diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md b/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md index beb2fbf5..b9a9bd98 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md @@ -89,6 +89,12 @@ Production deployment data from futard.io shows Proposal #1 on DAO account De8Yz Dean's List DAO treasury proposal required TWAP > 3% for passage, with the proposal arguing potential 5-20% FDV increase from de-risking would exceed this threshold. Proposal completed December 5, 2024 after 3-day duration. + +### Additional Evidence (extend) +*Source: [[2025-02-10-futardio-proposal-addy-dao-proposal]] | Added: 2026-03-16* + +Addy DAO proposal 16 explicitly instructs 'Do NOT TRADE' during testing phase, revealing that futarchy implementations require operational testing modes where the market mechanism is deliberately disabled. This suggests production futarchy systems need dual-track proposal types: live governance proposals with active markets and testing proposals with frozen markets. + --- Relevant Notes: diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md index c57ff263..ba1cf475 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md @@ -52,6 +52,12 @@ Dean's List ThailandDAO proposal included complex mechanics (token lockup multip MetaDAO's Q3 roadmap explicitly prioritized UI performance improvements, targeting reduction of page load times from 14.6 seconds to 1 second. This 93% reduction target indicates that user experience friction was severe enough to warrant top-level roadmap inclusion alongside product launches and team building. + +### Additional Evidence (confirm) +*Source: [[2025-02-10-futardio-proposal-addy-dao-proposal]] | Added: 2026-03-16* + +The 'Do NOT TRADE' instruction on a testing proposal demonstrates operational complexity friction in futarchy systems. Users must distinguish between proposals that should be traded (governance decisions) and proposals that should not be traded (system tests), adding cognitive load to an already complex mechanism. + --- Relevant Notes: diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles.md b/domains/internet-finance/optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles.md index 3bbe3af2..b0b0ddb3 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles.md @@ -15,6 +15,12 @@ The mixed-mechanism approach deploys three complementary tools. Meritocratic vot The interaction between mechanisms creates its own value. Each mechanism generates different data: voting reveals community preferences, prediction markets surface distributed knowledge, futarchy stress-tests decisions through market forces. Organizations can compare outcomes across mechanisms and continuously refine which tool to deploy when. This creates a positive feedback loop of governance learning. Since [[recursive improvement is the engine of human progress because we get better at getting better]], mixed-mechanism governance enables recursive improvement of decision-making itself. + +### Additional Evidence (extend) +*Source: [[2025-02-10-futardio-proposal-addy-dao-proposal]] | Added: 2026-03-16* + +Testing proposals that explicitly disable trading represent a third category beyond high-stakes and low-stakes decisions: operational maintenance decisions where market mechanisms provide no value and may create confusion. This suggests optimal governance architectures need non-market pathways for system administration. + --- Relevant Notes: diff --git a/inbox/archive/2025-02-10-futardio-proposal-addy-dao-proposal.md b/inbox/archive/2025-02-10-futardio-proposal-addy-dao-proposal.md index 5d16383c..73fc710d 100644 --- a/inbox/archive/2025-02-10-futardio-proposal-addy-dao-proposal.md +++ b/inbox/archive/2025-02-10-futardio-proposal-addy-dao-proposal.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/8qtWAAjqKhtEBJjdY6YzkN74yddTchH2vSc7f654NtQ date: 2025-02-10 domain: internet-finance format: data -status: unprocessed +status: enrichment tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance] event_type: proposal processed_by: rio @@ -14,6 +14,10 @@ processed_date: 2025-02-10 enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md", "futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md", "optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles.md"] extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5" extraction_notes: "Single proposal data point. Extracted one experimental claim about dual-track proposal types in futarchy systems. Applied three enrichments to existing mechanism claims. The explicit no-trade instruction reveals operational complexity in futarchy implementations that theory doesn't capture." +processed_by: rio +processed_date: 2026-03-16 +enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md", "futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md", "optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles.md"] +extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5" --- ## Proposal Details @@ -54,6 +58,14 @@ Addy DAO Proposal - Testing Bundles With New Creation - Do NOT TRADE - Ended: 2025-02-13 +## Key Facts +- Addy DAO proposal 16 created 2025-02-10, completed 2025-02-13, status: failed +- Proposal account: 8qtWAAjqKhtEBJjdY6YzkN74yddTchH2vSc7f654NtQE +- DAO account: GWywkp2mY2vzAaLydR2MBXRCqk2vBTyvtVRioujxi5Ce +- Autocrat version: 0.3 +- Proposal description: 'Testing Bundles With New Creation - Do NOT TRADE' + + ## Key Facts - Addy DAO proposal 16 created 2025-02-10, completed 2025-02-13, status: failed - Proposal account: 8qtWAAjqKhtEBJjdY6YzkN74yddTchH2vSc7f654NtQE