diff --git a/agents/rio/positions/metadao futarchy launchpad captures majority of solana token launches by end of 2027.md b/agents/rio/positions/metadao futarchy launchpad captures majority of solana token launches by end of 2027.md
index f6c846f..fae0a13 100644
--- a/agents/rio/positions/metadao futarchy launchpad captures majority of solana token launches by end of 2027.md	
+++ b/agents/rio/positions/metadao futarchy launchpad captures majority of solana token launches by end of 2027.md	
@@ -24,6 +24,10 @@ MetaDAO's unruggable ICO model solves it through mechanism, not promise. Since [
 
 The Q4 2025 numbers show the inflection: 6 ICOs launched, $18.7M total volume, expansion from 2 to 8 futarchy protocols, $219M total futarchy marketcap. Fee revenue hit $2.51M -- first-ever operating income. The flywheel is turning: more launches attract more traders, more traders deepen futarchy markets, deeper markets make governance more accurate, better governance attracts more projects.
 
+**Competitive divergence (Q4 2025).** MetaDAO delivered 6 launches/$18.7M while crypto marketcap fell 25%, Pump.fun tokenization dropped 40%, and Metaplex Genesis managed only 3 launches/$5.4M. Pine Analytics: "capturing share of a shrinking pie rather than simply riding market tailwinds." This is the strongest signal that MetaDAO's structural advantage (anti-extraction) is driving selection, not just macro sentiment.
+
+**Permissionless unlock (futard.io, Mar 2026).** 34 ICOs in the first 2 days, $15.6M deposits from 929 wallets, 2 DAOs funded. The 5.9% success rate is the market mechanism filtering — only projects attracting genuine capital survive. If this throughput sustains, the 30+ launches target for 2027 is conservative. However, first-mover hesitancy ("people are reluctant to be the first to put money in") is a real friction that may limit conversion rate. The curated (MetaDAO) + permissionless (futard.io) two-tier model addresses different market segments simultaneously.
+
 The competitive moat is the governance infrastructure itself. Since [[MetaDAOs Cayman SPC houses all launched projects as ring-fenced SegCos under a single entity with MetaDAO LLC as sole Director]], switching costs are structural -- the legal chassis, the futarchy tooling, the MetaLeX automated entity formation. This is not a frontend that can be forked.
 
 ## Reasoning Chain
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md b/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md
index 3c03d1f..2997e45 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md	
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md	
@@ -50,6 +50,10 @@ Raises include: Ranger ($6M minimum, uncapped), Solomon ($102.9M committed, $8M
 
 **Feb 2026 ecosystem update (metaproph3t "Learning, Fast").** $36M treasury value. $48M in launched project market cap. Three buyback proposals executed (Paystream Labs, Ranger Finance, Turbine Cash). Hurupay attempted $3-6M raise but attracted only ~$900k in real demand — the gap between committed ($2M) and real demand reveals a commitment-to-conversion problem. Mint Governor smart contract in audit for dynamic performance-based token minting.
 
+**Competitive outperformance (Q4 2025).** MetaDAO's Q4 performance diverged sharply from the broader market. Crypto marketcap fell 25% ($4T → $2.98T), Pump.fun tokenization dropped 40%, and Fear & Greed Index fell to 62. Competing launchpad Metaplex Genesis managed only 3 launches raising $5.4M (down from 5/$7.53M). MetaDAO delivered 6 launches/$18.7M — "capturing share of a shrinking pie rather than simply riding market tailwinds" (Pine Analytics Q4 Report). Non-META futarchy marketcap reached $69M with net appreciation of $40.7M beyond initial capital deployment. Revenue split: 54% Futarchy AMM, 46% Meteora LP.
+
+**Permissionless launches (futard.io, live Mar 2026).** In its first 2 days, futard.io saw 34 ICOs created, $15.6M in deposits from 929 wallets, and 2 DAOs reaching funding thresholds. The 5.9% success rate (2/34) is the market mechanism acting as quality filter — only projects attracting genuine capital survive. This is 34 launch attempts in 2 days vs 6 curated launches in all of Q4 — permissionless unlocks massive throughput. Pine Analytics noted "people are reluctant to be the first to put money into these raises" — first-mover hesitancy is a coordination problem that brand separation doesn't solve but the market mechanism eventually clears.
+
 **Treasury deployment (Mar 2026).** @oxranga proposed formation of a DAO treasury subcommittee with $150k legal/compliance budget as staged path to deploy the DAO treasury — the first concrete governance proposal to operationalize treasury management with institutional scaffolding.
 
 **MetaLeX partnership.** Since [[MetaLex BORG structure provides automated legal entity formation for futarchy-governed investment vehicles through Cayman SPC segregated portfolios with on-chain representation]], the go-forward infrastructure automates entity creation. MetaLeX services are "recommended and configured as default" but not mandatory. Economics: $150K advance + 7% of platform fees for 3 years per BORG.
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md
index 2079d63..4187bbf 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md	
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md	
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ Liquidity requirements create capital barriers that exclude smaller participants
 
 The Hurupay raise on MetaDAO (Feb 2026) provides direct evidence of these compounding frictions. The project attempted a $3-6M raise, attracted $2M in nominal commitments, but only ~$900k materialized as real demand. The commitment-to-real-demand gap reveals a new dimension of the liquidity barrier: participants commit to futarchy-governed raises at a higher rate than they actually fund them, suggesting that proposal complexity and capital lockup requirements create a "commitment theater" where expressed interest exceeds genuine willingness to deploy capital under futarchic conditions.
 
+**Futard.io first-mover hesitancy (Mar 2026).** Pine Analytics observed that on futard.io's permissionless launches, "people are reluctant to be the first to put money into these raises" — deposits follow momentum once someone else commits first. This is a new friction dimension beyond the three already identified: even when proposal creation is permissionless and token prices are accessible, the coordination problem of who commits first remains. Only 2 of 34 ICOs (5.9%) reached funding thresholds in the first 2 days. The pattern suggests that permissionless launch infrastructure solves the supply-side friction (anyone can create) but not the demand-side friction (who goes first). This may be solvable through seeding mechanisms, commitment bonuses, or reputation systems — but it's a real constraint on permissionless futarchy adoption at scale.
+
 Yet [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] suggests these barriers might be solvable through better tooling, token splits, and proposal templates rather than fundamental mechanism changes. The observation that [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]] implies futarchy could focus on high-stakes decisions where the benefits justify the complexity.
 
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