extract: 2024-00-00-govai-coordinated-pausing-evaluation-scheme
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Teleo Agents
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@ -47,6 +47,12 @@ Krier provides institutional mechanism: personal AI agents enable Coasean bargai
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2024-00-00-govai-coordinated-pausing-evaluation-scheme]] | Added: 2026-03-22*
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GovAI's coordinated pausing proposal provides the specific legal mechanism blocking coordination: antitrust law treats collective agreements to pause development among competing AI labs as potential cartel behavior, making voluntary coordination legally risky even when technically feasible. This is the concrete instantiation of the coordination problem—not just misaligned incentives, but legal architecture that prohibits the coordination mechanism.
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[the internet enabled global communication but not global cognition]] -- the coordination infrastructure gap that makes this problem unsolvable with existing tools
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- [[the alignment problem dissolves when human values are continuously woven into the system rather than specified in advance]] -- the structural solution to this coordination failure
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@ -55,6 +55,12 @@ Third-party pre-deployment audits are the top expert consensus priority (>60% ag
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Despite UK AISI building comprehensive control evaluation infrastructure (RepliBench, control monitoring frameworks, sandbagging detection, cyber attack scenarios), there is no evidence of regulatory adoption into EU AI Act Article 55 or other mandatory compliance frameworks. The research exists but governance does not pull it into enforceable standards, confirming that technical capability without binding requirements does not change deployment behavior.
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2024-00-00-govai-coordinated-pausing-evaluation-scheme]] | Added: 2026-03-22*
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GovAI's four-version escalation from voluntary pausing to legal mandate provides a roadmap showing why binding regulation is necessary: Versions 1-3 (voluntary mechanisms) all face antitrust obstacles that Version 4 (legal mandate) avoids. The necessity of government mandate is not just about enforcement but about legal structure—only regulatory requirements can mandate coordination without triggering competition law violations.
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[voluntary safety pledges cannot survive competitive pressure because unilateral commitments are structurally punished when competitors advance without equivalent constraints]] — confirmed with extensive evidence across multiple labs and governance mechanisms
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@ -58,6 +58,12 @@ Government pressure adds to competitive dynamics. The DoD/Anthropic episode show
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The research-to-compliance translation gap fails for the same structural reason voluntary commitments fail: nothing makes labs adopt research evaluations that exist. RepliBench was published in April 2025 before EU AI Act obligations took effect in August 2025, proving the tools existed before mandatory requirements—but no mechanism translated availability into obligation.
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2024-00-00-govai-coordinated-pausing-evaluation-scheme]] | Added: 2026-03-22*
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The coordinated pausing proposal shows that even multilateral voluntary commitments (Version 2: collective agreement) face structural barriers beyond competitive pressure—antitrust law may prohibit the coordination mechanism itself. This suggests the problem is deeper than incentive misalignment: legal architecture actively blocks the coordination that would solve the competitive race.
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[the alignment tax creates a structural race to the bottom because safety training costs capability and rational competitors skip it]] -- the RSP rollback is the clearest empirical confirmation of this claim
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@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
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{
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"rejected_claims": [
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{
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"filename": "evaluation-based-coordination-faces-antitrust-obstacles-because-collective-pausing-resembles-cartel-behavior.md",
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"issues": [
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"missing_attribution_extractor"
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]
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},
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{
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"filename": "legal-mandate-is-only-antitrust-safe-version-of-coordinated-pausing.md",
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"issues": [
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"missing_attribution_extractor"
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]
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}
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],
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"validation_stats": {
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"total": 2,
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"kept": 0,
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"fixed": 8,
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"rejected": 2,
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"fixes_applied": [
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"evaluation-based-coordination-faces-antitrust-obstacles-because-collective-pausing-resembles-cartel-behavior.md:set_created:2026-03-22",
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"evaluation-based-coordination-faces-antitrust-obstacles-because-collective-pausing-resembles-cartel-behavior.md:stripped_wiki_link:AI alignment is a coordination problem not a technical probl",
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"evaluation-based-coordination-faces-antitrust-obstacles-because-collective-pausing-resembles-cartel-behavior.md:stripped_wiki_link:voluntary safety pledges cannot survive competitive pressure",
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"evaluation-based-coordination-faces-antitrust-obstacles-because-collective-pausing-resembles-cartel-behavior.md:stripped_wiki_link:only binding regulation with enforcement teeth changes front",
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"legal-mandate-is-only-antitrust-safe-version-of-coordinated-pausing.md:set_created:2026-03-22",
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"legal-mandate-is-only-antitrust-safe-version-of-coordinated-pausing.md:stripped_wiki_link:evaluation-based-coordination-faces-antitrust-obstacles-beca",
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"legal-mandate-is-only-antitrust-safe-version-of-coordinated-pausing.md:stripped_wiki_link:only binding regulation with enforcement teeth changes front",
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"legal-mandate-is-only-antitrust-safe-version-of-coordinated-pausing.md:stripped_wiki_link:nation-states will inevitably assert control over frontier A"
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],
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"rejections": [
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"evaluation-based-coordination-faces-antitrust-obstacles-because-collective-pausing-resembles-cartel-behavior.md:missing_attribution_extractor",
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"legal-mandate-is-only-antitrust-safe-version-of-coordinated-pausing.md:missing_attribution_extractor"
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]
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},
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"model": "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5",
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"date": "2026-03-22"
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}
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@ -7,9 +7,13 @@ date: 2024-00-00
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domain: ai-alignment
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secondary_domains: [internet-finance]
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format: paper
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status: unprocessed
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status: enrichment
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priority: high
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tags: [coordinated-pausing, evaluation-based-coordination, dangerous-capabilities, mandatory-evaluation, governance-architecture, antitrust, GovAI, B1-disconfirmation, translation-gap]
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processed_by: theseus
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processed_date: 2026-03-22
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enrichments_applied: ["AI alignment is a coordination problem not a technical problem.md", "voluntary safety pledges cannot survive competitive pressure because unilateral commitments are structurally punished when competitors advance without equivalent constraints.md", "only binding regulation with enforcement teeth changes frontier AI lab behavior because every voluntary commitment has been eroded abandoned or made conditional on competitor behavior when commercially inconvenient.md"]
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extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
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---
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## Content
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@ -56,3 +60,11 @@ GovAI proposes an evaluation-based coordination scheme in which frontier AI deve
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PRIMARY CONNECTION: domains/ai-alignment/alignment-reframed-as-coordination-problem.md and translation-gap findings
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WHY ARCHIVED: The most detailed published proposal for closing the research-to-compliance translation gap; also provides the specific legal obstacle (antitrust) explaining why voluntary coordination can't solve the problem
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EXTRACTION HINT: The antitrust obstacle to coordinated pausing is the key claim — it explains why the translation gap requires government mandate (Version 4) not just industry coordination, connecting to the FDA vs. SEC model distinction
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## Key Facts
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- GovAI proposed coordinated pausing scheme has four versions: voluntary pausing, collective agreement, single auditor model, and legal mandate
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- Coordinated pausing triggers on models failing dangerous capability evaluations for: chemical weapons design, safety-critical software exploitation, disinformation synthesis, evading human control
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- Five-step coordinated pausing process: evaluate → pause if failed → notify others → others pause related work → analyze and resume when safe
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- GovAI explicitly identifies antitrust law as a practical obstacle requiring resolution
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- AI development is dominated by handful of large companies: OpenAI, Anthropic, Google DeepMind, Meta
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