ processed_by: rio
 processed_date: 2026-03-24
 enrichments_applied: ["futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate governance scaffolding for treasury operations because market mechanisms alone cannot provide operational security and legal compliance.md", "futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md"]
 extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2026-03-26
+enrichments_applied: ["futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate governance scaffolding for treasury operations because market mechanisms alone cannot provide operational security and legal compliance.md", "futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md"]
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
 ---
 
 # unknown — Tweet/Thread
@@ -34,3 +38,13 @@ teleo-codex/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-appoint-nallok-proph3t-benevolent
 - OKRs included: 10 GitHub issues per week, handle retroactive compensation within 1 week, oversee new landing page
 - Proposer: HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz
 - Proposal number: 14 on MetaDAO
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- MetaDAO BDF3M proposal passed on 2024-03-31
+- Total compensation: 1015 META + 100,000 USDC for 7 months (4 retroactive + 3 forward)
+- Average monthly compensation: 145 META + $14,000
+- OKRs included: 10 GitHub issues per week, handle retroactive compensation within 1 week, oversee new landing page
+- Proposer: HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz
+- Proposal number: 14 on MetaDAO
+- Estimated success impact: -20% if failed