auto-fix: strip 16 broken wiki links

Pipeline auto-fixer: removed [[ ]] brackets from links
that don't resolve to existing claims in the knowledge base.

inbox/queue/2026-03-25-cftc-anprm-prediction-markets-law-firm-analysis.md

@@ -60,9 +60,9 @@ Truth Predict (Trump Media, March 2026): Trump's media company entering predicti
 **What I expected but didn't find:** Any indication that MetaDAO, Robin Hanson, or Proph3t has submitted or is planning to submit a CFTC comment. META-036 (if it passed) would fund academic research that could inform such a comment, but the practical regulatory window closes before the research would complete.
 
 **KB connections:**
-- [[The gaming classification of prediction markets is the primary regulatory threat to futarchy governance — worse than the securities classification risk]] — this is the direct evidence that the gaming classification risk is unaddressed
-- [[CFTC ANPRM regulatory analysis]] (Session 9 archive, if filed) — enrichment target
-- [[Decentralized mechanism design creates regulatory defensibility]] (Belief #6) — the Howey analysis doesn't help here; the gaming classification requires a completely separate argument
+- The gaming classification of prediction markets is the primary regulatory threat to futarchy governance — worse than the securities classification risk — this is the direct evidence that the gaming classification risk is unaddressed
+- CFTC ANPRM regulatory analysis (Session 9 archive, if filed) — enrichment target
+- Decentralized mechanism design creates regulatory defensibility (Belief #6) — the Howey analysis doesn't help here; the gaming classification requires a completely separate argument
 
 **Extraction hints:**
 1. CLAIM: CFTC ANPRM contains no futarchy-specific questions, creating default gaming classification risk for governance decision markets — high confidence, directly documented

inbox/queue/2026-03-25-futardio-capital-concentration-live-data.md

@@ -57,9 +57,9 @@ Live data from the Futardio homepage, captured March 25, 2026.
 **What I expected but didn't find:** More distributed capital across the 52 launches. I expected the permissionless model to produce a long tail with some winners, like a decentralized VC portfolio. Instead it produced a power law with near-zero tail allocation. This is more extreme than even the Pareto distribution in traditional VC (where top 20% of investments typically return 80%).
 
 **KB connections:**
-- [[Futardio ecosystem]] (Session 6 archive) — this enriches the existing Session 6 observation with current data
-- [[Permissionless capital formation]] — the capital concentration challenges the democratization thesis of removing gatekeepers
-- [[MetaDAO ICO participant composition includes 30-40% passive allocators]] — related: both findings suggest futarchy-governed capital formation doesn't produce the idealized "aligned community of holders" that the ownership coins thesis predicts
+- Futardio ecosystem (Session 6 archive) — this enriches the existing Session 6 observation with current data
+- Permissionless capital formation — the capital concentration challenges the democratization thesis of removing gatekeepers
+- MetaDAO ICO participant composition includes 30-40% passive allocators — related: both findings suggest futarchy-governed capital formation doesn't produce the idealized "aligned community of holders" that the ownership coins thesis predicts
 
 **Extraction hints:**
 1. CLAIM: Permissionless futarchy capital formation concentrates in platform meta-bets — documented evidence from Futardio's 52-launch portfolio

inbox/queue/2026-03-25-metadao-omnibus-migration-proposal.md

@@ -51,9 +51,9 @@ The Squads multisig integration is particularly interesting for the trustless jo
 **What I expected but didn't find:** The proposal text. The 429 rate-limiting on MetaDAO's platform has been a recurring obstacle. This is the third session where a significant governance event is confirmed to exist but content is inaccessible.
 
 **KB connections:**
-- [[Futarchy-governed DAOs can use conditional markets to authorize temporary executive delegation]] (BDF3M meta-governance claim from Session 11) — the Squads integration may be the structural replacement for the temporary centralization
-- [[Futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities]] — program migrations directly affect the manipulation surface area
-- [[Ooki DAO proved entity structure is prerequisite for futarchy vehicles]] — legal document update component may relate to entity structuring
+- Futarchy-governed DAOs can use conditional markets to authorize temporary executive delegation (BDF3M meta-governance claim from Session 11) — the Squads integration may be the structural replacement for the temporary centralization
+- Futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities — program migrations directly affect the manipulation surface area
+- Ooki DAO proved entity structure is prerequisite for futarchy vehicles — legal document update component may relate to entity structuring
 
 **Extraction hints:**
 1. Once proposal text is accessible: extract as evidence for mechanism improvement claim (autocrat migration history pattern)

inbox/queue/2026-03-25-pine-analytics-p2p-me-ico-analysis.md

@@ -58,9 +58,9 @@ Pine Analytics published a comprehensive pre-ICO analysis of P2P.me ahead of the
 **What I expected but didn't find:** Founder backgrounds. The team section is completely blank in every indexed source. This is a meaningful transparency gap for an "ownership" thesis — you're aligned with people you can't identify.
 
 **KB connections:**
-- [[MetaDAO ICO participant composition includes 30-40% passive allocators]] — the 50% float will immediately surface this structural pressure post-TGE
-- [[Ownership alignment turns network effects from extractive to generative]] — the performance-gated vesting is the mechanism design instantiation of this belief
-- [[Futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities]] — contrast with the Polymarket controversy (see separate archive)
+- MetaDAO ICO participant composition includes 30-40% passive allocators — the 50% float will immediately surface this structural pressure post-TGE
+- Ownership alignment turns network effects from extractive to generative — the performance-gated vesting is the mechanism design instantiation of this belief
+- Futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities — contrast with the Polymarket controversy (see separate archive)
 
 **Extraction hints:**
 1. CLAIM: Performance-gated team vesting (no benefit below 2x ICO price) eliminates early insider selling as an ownership alignment mechanism — extract as a mechanism design innovation claim

inbox/queue/2026-03-25-polymarket-p2p-commitment-market-controversy.md

@@ -50,8 +50,8 @@ The highest-information actor (P2P team, who controls business decisions) can pu
 **What I expected but didn't find:** A formal Polymarket ruling or investigation. The allegation appears in the comment thread, not in any official announcement. This may mean: (a) Polymarket investigated and found nothing, (b) Polymarket hasn't investigated, or (c) the allegation was low-quality. Cannot determine which from available data.
 
 **KB connections:**
-- [[Futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities]] — this is a DIFFERENT manipulation type (prediction market social proof, not governance market)
-- [[Speculative markets aggregate information only when participants have incentives to acquire and reveal information (Mechanism B)]] — team participation corrupts Mechanism B by making the highest-information actor self-interested in the prediction
+- Futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities — this is a DIFFERENT manipulation type (prediction market social proof, not governance market)
+- Speculative markets aggregate information only when participants have incentives to acquire and reveal information (Mechanism B) — team participation corrupts Mechanism B by making the highest-information actor self-interested in the prediction
 
 **Extraction hints:**
 1. CLAIM CANDIDATE: Prediction market participation by project issuers in their own commitment markets creates circular social proof with no arbitrage correction — novel mechanism risk not in KB

inbox/queue/2026-03-25-prediction-market-institutional-legitimization.md

@@ -42,8 +42,8 @@ Two March 2026 developments signal accelerating institutional adoption of predic
 **What I expected but didn't find:** Any 5c(c) Capital statement on the types of prediction market companies they'll invest in. If they invest in governance decision market platforms (futarchy), they become natural allies for regulatory advocacy. If they invest only in event prediction platforms, they're separate interests.
 
 **KB connections:**
-- [[Markets beat votes for information aggregation]] (Belief #1) — institutional legitimization is indirect evidence for societal acceptance of the "markets as better mechanism" thesis
-- [[CFTC ANPRM futarchy advocacy gap]] (see separate archive) — the institutional players mobilizing around prediction markets may or may not include futarchy advocates
+- Markets beat votes for information aggregation (Belief #1) — institutional legitimization is indirect evidence for societal acceptance of the "markets as better mechanism" thesis
+- CFTC ANPRM futarchy advocacy gap (see separate archive) — the institutional players mobilizing around prediction markets may or may not include futarchy advocates
 
 **Extraction hints:**
 1. CLAIM: Prediction market founders creating dedicated VC funds signals industry maturation beyond platform-building into capital formation infrastructure — institutional legitimization milestone