auto-fix: strip 11 broken wiki links

Pipeline auto-fixer: removed [[ ]] brackets from links
that don't resolve to existing claims in the knowledge base.

inbox/queue/2026-03-30-p2p-me-insider-trading-polymarket-metadao-fundraise.md

@@ -53,8 +53,8 @@ Some legal observers said the $3M oral Multicoin commitment constituted MNPI —
 
 **KB connections:**
 - Identity.md blindspot: "Drafted a post defending team members betting on their own fundraise outcome on Polymarket. Framed it as 'reflexivity, not manipulation.' m3ta killed it." — this is the exact scenario playing out
-- [[Legacy ICOs failed because team treasury control created extraction incentives that scaled with success]] — P2P.me is a variant: not treasury extraction but MNPI-based prediction market profit during a futarchy-governed ICO
-- [[MetaDAO empirical results show smaller participants gaining influence through futarchy]] — the P2P.me controversy creates a governance quality question: if insiders can place correlated bets, does the futarchy signal get contaminated?
+- Legacy ICOs failed because team treasury control created extraction incentives that scaled with success — P2P.me is a variant: not treasury extraction but MNPI-based prediction market profit during a futarchy-governed ICO
+- MetaDAO empirical results show smaller participants gaining influence through futarchy — the P2P.me controversy creates a governance quality question: if insiders can place correlated bets, does the futarchy signal get contaminated?
 - [[futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for arbitrageurs]] — this case tests the manipulation resistance claim under MNPI conditions. The manipulation was on Polymarket (not MetaDAO's governance market), but the MNPI came from the MetaDAO ICO context.
 
 **Extraction hints:**

inbox/queue/2026-04-21-kalshi-polymarket-crypto-perps-dcm-pivot.md

@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ This is a deliberate product expansion using prediction market DCM licenses as r
 **What I expected but didn't find:** Any CFTC pushback on prediction market platforms entering the crypto perps market. Chairman Selig appears to actively support it — the prediction market regulatory framework is being used to create a new class of regulated crypto exchange.
 
 **KB connections:**
-- [[Internet finance is an industry transition from traditional finance where the attractor state replaces intermediaries with programmable coordination and market-tested governance]] — perps launch shows prediction market infrastructure enabling competition against traditional exchange intermediaries
+- Internet finance is an industry transition from traditional finance where the attractor state replaces intermediaries with programmable coordination and market-tested governance — perps launch shows prediction market infrastructure enabling competition against traditional exchange intermediaries
 - [[permissionless leverage on metaDAO ecosystem tokens catalyzes trading volume and price discovery that strengthens governance by making futarchy markets more liquid]] — the perps competition validates leverage's role in market ecosystem development
 - Pattern: Three-way category split (regulated DCMs / offshore decentralized / on-chain governance markets) now confirmed by product launches
 
@@ -54,6 +54,6 @@ This is a deliberate product expansion using prediction market DCM licenses as r
 **Context:** Perps launch puts Kalshi and Polymarket in direct competition with Coinbase, which is simultaneously fighting New York AG enforcement of state gambling laws. The regulatory asymmetry: Coinbase faces state AG targeting for prediction market offerings; Kalshi/Polymarket face state AG targeting for prediction market offerings AND are competing against Coinbase in perps. Coinbase and Kalshi are both defendants in state prediction market cases AND direct competitors in perps.
 
 ## Curator Notes
-PRIMARY CONNECTION: [[Internet finance is an industry transition from traditional finance where the attractor state replaces intermediaries with programmable coordination and market-tested governance]]
-WHY ARCHIVED: Confirms the structural three-way category split; tests Belief #1's disconfirmation target (incumbentization vs. displacement); directly relevant to [[permissionless leverage on metaDAO ecosystem tokens catalyzes trading volume and price discovery]]
+PRIMARY CONNECTION: Internet finance is an industry transition from traditional finance where the attractor state replaces intermediaries with programmable coordination and market-tested governance
+WHY ARCHIVED: Confirms the structural three-way category split; tests Belief #1's disconfirmation target (incumbentization vs. displacement); directly relevant to permissionless leverage on metaDAO ecosystem tokens catalyzes trading volume and price discovery
 EXTRACTION HINT: The "regulatory wedge" framing — prediction market DCM license as the mechanism for entering traditional exchange markets — is the key claim to extract. Also the three-way split claim has been building for 3 sessions and this source confirms it.

inbox/queue/2026-04-24-cftc-sues-new-york-prediction-markets-fifth-state.md

@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ New York AG Letitia James sued Coinbase and Gemini for their prediction market o
 **What I expected but didn't find:** Any CFTC TRO motion in New York (vs. Arizona where TRO was filed immediately). The SDNY case appears to be filed as a complaint for declaratory/injunctive relief, not as an emergency TRO request — suggesting CFTC may be treating New York's enforcement as less urgently harmful than Arizona's criminal prosecution.
 
 **KB connections:**
-- [[Internet finance is an industry transition from traditional finance where the attractor state replaces intermediaries with programmable coordination and market-tested governance]] — the New York enforcement theory threatens a much wider swath of programmable coordination infrastructure than previous state actions
+- Internet finance is an industry transition from traditional finance where the attractor state replaces intermediaries with programmable coordination and market-tested governance — the New York enforcement theory threatens a much wider swath of programmable coordination infrastructure than previous state actions
 - Pattern: 5 states now under CFTC lawsuit. The CFTC is running a multi-front legal campaign while simultaneously being squeezed by Democrats in Congress. This is institutional overextension.
 
 **Extraction hints:**

inbox/queue/2026-04-30-arthur-hayes-hype-prediction-market-weapon.md

@@ -56,8 +56,8 @@ Arthur Hayes (Maelstrom Capital CIO) published analysis on April 30 arguing that
 **What I expected but didn't find:** Any Polymarket response to the HYPE threat — no announcement of POLY token staking mechanism, no zero-fee counter-offering. Polymarket's regulatory constraints (DCM rules) may prevent the kind of token value accrual model Hyperliquid can offer offshore.
 
 **KB connections:**
-- [[Ownership alignment turns network effects from extractive to generative]] — direct empirical validation from prediction market platform competition
-- [[Community ownership accelerates growth through aligned evangelism not passive holding]] — the 3.3% → 12% crossover shows ownership-aligned users ARE higher-value users
+- Ownership alignment turns network effects from extractive to generative — direct empirical validation from prediction market platform competition
+- Community ownership accelerates growth through aligned evangelism not passive holding — the 3.3% → 12% crossover shows ownership-aligned users ARE higher-value users
 - [[permissionless leverage on metaDAO ecosystem tokens catalyzes trading volume and price discovery that strengthens governance by making futarchy markets more liquid]] — HYPE's staking mechanic as prediction market incentive layer parallels how leverage enlivens MetaDAO governance markets
 - Prediction market platform competition as empirical test of Belief #4 — strongest test seen in 33 sessions
 
@@ -68,6 +68,6 @@ Arthur Hayes (Maelstrom Capital CIO) published analysis on April 30 arguing that
 **Context:** Hayes is Maelstrom Capital CIO and a major crypto investor. His track record includes correct early calls on Ethereum (2015), BitMEX's perps model as the dominant crypto product, and the post-FTX "crypto winter is over" thesis. He is directionally right more often than wrong on crypto market structure. His HYPE thesis deserves weight.
 
 ## Curator Notes
-PRIMARY CONNECTION: [[Ownership alignment turns network effects from extractive to generative]]
+PRIMARY CONNECTION: Ownership alignment turns network effects from extractive to generative
 WHY ARCHIVED: Strongest empirical test of Belief #4 seen in 33 sessions; the 3.3%→12% volume crossover is a quantified ownership alignment effect; Hayes's prediction creates a testable hypothesis for when HIP-4 mainnet launches
 EXTRACTION HINT: Focus on the ownership alignment premium in FDV ratios AND the per-user volume differential as evidence that ownership-aligned platforms attract disproportionately high-value users (information aggregation mechanism via selection)

inbox/queue/2026-05-01-metadao-39m-cumulative-fundraising-11-projects.md

@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ As of May 1, 2026, MetaDAO has achieved:
 **What I expected but didn't find:** Current governance proposal activity data (number of active proposals, pass/fail rates, TWAP data). The $39.6M figure is a cumulative fundraising metric; I don't have current governance health data.
 
 **KB connections:**
-- [[MetaDAO empirical results show smaller participants gaining influence through futarchy]] — the $39.6M across 11 projects updates the evidence base for this claim
+- MetaDAO empirical results show smaller participants gaining influence through futarchy — the $39.6M across 11 projects updates the evidence base for this claim
 - [[futarchy-based fundraising creates regulatory separation because there are no beneficial owners and investment decisions emerge from market forces not centralized control]] — the cumulative ICO data is the empirical track record of futarchy-governed capital formation
 - The P2P.me controversy (same session archive): platform survived a governance controversy, which is evidence for resilience of the futarchy model
 
@@ -55,6 +55,6 @@ As of May 1, 2026, MetaDAO has achieved:
 **Context:** Messari is the primary research database for MetaDAO data; their figures are the most reliable available. The Blockworks Umbra coverage provides the oversubscription figure. Alea Research's MetaDAO analysis (archived from Session 2) provides the Q4 2025 baseline.
 
 ## Curator Notes
-PRIMARY CONNECTION: [[MetaDAO empirical results show smaller participants gaining influence through futarchy]]
+PRIMARY CONNECTION: MetaDAO empirical results show smaller participants gaining influence through futarchy
 WHY ARCHIVED: $39.6M cumulative is the current empirical baseline for futarchy-governed capital formation; Umbra's 1169% oversubscription is the most extreme demand signal in MetaDAO's history and needs extraction/verification
 EXTRACTION HINT: Verify whether Umbra's $750M is the raise target or a market cap figure before extracting — the oversubscription math changes based on which interpretation is correct