teleo/teleo-codex
8
0
Fork 0
Code Issues 22 Pull requests 11 Projects Releases Packages Wiki Activity Actions 1

extract: 2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy

Browse source
This commit is contained in:
Teleo Agents 2026-03-16 10:40:41 +00:00
parent 8139841a10
commit 789d291b4d
5 changed files with 38 additions and 1 deletions
Show stats Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

6
domains/internet-finance/amm-futarchy-reduces-state-rent-costs-by-99-percent-versus-clob-by-eliminating-orderbook-storage-requirements.md
View file

@ -21,6 +21,12 @@ This cost differential becomes material at scale: a DAO running 50 proposals ann
- AMM state requirements described as "almost nothing"
- State rent recovery requires autocrat program migration (feedback section)
### Additional Evidence (confirm)
*Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
MetaDAO proposal CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG documents specific cost reduction: CLOB market pairs cost 3.75 SOL in state rent per proposal, totaling 135-225 SOL annually ($11,475-$19,125 at 2024 prices) for 3-5 proposals per month. AMMs cost 'almost nothing in state rent' by comparison. Proposal passed and was implemented 2024-01-29.
---
Relevant Notes:

6
domains/internet-finance/futarchy-clob-liquidity-fragmentation-creates-wide-spreads-because-pricing-counterfactual-governance-outcomes-has-inherent-uncertainty.md
View file

@ -23,6 +23,12 @@ This connects to [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume
- Expected pattern: liquidity increases as proposal duration progresses
- CLOB minimum order size (1 META) acts as spam filter but fragments liquidity further
### Additional Evidence (confirm)
*Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
MetaDAO identified that 'estimating a fair price for the future value of MetaDao under pass/fail conditions is difficult, and most reasonable estimates will have a wide range. This uncertainty discourages people from risking their funds with limit orders near the midpoint price, and has the effect of reducing liquidity (and trading).' This was cited as the main reason for switching from CLOBs to AMMs.
---
Relevant Notes:

6
domains/internet-finance/high-fee-amms-create-lp-incentive-and-manipulation-deterrent-simultaneously-by-making-passive-provision-profitable-and-active-trading-expensive.md
View file

@ -36,6 +36,12 @@ The mechanism depends on futarchy-specific conditions (short duration, governanc
- May reduce legitimate trading volume
- LP attraction depends on base trading activity
### Additional Evidence (confirm)
*Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
MetaDAO proposal specified 3-5% fee structure explicitly designed to 'both: encourage LPs, and aggressively discourage wash-trading and manipulation.' The proposal explains that high fees make price movement through wash trading expensive while creating strong LP incentives.
---
Relevant Notes:

6
domains/internet-finance/liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-solves-futarchy-manipulation-through-capital-commitment-not-vote-counting.md
View file

@ -30,6 +30,12 @@ The proposal acknowledges CLOB manipulation is "a 1/n problem" addressable by de
- No empirical data on manipulation resistance
- High fees may reduce legitimate trading volume
### Additional Evidence (confirm)
*Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
MetaDAO AMM implementation uses 'liquidity-weighted price over time' metric where 'the more liquidity that is on the books, the more weight the current price of the pass or fail market is given. Every time there is a swap, these metrics are updated/aggregated.' This replaced the CLOB midpoint system that was vulnerable to 1 META manipulation.
---
Relevant Notes:

15
inbox/archive/2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy.md
View file

@ -6,9 +6,13 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1P
date: 2024-01-24
domain: internet-finance
format: data
status: unprocessed
status: enrichment
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
event_type: proposal
processed_by: rio
processed_date: 2026-03-16
enrichments_applied: ["amm-futarchy-reduces-state-rent-costs-by-99-percent-versus-clob-by-eliminating-orderbook-storage-requirements.md", "futarchy-clob-liquidity-fragmentation-creates-wide-spreads-because-pricing-counterfactual-governance-outcomes-has-inherent-uncertainty.md", "high-fee-amms-create-lp-incentive-and-manipulation-deterrent-simultaneously-by-making-passive-provision-profitable-and-active-trading-expensive.md", "liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-solves-futarchy-manipulation-through-capital-commitment-not-vote-counting.md"]
extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
---
## Proposal Details
@ -128,3 +132,12 @@ Any important changes or feedback brought up during the proposal vote will be re
- Autocrat version: 0.1
- Completed: 2024-01-29
- Ended: 2024-01-29
## Key Facts
- MetaDAO Proposal #4 (CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG) passed 2024-01-29
- Proposal budget was 400 META on passing + 800 META on completed migration
- Implementation timeline was 3 weeks from passing with additional week for review
- CLOB minimum order size was 1 META as spam filter
- Autocrat v0.1 proposal duration was 3 days
- joebuild wrote program changes, 0xNalloK handled frontend integration