extract: 2024-08-28-futardio-proposal-a-very-unique-title-some-say-its-really-unique

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@ -27,6 +27,12 @@ From the MetaDAO proposal:
This claim extends futarchy-governed-permissionless-launches-require-brand-separation-to-manage-reputational-liability-because-failed-projects-on-a-curated-platform-damage-the-platforms-credibility by showing the reputational concern operates at the mechanism level, not just the platform level. The market's rejection of Futardio suggests futarchy stakeholders prioritize mechanism credibility over short-term adoption metrics.
### Additional Evidence (confirm)
*Source: [[2024-08-28-futardio-proposal-a-very-unique-title-some-say-its-really-unique]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
The futardio proposal explicitly acknowledges reputational risk as a core concern, listing 'Makes futarchy look less serious' and 'May make it harder to sell DeFi DAOs / non-crypto organizations' as potential pitfalls. The proposal ultimately failed, suggesting the market judged the reputational cost as exceeding the adoption benefit. MetaDAO put the decision to futarchy specifically because 'we are not sure whether it makes sense for MetaDAO to release such a platform.'
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Relevant Notes:

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@ -28,6 +28,12 @@ From the proposal:
This claim complements [[coin price is the fairest objective function for asset futarchy]] by identifying the specific context where coin price is unambiguously correct: assets with no purpose beyond speculation. It also relates to [[redistribution proposals are futarchys hardest unsolved problem because they can increase measured welfare while reducing productive value creation]]—memecoins avoid this problem by having no productive value to begin with.
### Additional Evidence (confirm)
*Source: [[2024-08-28-futardio-proposal-a-very-unique-title-some-say-its-really-unique]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
MetaDAO's futardio proposal explicitly identifies memecoin governance as an ideal futarchy use-case because 'memecoin holders only want the price of the token to increase. There's no question of maybe the market knows what's the best short-term action, but not the best long-term action.' The proposal was designed to bootstrap futarchy adoption through memecoin launchpads where each token gets a futarchy DAO.
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Relevant Notes:

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@ -6,9 +6,13 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/GugKjNpirFNaaRkEStRKGJPnutptsnTA3XuCJ8nwaVt
date: 2024-08-28
domain: internet-finance
format: data
status: unprocessed
status: enrichment
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
event_type: proposal
processed_by: rio
processed_date: 2026-03-15
enrichments_applied: ["memecoin-governance-is-ideal-futarchy-use-case-because-single-objective-function-eliminates-long-term-tradeoff-ambiguity.md", "futarchy-governed-memecoin-launchpads-face-reputational-risk-tradeoff-between-adoption-and-credibility.md"]
extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
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## Proposal Details
@ -353,3 +357,14 @@ This would all be left to the discretion of the team building it, but they would
- Autocrat version: 0.3
- Completed: 2024-09-01
- Ended: 2024-09-01
## Key Facts
- Futardio proposal GugKjNpirFNaaRkEStRKGJPnutptsnTA3XuCJ8nwaVtK was created 2024-08-28 and failed 2024-09-01
- Proposal included $100k grant paid over 6 months to development team
- Futardio design: memecoin launchpad where percentage of each token allocated to futarchy DAO, users earn points converting to $FUTA token within 180 days
- FUTA distribution split between points owners and MetaDAO only
- All futardio revenue would flow to vault claimable by FUTA holders
- Platform would be immutable (open-source program, IPFS/Arweave hosting) by token launch
- Nallok and Proph3t would support team but not be core team
- If no team started by end Q3, money would be returned and project cancelled