rio: extract from 2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md
- Source: inbox/archive/2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md - Domain: internet-finance - Extracted by: headless extraction cron (worker 4) Pentagon-Agent: Rio <HEADLESS>
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@ -82,6 +82,12 @@ Futardio cult launch (2026-03-03 to 2026-03-04) demonstrates MetaDAO's platform
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(challenge) Areal's failed Futardio launch ($11,654 raised of $50K target, REFUNDING status) demonstrates that futarchy-governed fundraising does not guarantee capital formation success. The mechanism provides credible exit guarantees through market-governed liquidation and governance quality through conditional markets, but market participants still evaluate project fundamentals and team credibility. Futarchy reduces rug risk but does not eliminate market skepticism of unproven business models or early-stage teams.
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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(extend) COAL's Meta-PoW proposal demonstrates a new pattern for ownership coin economics: using futarchy governance to approve a complex multi-token system (COAL, ORE, INGOT, WOOD) with algorithmic supply controls. The proposal passed on 2025-11-10 after being created on 2025-11-07, showing MetaDAO's ability to evaluate and approve sophisticated economic mechanisms through conditional markets. The system includes dynamic license fees (c(y) = c0 * (y/y_ref)^p), evergreen tool durability with 4% daily decay, and a treasury accumulation mechanism targeting ~1 ORE/day per active pickaxe. This extends MetaDAO's role beyond simple fundraising to governance of intricate token economic architectures.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -32,6 +32,12 @@ The connection to futarchy governance is important. Since [[MetaDAOs Autocrat pr
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- If performance metrics are poorly chosen, dynamic minting could be more inflationary than fixed schedules, diluting holders during periods of metric gaming
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- Without robust oracle or futarchy verification of performance claims, this reduces to governance theater with extra steps
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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(extend) COAL's Meta-PoW implements halving-band emissions where daily emission rate R_t = R_0 * 2^(-k_t) decreases as circulation increases, with k_t = floor((C_t - C_0) / h) where h = 1,250,000 COAL (5% of 25M max supply). Initial rate R_0 = 11,250 COAL/day. However, emissions are gated through pickaxe ownership rather than distributed directly, and pickaxe crafting costs adjust dynamically via c(y) = c0 * (y/y_ref)^p based on COAL/ORE price ratio. This creates a two-layer performance mechanism: halving bands reduce base emissions over time, while dynamic license fees throttle access to those emissions based on token price performance. The combination means emission access becomes more expensive as COAL weakens (y increases), creating automatic supply discipline without governance intervention.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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---
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type: claim
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domain: internet-finance
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description: "COAL's c(y) = c0 * (y/y_ref)^p formula adjusts mining entry cost based on COAL/ORE price ratio, enabling automatic supply throttling"
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confidence: experimental
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source: "futard.io, Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol proposal, 2025-11-07"
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created: 2026-03-11
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---
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# Dynamic license fees using price ratio exponents create automatic supply throttling in token economies without governance intervention
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COAL's Meta-PoW introduces a pickaxe crafting license fee that adjusts algorithmically based on the COAL/ORE price ratio: c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^p, where y = P_ORE / P_COAL. With suggested parameters c0 = 200 COAL, y_ref = 50, p = 3, and bounds c_min = 1 to c_max = 300, this creates a cubic response to price changes.
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When COAL strengthens relative to ORE (y decreases), the license cost drops, making pickaxe crafting economically viable for more players. This increases mining activity, INGOT smelting, and ORE inflow to the treasury. When COAL weakens relative to ORE (y increases), the license cost rises sharply (cubic exponent), throttling new pickaxe creation and reducing system load without requiring governance votes or manual intervention.
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The mechanism uses an EMA-smoothed TWAP for the price ratio to prevent manipulation and short-term volatility from triggering inappropriate adjustments. The license fee is paid in COAL and burned (not sent to treasury), making it a pure control parameter rather than a revenue mechanism.
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## Evidence
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From the Meta-PoW proposal:
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- "c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^p, Clamped so that c_min ≤ c(y) ≤ c_max"
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- "Suggested defaults: c0 = 200 COAL, y_ref = 50, p = 3, c_min = 1, c_max = 300"
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- "When COAL is strong relative to ORE (y low): c(y) decreases, More picks are economically viable, More smelting and more ORE flows into the treasury"
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- "When COAL is weak relative to ORE (y high): c(y) increases, Crafting slows, The system self-throttles without intervention"
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- "The license is paid in COAL only. That COAL is burned, not sent to the treasury. It is a control parameter, not a revenue stream"
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- "y = P_ORE / P_COAL using an EMA-smoothed TWAP"
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## Mechanism Comparison
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This differs from fixed license fees (no price responsiveness), linear adjustments (insufficient throttling range), or governance-voted changes (too slow and politically contentious). The cubic exponent (p = 3) means a 2x increase in y produces an 8x increase in license cost, creating strong negative feedback when COAL weakens. The clamping bounds (1 to 300 COAL) prevent extreme values while preserving the core dynamic. The use of price ratio rather than absolute price makes the system robust to overall market conditions—it responds to relative value between COAL and ORE, not USD denomination.
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---
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Topics:
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- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
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---
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type: claim
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domain: internet-finance
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description: "COAL's Meta-PoW uses 4% daily decay with repair cheaper than recrafting to stabilize mining behavior and treasury inflow"
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confidence: experimental
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source: "futard.io, Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol proposal, 2025-11-07"
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created: 2026-03-11
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---
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# Meta-PoW implements evergreen tool economics where repair costs less than recrafting, creating stable demand for INGOT and predictable ORE treasury inflow
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COAL's Meta-PoW proposal introduces a tool durability system where pickaxes decay by 4% per day if not repaired, but repair costs (0.082643 INGOT + 0.3 WOOD daily) are deliberately set lower than the cost of crafting a new pickaxe (1 INGOT + 8 WOOD + c(y) COAL license). This creates a rational incentive for players to maintain existing tools rather than constantly recrafting, which stabilizes the number of active mining tools and creates predictable demand for INGOT smelting.
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The evergreen design means tools never permanently break—skipped repairs accumulate as debt that can be paid later to restore full power. This eliminates the boom-bust cycle of tool creation and abandonment that would destabilize treasury inflows.
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The calibration targets approximately 1 ORE per day flowing to the COAL treasury per fully maintained pickaxe. Since repair is cheaper than recrafting, rational players maintain their gear, making the count of active fully-repaired picks the key state variable for predicting ORE accumulation.
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## Evidence
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From the Meta-PoW proposal:
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- "Each pick has power p between 0 and 1. If repaired for the day, p stays at 1. If not repaired, p decays by 4% per day: p_next = 0.96 * p"
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- "Daily repair cost to maintain full power: r_ing_total INGOT, 0.3 WOOD. Current calibration: r_ing_total ≈ 0.082643 INGOT per day"
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- "Crafting a pickaxe: 1 INGOT, 8 WOOD, c(y) COAL burned as a license"
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- "Tools are evergreen and cheaper to repair than to recraft, so players maintain their gear instead of churning it"
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- "A fully maintained pick effectively corresponds to about 1 ORE/day of smelt demand into the treasury"
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## Mechanism Design
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The repair-vs-recraft ratio is the critical parameter. If repair were more expensive than recrafting, players would abandon degraded tools and craft new ones, creating volatile INGOT demand. By making repair consistently cheaper, the system incentivizes tool longevity and transforms mining behavior from episodic crafting to continuous maintenance.
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The 4% daily decay rate creates meaningful pressure (tools lose half their power in ~17 days without repair) while the accumulated repair debt mechanism prevents permanent tool loss. This design converts what would be a discrete, bursty economic activity (crafting new tools) into a smooth, predictable flow (daily repairs), enabling the treasury to model ORE inflow as a function of active tool count.
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---
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Topics:
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- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
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---
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type: claim
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domain: internet-finance
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description: "COAL separates COAL burns from ORE payments to independently optimize supply control and treasury accumulation"
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confidence: experimental
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source: "futard.io, Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol proposal, 2025-11-07"
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created: 2026-03-11
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---
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# Treasury inflow mechanisms that separate burn from payment enable dual optimization of supply control and asset accumulation
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COAL's Meta-PoW architecture burns COAL at two distinct points—pickaxe license fees and INGOT smelting—but only captures ORE treasury inflow at the smelting step. This separation creates independent optimization surfaces: COAL burns control token supply and mining entry costs, while ORE payments accumulate hard assets in the treasury without being coupled to the burn rate.
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The pickaxe license c(y) burns COAL as a dynamic throttle on mining activity but sends nothing to the treasury. The smelting process burns 100 COAL per INGOT and requires a payment of μ ORE (currently ~12.10 ORE) that goes entirely to the COAL treasury. This means the treasury accumulates ORE at a rate determined by INGOT demand (driven by tool crafting and repair), while COAL supply is controlled by both license burns and smelting burns.
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The design allows governance to tune treasury accumulation (by adjusting μ) independently from supply throttling (by adjusting license parameters c0, y_ref, p). A single combined burn-and-payment mechanism would force tradeoffs between these objectives: if license fees required ORE payment, treasury inflow would spike during COAL strength (when licenses are cheap and crafting increases) but the system would accumulate less ORE per active tool. By concentrating ORE payment at smelting, the treasury inflow becomes proportional to active tool count rather than tool creation rate.
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## Evidence
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From the Meta-PoW proposal:
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- "To smelt 1 INGOT: Burn 100 COAL, Pay μ ORE to the COAL treasury. Current μ ≈ 12.10 ORE per INGOT"
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- "ORE enters only at smelt. No ORE is charged at craft or repair"
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- "Crafting a pickaxe: 1 INGOT, 8 WOOD, c(y) COAL burned as a license"
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- "The license is paid in COAL only. That COAL is burned, not sent to the treasury. It is a control parameter, not a revenue stream"
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- "All ORE paid at smelt goes to the COAL treasury"
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- "Each active, fully repaired pick is designed to support approximately: 1 ORE per day of inflow to the treasury, 8.26 COAL per day burned via smelting"
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## Design Rationale
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The separation also makes the system more legible: ORE/day to treasury ≈ number of fully maintained picks, because each pick requires ~0.082643 INGOT/day for repair, and each INGOT requires μ ORE at smelting. This creates a simple mental model for treasury growth that governance can use to calibrate μ independently from license curve parameters.
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---
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Topics:
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- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
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---
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type: entity
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entity_type: decision_market
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name: "COAL: Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol"
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domain: internet-finance
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status: passed
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parent_entity: "[[futardio]]"
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platform: "futardio"
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proposer: "coal project team"
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proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg"
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proposal_account: "G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg"
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proposal_number: 4
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proposal_date: 2025-11-07
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resolution_date: 2025-11-10
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category: "mechanism"
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summary: "Introduces Meta-PoW economic model with dynamic license fees, evergreen tool durability, and ORE treasury accumulation"
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tracked_by: rio
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created: 2026-03-11
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---
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# COAL: Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol
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## Summary
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The Meta-PoW proposal establishes a sustainable economic model for COAL by creating a multi-token system (COAL, ORE, INGOT, WOOD) with algorithmic supply controls. Players forge INGOT using COAL and ORE, craft pickaxes using COAL, INGOT, and WOOD, then mine COAL with pickaxes. The system features dynamic license fees that adjust based on COAL/ORE price ratio (c(y) = c0 * (y/y_ref)^p), evergreen tool durability with 4% daily decay but cheaper repair than recrafting, and a treasury accumulation mechanism targeting approximately 1 ORE per day per fully maintained pickaxe.
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## Market Data
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- **Outcome:** Passed
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- **Proposer:** coal project team
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- **Created:** 2025-11-07
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- **Completed:** 2025-11-10
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- **Proposal Account:** G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg
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- **DAO Account:** 3LGGRzLrgwhEbEsNYBSTZc5MLve1bw3nDaHzzfJMQ1PG
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- **Autocrat Version:** 0.3
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## Significance
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This proposal demonstrates MetaDAO's ability to evaluate and approve complex token economic architectures through futarchy governance. The Meta-PoW system introduces several novel mechanisms:
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1. **Dual-burn architecture:** COAL burns at pickaxe licensing (control parameter) and INGOT smelting (coupled with ORE payment), creating independent optimization surfaces for supply control and treasury accumulation
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2. **Dynamic throttling:** License fee c(y) uses cubic exponent (p=3) on price ratio, creating 8x cost increase when COAL/ORE ratio doubles, providing automatic supply discipline without governance intervention
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3. **Evergreen tool economics:** 4% daily decay with repair costs (0.082643 INGOT + 0.3 WOOD) deliberately set lower than recrafting costs (1 INGOT + 8 WOOD + license) to stabilize mining behavior and create predictable treasury inflows
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The proposal allows core team parameter adjustments before launch based on community feedback, showing pragmatic governance that balances mechanism design with implementation flexibility.
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## Relationship to KB
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- [[futardio]] — governance decision on economic model
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- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]] — extends MetaDAO's role to complex mechanism approval
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- [[dynamic performance-based token minting replaces fixed emission schedules by tying new token creation to measurable outcomes creating algorithmic meritocracy in token distribution]] — implements halving-band emissions gated by dynamic license fees
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25
entities/internet-finance/coal.md
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entities/internet-finance/coal.md
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---
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type: entity
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entity_type: company
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name: "COAL"
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domain: internet-finance
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status: active
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tracked_by: rio
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created: 2026-03-11
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---
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# COAL
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## Overview
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COAL is a mineable token project on Solana implementing a multi-token economic system (COAL, ORE, INGOT, WOOD) with proof-of-work mining mechanics. The project uses futarchy governance through MetaDAO/Futardio to approve economic model changes. COAL has a fixed max supply of 25,000,000 tokens with halving-band emissions that decrease every 5% of max supply added to circulation.
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## Timeline
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- **2025-11-07** — [[coal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol]] proposed: Meta-PoW economic model with dynamic license fees, evergreen tool durability, and ORE treasury accumulation mechanism
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- **2025-11-10** — [[coal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol]] passed: Approved Meta-PoW as new COAL economic model through futarchy governance
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## Relationship to KB
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- [[futardio]] — governance platform
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- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]] — uses MetaDAO futarchy for economic model governance
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@ -46,6 +46,8 @@ MetaDAO's token launch platform. Implements "unruggable ICOs" — permissionless
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- **2026-03-07** — Areal DAO launch: $50K target, raised $11,654 (23.3%), REFUNDING status by 2026-03-08 — first documented failed futarchy-governed fundraise on platform
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- **2026-03-04** — [[seekervault]] fundraise launched targeting $75,000, closed next day with only $1,186 (1.6% of target) in refunding status
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- **2025-11-07** — [[coal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol]] proposed: COAL Meta-PoW economic model with dynamic license fees and ORE treasury accumulation
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- **2025-11-10** — [[coal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol]] passed: Approved complex multi-token economic architecture through futarchy governance
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## Competitive Position
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- **Unique mechanism**: Only launch platform with futarchy-governed accountability and treasury return guarantees
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- **vs pump.fun**: pump.fun is memecoin launch (zero accountability, pure speculation). Futardio is ownership coin launch (futarchy governance, treasury enforcement). Different categories despite both being "launch platforms."
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@ -6,9 +6,15 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuA
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date: 2025-11-07
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domain: internet-finance
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format: data
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status: unprocessed
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status: processed
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tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
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event_type: proposal
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processed_by: rio
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processed_date: 2026-03-11
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claims_extracted: ["meta-pow-implements-evergreen-tool-economics-where-repair-costs-less-than-recrafting-creating-stable-demand-for-ingot-and-ore-treasury-inflow.md", "dynamic-license-fees-using-price-ratio-exponents-create-automatic-supply-throttling-in-token-economies-without-governance-intervention.md", "treasury-inflow-mechanisms-that-separate-burn-from-payment-enable-dual-optimization-of-supply-control-and-asset-accumulation.md"]
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enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md", "dynamic performance-based token minting replaces fixed emission schedules by tying new token creation to measurable outcomes creating algorithmic meritocracy in token distribution.md"]
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extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
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extraction_notes: "Extracted 3 mechanism design claims about evergreen tool economics, dynamic license fees, and dual-burn treasury architecture. Created decision_market entity for the Meta-PoW proposal and company entity for COAL project. Enriched 2 existing claims about MetaDAO's role and dynamic token minting. The proposal demonstrates futarchy governance of complex multi-token economic systems with algorithmic supply controls."
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---
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## Proposal Details
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@ -265,3 +271,15 @@ Vote NO – keep the current model unchanged.
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- Autocrat version: 0.3
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- Completed: 2025-11-10
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- Ended: 2025-11-10
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## Key Facts
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- COAL max supply: 25,000,000 tokens
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- COAL halving bands: every 5% of max supply (1,250,000 COAL)
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- Initial emission rate: 11,250 COAL/day
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- INGOT smelting cost: 100 COAL + ~12.10 ORE
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- Pickaxe crafting: 1 INGOT + 8 WOOD + c(y) COAL license
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- Daily pickaxe repair: ~0.082643 INGOT + 0.3 WOOD
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- Tool decay rate: 4% per day if not repaired
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- License fee formula: c(y) = 200 * (y/50)^3, clamped between 1-300 COAL
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- Target treasury inflow: ~1 ORE/day per fully maintained pickaxe
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