rio: extract from 2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme.md
- Source: inbox/archive/2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme.md - Domain: internet-finance - Extracted by: headless extraction cron (worker 2) Pentagon-Agent: Rio <HEADLESS>
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@ -53,6 +53,12 @@ Autocrat is MetaDAO's core governance program on Solana -- the on-chain implemen
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**Limitations.** [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] -- when proposals are clearly good or clearly bad, few traders participate because the expected profit from trading in a consensus market is near zero. This is a structural feature, not a bug: contested decisions get more participation precisely because they're uncertain, which is when you most need information aggregation. But it does mean uncontested proposals can pass or fail with very thin markets, making the TWAP potentially noisy.
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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Dean's List DAO proposal (DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM) ran on Autocrat v0.3 with standard 3-day TWAP settlement window. Proposal required 3% TWAP increase for passage. The implementation details confirm: proposal account DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM, DAO account 9TKh2yav4WpSNkFV2cLybrWZETBWZBkQ6WB6qV9Nt9dJ, proposer HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz, completed 2024-06-25. This provides concrete on-chain evidence of Autocrat's 3-day TWAP mechanism in production use beyond MetaDAO's own governance, demonstrating the mechanism operates consistently across different DAOs on Solana.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -23,6 +23,12 @@ This evidence has direct implications for governance design. It suggests that [[
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Optimism's futarchy experiment achieved 5,898 total trades from 430 active forecasters (average 13.6 transactions per person) over 21 days, with 88.6% being first-time Optimism governance participants. This suggests futarchy CAN attract substantial engagement when implemented at scale with proper incentives, contradicting the limited-volume pattern observed in MetaDAO. Key differences: Optimism used play money (lower barrier to entry), had institutional backing (Uniswap Foundation co-sponsor), and involved grant selection (clearer stakes) rather than protocol governance decisions. The participation breadth (10 countries, 4 continents, 36 new users/day) suggests the limited-volume finding may be specific to MetaDAO's implementation or use case rather than a structural futarchy limitation.
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO proposal (DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM, Autocrat v0.3) failed despite requiring only 3% TWAP increase against projected 1,523% FDV growth ($123,263 to $2M+). The proposal had clear favorable economics: $15K budget, 5-7M $DEAN allocation, concrete deliverables (travel for top 5, events for top 50), and established event timeline (Sept 25 - Oct 25, 2024). Yet it failed to attract sufficient trading volume over the 3-day window (completed 2024-06-25). This confirms the pattern where obviously favorable proposals fail to generate trading activity because there's no edge to capture — rational traders don't engage when the outcome seems predetermined, creating a liquidity death spiral that prevents the mechanism from functioning.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
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---
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type: claim
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domain: internet-finance
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description: "Dean's List DAO structured event rewards as steep power-law distribution (top 5 get $10K travel, top 50 get event access) revealing preference for concentrated incentives over broad participation"
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confidence: experimental
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source: "Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO proposal, futardio DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM"
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created: 2024-06-22
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---
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# DAO event incentive proposals reveal governance power concentration through leaderboard mechanics
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The Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO proposal structured incentives as a steep power-law distribution: top 5 governance power holders receive $10K in travel and accommodation coverage (12 days at DL DAO Villa during Sept 25 - Oct 25 event), while positions 6-50 receive only event invitations and potential airdrops. This creates a 50:1 participant ratio with heavily concentrated rewards ($10K for 5 people vs $5K for 45 people).
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**Reward structure:**
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- **Top 5:** Airplane fares + 12-day accommodation at ThailandDAO villa
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- **Top 50:** IRL event invitations, parties, partner airdrops
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- **All contributors:** Option to receive payments in $DEAN at 10% discount for 3 months
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The proposal explicitly designed a real-time leaderboard showing governance power rankings, with rewards tied to position. The mechanism assumes governance power concentration is both acceptable and useful for driving engagement. The proposal states: "Given the low circulating supply of the $DEAN token and the mechanics of locking tokens for multiple years to increase governance power and climb the leaderboard ranks, we project a significant increase in the Fully Diluted Valuation."
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**Revealed preference for concentration:** This structure reveals an implicit theory that leaderboard competition for scarce high-value rewards (top 5 positions) drives more governance power accumulation than broad-based participation incentives. The 10:1 spending ratio (top 5 vs top 50) suggests proposal designers believed concentrated rewards are more effective than distributed ones at maximizing engagement.
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The proposal also included delegation mechanics where "delegation is permitted, transferring governance power to the delegatee, not the original holder" — acknowledging that governance power can be rented or consolidated beyond direct token holdings. This further enables concentration since top performers can accumulate delegated power from others.
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**Mechanism design implication:** Whether this concentration is optimal for DAO health is separate from the revealed preference. The proposal designers believed steep reward gradients would maximize engagement, suggesting they view governance power concentration as a feature rather than a bug of leaderboard-based incentive design.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[token voting DAOs offer no minority protection beyond majority goodwill.md]]
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- [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles.md]]
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Topics:
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- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
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- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]
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@ -34,6 +34,12 @@ MycoRealms implementation reveals operational friction points: monthly $10,000 a
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Optimism futarchy achieved 430 active forecasters and 88.6% first-time governance participants by using play money, demonstrating that removing capital requirements can dramatically lower participation barriers. However, this came at the cost of prediction accuracy (8x overshoot on magnitude estimates), revealing a new friction: the play-money vs real-money tradeoff. Play money enables permissionless participation but sacrifices calibration; real money provides calibration but creates regulatory and capital barriers. This suggests futarchy adoption faces a structural dilemma between accessibility and accuracy that liquidity requirements alone don't capture. The tradeoff is not merely about quantity of liquidity but the fundamental difference between incentive structures that attract participants vs incentive structures that produce accurate predictions.
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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Dean's List DAO proposal demonstrates all three friction sources simultaneously: (1) Token price psychology — proposal projected $DEAN FDV from $123K to $2M+ based on locking mechanics and supply reduction, requiring traders to believe in 15x appreciation; (2) Proposal complexity — multi-layered structure with leaderboard mechanics, delegation rules, payment-in-token options at 10% discount, tiered rewards (top 5 vs top 50), and conditional perks tied to governance power; (3) Liquidity requirements — 3-day trading window on a token with $123K FDV and limited circulating supply due to locking incentives. The proposal failed despite favorable economics (3% threshold vs 1500%+ projected growth), suggesting these frictions compound rather than operate independently. The failure occurred on Autocrat v0.3 (proposal DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM, completed 2024-06-25).
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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---
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type: claim
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domain: internet-finance
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description: "Dean's List DAO proposal failed despite 3% TWAP threshold being trivial relative to projected 1500% FDV increase, suggesting futarchy adoption barriers operate above mechanism design"
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confidence: experimental
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source: "Futardio proposal DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM, Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO event promotion"
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created: 2024-06-22
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depends_on: ["MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md", "futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md"]
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---
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# Futarchy proposal failure despite favorable economics reveals adoption friction beyond mechanism design
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The Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO event proposal failed despite having economics that should have made passage trivial under rational market conditions. The proposal required only a 3% TWAP increase ($3,698 absolute) over 3 days while projecting FDV growth from $123,263 to over $2,000,000 (1,523% increase). The proposal budget was $15K with token allocation of 5-7 million $DEAN, meaning even conservative execution would have cleared the 3% threshold by orders of magnitude.
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**Proposal specifics:**
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- Proposal account: `DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM`
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- DAO account: `9TKh2yav4WpSNkFV2cLybrWZETBWZBkQ6WB6qV9Nt9dJ`
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- Autocrat version: 0.3
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- Trading period: 3 days (completed 2024-06-25)
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- Status: Failed
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- Deliverables: Travel for top 5 governance power holders, events for top 50, payment option in $DEAN at 10% discount
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**The paradox:** This failure pattern suggests futarchy adoption barriers operate at a layer above mechanism design. The proposal had:
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- Clear economic favorability (3% threshold vs 1500%+ projected growth)
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- Defined budget and timeline
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- Concrete deliverables (travel for top 5, events for top 50)
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- Established event (ThailandDAO Sept 25 - Oct 25, 2024)
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- Three-day trading window for price discovery
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Yet it failed to attract sufficient trading volume or pass-market support. This indicates that friction from token price psychology, proposal complexity, and liquidity requirements operates even when the economic case is overwhelming. The failure mode is not "markets rejected a bad proposal" but "markets failed to engage with a proposal that should have been obviously favorable."
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This is consistent with the pattern that when a proposal is clearly favorable, there's no trading edge, so volume collapses. But without volume, the mechanism cannot function as intended. The proposal failed not because markets thought it was bad, but because markets didn't engage at all—a liquidity death spiral that prevents futarchy from functioning even when conditions appear ideal.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md]]
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- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md]]
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- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md]]
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Topics:
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- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
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- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]
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---
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type: entity
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entity_type: decision_market
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name: "Dean's List: ThailandDAO Event Promotion to Boost Governance Engagement"
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domain: internet-finance
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status: failed
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parent_entity: "[[deans-list]]"
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platform: "futardio"
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proposer: "HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz"
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proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM"
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proposal_account: "DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM"
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dao_account: "9TKh2yav4WpSNkFV2cLybrWZETBWZBkQ6WB6qV9Nt9dJ"
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autocrat_version: "0.3"
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proposal_date: 2024-06-22
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resolution_date: 2024-06-25
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category: "grants"
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key_metrics:
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budget: "$15,000"
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token_allocation: "5-7M $DEAN"
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twap_threshold: "3%"
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current_fdv: "$123,263"
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projected_fdv: "$2,000,000+"
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trading_period: "3 days"
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summary: "Proposal to fund ThailandDAO event attendance for top governance power holders, offering travel and accommodation for top 5 and event access for top 50, with payment-in-token option at 10% discount"
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tracked_by: rio
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created: 2026-03-11
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---
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# Dean's List: ThailandDAO Event Promotion to Boost Governance Engagement
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## Summary
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Proposal to create a promotional campaign around ThailandDAO event (Sept 25 - Oct 25, 2024, Koh Samui) offering exclusive perks to top Dean's List DAO governance power holders. Top 5 receive airplane fares and 12-day accommodation ($10K), top 50 receive event invitations and partner airdrops ($5K). Contributors could opt to receive payments in $DEAN at 10% discount for 3 months. Total budget $15K with 5-7M $DEAN token allocation.
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## Market Data
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- **Outcome:** Failed
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- **Proposer:** HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz
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- **TWAP Threshold:** 3% increase required
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- **Trading Period:** 3 days (2024-06-22 to 2024-06-25)
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- **Autocrat Version:** 0.3
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## Significance
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This proposal failed despite having economics that should have made passage trivial — requiring only 3% TWAP increase while projecting 1,523% FDV growth ($123K to $2M+). The failure reveals futarchy adoption friction beyond mechanism design: when proposals are obviously favorable, trading volume collapses because there's no edge to capture. The proposal also demonstrates DAO event incentive design through steep power-law distribution (top 5 get $10K, positions 6-50 get event access only) and leaderboard mechanics to drive governance power accumulation.
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The proposal structure included:
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- Real-time governance power leaderboard
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- Tiered rewards (50:1 participant ratio with concentrated top rewards)
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- Delegation mechanics (governance power transfers to delegatee)
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- Payment-in-token option at 10% discount
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- Token locking incentives to reduce circulating supply
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## Relationship to KB
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- [[deans-list]] — governance decision
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- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — confirmed by failure despite favorable economics
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- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] — confirmed by low engagement on obviously favorable proposal
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- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] — implementation evidence
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@ -43,3 +43,8 @@ Relevant Entities:
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Topics:
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- [[internet finance and decision markets]]
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## Timeline
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- **2024-06-22** — [[deans-list-thailanddao-event-promotion]] proposed: $15K budget for ThailandDAO event attendance (top 5 travel, top 50 events), requiring 3% TWAP increase against $123K FDV
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- **2024-06-25** — [[deans-list-thailanddao-event-promotion]] failed despite favorable economics (3% threshold vs projected 1,523% FDV growth), revealing futarchy liquidity challenges on uncontested proposals
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@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM
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date: 2024-06-22
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domain: internet-finance
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format: data
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status: unprocessed
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status: processed
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tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
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event_type: proposal
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processed_by: rio
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@ -14,6 +14,12 @@ processed_date: 2024-06-22
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enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md", "futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md", "MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md"]
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extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
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extraction_notes: "Extracted 2 claims about futarchy market failure modes and DAO incentive mechanisms. Both claims are experimental/speculative due to single-case evidence. Proposal failed despite seemingly favorable economics, which itself is evidence about futarchy adoption barriers. Enriched 3 existing claims with concrete implementation data and failure case confirmation."
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processed_by: rio
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processed_date: 2026-03-11
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claims_extracted: ["futarchy-proposal-failure-despite-favorable-economics-reveals-adoption-friction-beyond-mechanism-design.md", "dao-event-incentive-proposals-reveal-governance-power-concentration-through-leaderboard-mechanics.md"]
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enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md", "futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md", "MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md"]
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extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
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extraction_notes: "Extracted 2 claims about futarchy market failure modes and DAO incentive mechanisms. Both claims are experimental confidence due to single-case evidence. Proposal failed despite seemingly favorable economics (3% threshold vs 1500%+ projected growth), which itself is evidence about futarchy adoption barriers. Created decision_market entity for the proposal and updated Dean's List timeline. Enriched 3 existing claims with concrete implementation data and failure case confirmation."
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---
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## Proposal Details
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@ -182,3 +188,15 @@ This proposal to create a promotional event at ThailandDAO, incentivizing govern
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- Proposal completed: 2024-06-25
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- Required TWAP increase: 3% ($3,698 absolute)
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- Trading period: 3 days
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## Key Facts
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- Dean's List DAO FDV: $123,263 (2024-06-22)
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- ThailandDAO event: Sept 25 - Oct 25, 2024, Koh Samui Thailand
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- Proposal budget: $15K ($10K top 5 travel, $5K top 50 events)
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- Token allocation: 5-7M $DEAN
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- TWAP threshold: 3% increase over 3 days
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- Projected FDV: $2M+ (1,523% increase)
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- Autocrat version: 0.3
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- Proposal account: DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM
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- DAO account: 9TKh2yav4WpSNkFV2cLybrWZETBWZBkQ6WB6qV9Nt9dJ
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