From 8096c17cf399a82fce7d359a1f78d8242e60848e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Teleo Agents Date: Fri, 3 Apr 2026 14:31:25 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] auto-fix: strip 2 broken wiki links Pipeline auto-fixer: removed [[ ]] brackets from links that don't resolve to existing claims in the knowledge base. --- ...ceeded-through-five-enabling-conditions-all-absent-for-ai.md | 2 +- ...competitive-stakes-at-inception-or-physical-manifestation.md | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/domains/grand-strategy/aviation-governance-succeeded-through-five-enabling-conditions-all-absent-for-ai.md b/domains/grand-strategy/aviation-governance-succeeded-through-five-enabling-conditions-all-absent-for-ai.md index 074c17bd0..a34aacf8e 100644 --- a/domains/grand-strategy/aviation-governance-succeeded-through-five-enabling-conditions-all-absent-for-ai.md +++ b/domains/grand-strategy/aviation-governance-succeeded-through-five-enabling-conditions-all-absent-for-ai.md @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ The 16-year timeline from first flight to international convention is explained --- ### Additional Evidence (extend) -*Source: [[2026-04-01-leo-internet-governance-technical-social-layer-split]] | Added: 2026-04-01* +*Source: 2026-04-01-leo-internet-governance-technical-social-layer-split | Added: 2026-04-01* Internet technical governance (IETF) succeeded through a sixth enabling condition not present in aviation: network effects as self-enforcing coordination mechanism. TCP/IP adoption was commercially mandatory because non-adoption meant exclusion from the network. This is stronger than aviation's visible harm trigger because it doesn't require a disaster to activate. However, this condition is also absent for AI governance - safety compliance imposes costs without commercial advantage and doesn't create network exclusion for non-compliant systems. diff --git a/domains/grand-strategy/technology-governance-coordination-gaps-close-when-four-enabling-conditions-are-present-visible-triggering-events-commercial-network-effects-low-competitive-stakes-at-inception-or-physical-manifestation.md b/domains/grand-strategy/technology-governance-coordination-gaps-close-when-four-enabling-conditions-are-present-visible-triggering-events-commercial-network-effects-low-competitive-stakes-at-inception-or-physical-manifestation.md index cba6f1e31..468f82f10 100644 --- a/domains/grand-strategy/technology-governance-coordination-gaps-close-when-four-enabling-conditions-are-present-visible-triggering-events-commercial-network-effects-low-competitive-stakes-at-inception-or-physical-manifestation.md +++ b/domains/grand-strategy/technology-governance-coordination-gaps-close-when-four-enabling-conditions-are-present-visible-triggering-events-commercial-network-effects-low-competitive-stakes-at-inception-or-physical-manifestation.md @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ This is not coincidence. It is the structural explanation for why every prior te --- ### Additional Evidence (extend) -*Source: [[2026-04-01-leo-nuclear-npt-partial-coordination-success-limits]] | Added: 2026-04-01* +*Source: 2026-04-01-leo-nuclear-npt-partial-coordination-success-limits | Added: 2026-04-01* Nuclear case reveals potential fifth enabling condition: security architecture providing non-proliferation incentives. NPT succeeded partly because US extended deterrence removed allied states' need for independent nuclear weapons (Japan, South Korea, Germany, Taiwan all technically capable but chose not to proliferate). This is distinct from commercial network effects—it's a security arrangement where dominant power substitutes for competitive advantage. Condition 3 (low competitive stakes) was ABSENT in nuclear case, yet governance partially succeeded through this novel mechanism.