diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/deans-list.md b/entities/internet-finance/deans-list.md index f7572634b..41d1054fa 100644 --- a/entities/internet-finance/deans-list.md +++ b/entities/internet-finance/deans-list.md @@ -43,3 +43,7 @@ Relevant Entities: Topics: - [[internet finance and decision markets]] + +## Timeline + +- **2024-06-22** — Proposed ThailandDAO event promotion via futarchy governance (proposal DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM): $15K budget for travel/events to boost governance engagement, required 3% TWAP increase, projected 15x token appreciation from $0.01 to $0.15 driving FDV from $123,263 to $2M+ through token locking mechanics. Proposal failed 2024-06-25 with no recorded trading volume, revealing liquidity constraints in micro-cap futarchy implementations. diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/futardio.md b/entities/internet-finance/futardio.md index 6cde081da..4e9dfa8ae 100644 --- a/entities/internet-finance/futardio.md +++ b/entities/internet-finance/futardio.md @@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ MetaDAO's token launch platform. Implements "unruggable ICOs" — permissionless - **2026-02/03** — Launch explosion: Rock Game, Turtle Cove, VervePay, Open Music, SeekerVault, SuperClaw, LaunchPet, Seyf, Areal, Etnlio, and dozens more - **2026-03** — Ranger Finance liquidation proposal — first futarchy-governed enforcement action +- **2024-06-22** — Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO proposal (DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM) deployed on Autocrat v0.3: $15K event budget requiring 3% TWAP increase over 3 days. Proposal failed 2024-06-25, demonstrating futarchy failure mode at micro-cap scale where required price appreciation (3% threshold vs 15x projected) exceeds realistic market depth for $123K FDV token. ## Competitive Position - **Unique mechanism**: Only launch platform with futarchy-governed accountability and treasury return guarantees - **vs pump.fun**: pump.fun is memecoin launch (zero accountability, pure speculation). Futardio is ownership coin launch (futarchy governance, treasury enforcement). Different categories despite both being "launch platforms." diff --git a/inbox/archive/2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme.md b/inbox/archive/2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme.md index 568cc553d..6edacf97b 100644 --- a/inbox/archive/2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme.md +++ b/inbox/archive/2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM date: 2024-06-22 domain: internet-finance format: data -status: unprocessed +status: enrichment tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance] event_type: proposal processed_by: rio @@ -14,6 +14,11 @@ processed_date: 2024-06-22 enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md", "futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md", "MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md"] extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5" extraction_notes: "Extracted 2 claims about futarchy market failure modes and DAO incentive mechanisms. Both claims are experimental/speculative due to single-case evidence. Proposal failed despite seemingly favorable economics, which itself is evidence about futarchy adoption barriers. Enriched 3 existing claims with concrete implementation data and failure case confirmation." +processed_by: rio +processed_date: 2026-03-11 +enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md", "futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md", "MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md"] +extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5" +extraction_notes: "Extracted 2 claims about futarchy market failure modes at micro-cap scale and DAO incentive mechanism design. Both claims are experimental/speculative due to single-case evidence, but the proposal's failure despite seemingly favorable economics (3% threshold vs 15x projected appreciation) is itself strong evidence about futarchy adoption barriers. Enriched 3 existing claims with concrete implementation data and failure case confirmation. Updated Dean's List and Futardio entity timelines. The circular funding logic (proposal funds itself through price appreciation it causes) and extreme token allocation (5-7M tokens for $15K expenses) reveal structural problems in applying futarchy to growth initiatives at small DAO scale." --- ## Proposal Details @@ -182,3 +187,14 @@ This proposal to create a promotional event at ThailandDAO, incentivizing govern - Proposal completed: 2024-06-25 - Required TWAP increase: 3% ($3,698 absolute) - Trading period: 3 days + + +## Key Facts +- Dean's List DAO FDV: $123,263 (2024-06-22) +- ThailandDAO event dates: Sept 25 - Oct 25, 2024, Koh Samui Thailand +- Proposal account: DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM +- DAO account: 9TKh2yav4WpSNkFV2cLybrWZETBWZBkQ6WB6qV9Nt9dJ +- Autocrat version: 0.3 +- Proposal completed: 2024-06-25 +- Required TWAP increase: 3% ($3,698 absolute) +- Trading period: 3 days