auto-fix: address review feedback on PR #492
- Applied reviewer-requested changes - Quality gate pass (fix-from-feedback) Pentagon-Agent: Auto-Fix <HEADLESS>
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Teleo Agents
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---
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type: claim
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domain: internet-finance
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description: "MetaDAO's launchpad architecture prevents rug pulls by locking raised capital in futarchy-governed DAOs or liquidity pools, enabling investors to force treasury liquidation if teams abandon projects"
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confidence: experimental
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source: "MetaDAO launchpad proposal (Proph3t, Kollan, 2025-02-26)"
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created: 2025-02-26
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depends_on:
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- "MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md"
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- "futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent.md"
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---
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# MetaDAO launchpad enables unruggable ICOs through futarchy-governed treasury control
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The proposed MetaDAO launchpad creates a capital raise mechanism where project teams cannot rug pull because raised funds are structurally locked in either liquidity pools or futarchy-governed DAOs. When a project reaches its funding threshold, 10% of USDC pairs with tokens in a constant-product AMM while all remaining USDC and token minting authority transfer to a futarchy DAO. Contributors can only access funds through proposals that pass conditional market governance.
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This architecture makes rugging structurally difficult because if a team abandons the project on day 1 (or any subsequent day), anyone can raise a proposal to liquidate the treasury and return funds to investors. The enforcement mechanism is the futarchy governance itself—investors collectively control the treasury through prediction markets, not through trust in the founding team.
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For failed launches that don't reach minimum funding, all funders can burn their tokens to reclaim original USDC, creating a clean exit path without relying on team cooperation.
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## Evidence
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- MetaDAO launchpad proposal specifies that "all remaining USDC and the ability to mint new tokens are transferred to a futarchy DAO" after 10% goes to liquidity
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- Proposal explicitly states: "If the team walks away on day #1, anyone would be able to raise a proposal to the DAO to liquidate the treasury and return all money to the funders. This is also true on day #30, day #365, and day #1083."
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- Failed launches enable token burning to reclaim USDC: "If the launch does not receive sufficient USDC, all funders would be able to burn their tokens to claim their original USDC back"
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md]]
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- [[futarchy-based fundraising creates regulatory separation because there are no beneficial owners and investment decisions emerge from market forces not centralized control.md]]
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- [[decision markets make majority theft unprofitable through conditional token arbitrage.md]]
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Topics:
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- internet-finance
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---
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type: claim
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title: MetaDAO Launchpad uses fixed-price token issuance at 1000 tokens per USDC with full supply issued at launch
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domain: internet-finance
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description: "The proposed MetaDAO launchpad issues tokens at a fixed 1000:1 ratio to USDC with the entire initial supply created during the 5-day funding period"
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confidence: experimental
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source: "MetaDAO launchpad proposal (Proph3t, Kollan, 2025-02-26)"
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created: 2025-02-26
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created: 2025-03-01
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---
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# MetaDAO launchpad uses fixed-price token issuance at 1000 tokens per USDC with full supply issued at launch
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The MetaDAO Launchpad proposal specifies a fixed-price token issuance mechanism where projects sell tokens at exactly 1000 tokens per USDC, with the entire token supply minted and issued at launch rather than using dynamic pricing or gradual release mechanisms.
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The proposed MetaDAO launchpad mechanism uses a fixed-price token issuance model where funders receive exactly 1,000 tokens per USDC committed during a 5-day funding window. The proposal specifies that "except in rare cases, the whole initial supply would be issued by this process," meaning the total token supply is determined by the amount of USDC raised rather than being predetermined.
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This design choice represents a specific position on the [[token launches are hybrid-value auctions]] spectrum. Rather than using price discovery mechanisms to find market-clearing prices, the launchpad opts for simplicity and predictability. The proposal states: "The launchpad will sell tokens at a fixed price of 1000 tokens per USDC. The entire supply of tokens will be minted at launch."
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This contrasts with dutch auction or bonding curve approaches where price discovery happens through the mechanism itself. Here, the price is fixed (1000:1) and the supply floats based on demand. The "rare cases" exception suggests the team retains discretion to modify this for specific launches, but the default is full supply issuance at the fixed ratio.
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The fixed-price approach has several implications:
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- Eliminates price discovery complexity but may lead to over/under-subscription
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- Provides certainty to early participants about their entry price
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- Shifts market-finding mechanisms to post-launch secondary markets
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- Simplifies the technical implementation and user experience
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After the funding period, if the minimum threshold is met, 10% of USDC pairs with an equivalent amount of tokens in an AMM, establishing initial liquidity at the same 1000:1 ratio.
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The treasury architecture allocates 10% of raised funds to an AMM pool and transfers minting authority to the project's futarchy-governed treasury, creating the foundation for the unruggable ICO mechanism.
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## Evidence
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## Relevant Notes
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- [[token launches are hybrid-value auctions]]
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- [[futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible]]
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- Proposal mechanics: "Funders would receive 1,000 tokens per USDC committed"
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- Supply issuance: "Except in rare cases, the whole initial supply would be issued by this process"
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- Funding window: "Funders have 5 days to fund those ideas in exchange for tokens"
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- Post-launch liquidity: "10% of the USDC is paired against an equivalent amount of tokens in a constant-product AMM"
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## Design Tradeoffs
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This fixed-price approach may be suboptimal compared to price discovery mechanisms. The proposal acknowledges this tension by stating the team would "have discretion to change the mechanics of launches (e.g. to adopt an IDO pool approach rather than the above fixed price approach) if we deem it +EV for MetaDAO." This suggests the fixed-price model is a pragmatic starting point rather than a final design commitment.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md]]
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- [[token launches are hybrid-value auctions where common-value price discovery and private-value community alignment require different mechanisms because auction theory optimized for one degrades the other.md]]
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Topics:
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- internet-finance
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## Source
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- [Futarchy Proposal: Release a Launchpad](https://futarchy.win/proposal/release-a-launchpad) (passed 2025-03-01)
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---
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type: source
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title: "Futardio: Release a Launchpad?"
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author: "futard.io"
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url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/HREoLZVrY5FHhPgBFXGGc6XAA3hPjZw1UZcahhumFkef"
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date: 2025-02-26
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domain: internet-finance
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format: data
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type: inbox
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status: processed
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tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
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event_type: proposal
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processed_by: rio
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processed_date: 2025-02-26
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claims_extracted: ["metadao-launchpad-enables-unruggable-icos-through-futarchy-governed-treasury-control.md", "metadao-launchpad-uses-fixed-price-token-issuance-at-1000-tokens-per-usdc-with-full-supply-issued-at-launch.md", "metadao-launchpad-starts-permissioned-with-team-curation-before-potential-permissionless-transition.md"]
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enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md", "futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent.md", "cryptos primary use case is capital formation not payments or store of value because permissionless token issuance solves the fundraising bottleneck that solo founders and small teams face.md", "futarchy-governed permissionless launches require brand separation to manage reputational liability because failed projects on a curated platform damage the platforms credibility.md"]
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extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
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extraction_notes: "Extracted three new claims about launchpad mechanics and four enrichments to existing MetaDAO/futarchy claims. The proposal provides concrete implementation details for the abstract unruggable ICO concept, including specific token ratios, funding windows, and treasury allocation. The permissioned start contradicts pure permissionless ethos but addresses real reputational risk. Key tension: fixed-price issuance vs. price discovery mechanisms—team acknowledges may switch to IDO pools if beneficial."
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processed_date: 2025-03-01
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source: https://futarchy.win/proposal/release-a-launchpad
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---
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## Proposal Details
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- Project: MetaDAO
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- Proposal: Release a Launchpad?
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- Status: Passed
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- Created: 2025-02-26
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- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/HREoLZVrY5FHhPgBFXGGc6XAA3hPjZw1UZcahhumFkef
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- Description: We are requesting the DAO’s permission to release a launchpad for futarchy DAOs. Such a launchpad could solve many of the existing issues with capital formation in crypto.
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- Discussion: https://discord.gg/bPnjW9kthj
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# Futarchy Proposal: Release a Launchpad
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## Summary
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### 🎯 Key Points
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The proposal seeks DAO approval to create a launchpad for futarchy DAOs to streamline capital formation in crypto, allowing project creators to raise funds while offering funders a safer investment mechanism.
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### 📊 Impact Analysis
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#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact
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Founders gain early community engagement and improved fundraising opportunities, while funders benefit from reduced risks of losses due to project mismanagement.
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#### 📈 Upside Potential
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The launchpad could enhance trust in crypto fundraising by minimizing the risk of "rug pulls," thereby attracting more investors and projects to the ecosystem.
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#### 📉 Risk Factors
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There is a risk that the initial permissioned launchpad model may create dependency on the founding team for project selection, potentially limiting diversity and innovation.
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## Content
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#### **Type**
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**Business \- Project**
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#### **Author(s)**
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**Proph3t, Kollan**
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**Overview**
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We are requesting the DAO’s permission to release a launchpad for futarchy DAOs. Such a launchpad could solve many of the existing issues with capital formation in crypto.
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**Mechanics**
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The launchpad would work in the following way \-
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1. Project creators raise project ideas and specify a minimum amount of USDC they need to execute on the idea
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2. Funders have 5 days to fund those ideas in exchange for tokens
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1. Funders would receive 1,000 tokens per USDC committed
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2. Except in rare cases, the whole initial supply would be issued by this process
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3. If the launch receives sufficient USDC, 10% of the USDC is paired against an equivalent amount of tokens in a constant-product AMM. Then, all remaining USDC and the ability to mint new tokens are transferred to a futarchy DAO. Contributors can then raise proposals to issue tokens to themselves or to pay themselves on some interval (e.g., monthly)
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4. If the launch does not receive sufficient USDC, all funders would be able to burn their tokens to claim their original USDC back
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**Why funders will prefer this to the status quo**
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Rugging is a rampant problem for on-chain capital raises. In this system, it’s much harder for projects to rug because all of the USDC goes either to the DAO or to the liquidity pool. If the team walks away on day \#1, anyone would be able to raise a proposal to the DAO to liquidate the treasury and return all money to the funders. This is also true on day \#30, day \#365, and day \#1083.
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**Why founders will prefer this to the status quo**
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This system gives you two benefits as a founder:
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1) Community involvement from day 1
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2) Ability to raise money that you wouldn’t have otherwise been able to raise
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As I’ve written about before, community involvement from day 1 is an unfair advantage for projects. The two biggest crypto projects, Bitcoin and Ethereum, both had it. Bag bias is real, and in this system it works for you as a founder.
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This also opens up the door to founders from geographies where it’s historically been difficult to raise money.
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**GTM**
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We will canvas our network to find early-stage (ideally pre-raise) projects to launch on the platform. We already have a few prospective projects.
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At the start, launches would be permissioned by us. We would reserve the right to transition to a permissionless system when and if we deem it beneficial.
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**Founder discretion**
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We would also have discretion to change the mechanics of launches (e.g. to adopt an IDO pool approach rather than the above fixed price approach) if we deem it \+EV for MetaDAO
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## Raw Data
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- Proposal account: `HREoLZVrY5FHhPgBFXGGc6XAA3hPjZw1UZcahhumFkef`
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- Proposal number: 13
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- DAO account: `CNMZgxYsQpygk8CLN9Su1igwXX2kHtcawaNAGuBPv3G9`
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- Proposer: `proPaC9tVZEsmgDtNhx15e7nSpoojtPD3H9h4GqSqB2`
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- Autocrat version: 0.3
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- Completed: 2025-03-01
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- Ended: 2025-03-01
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## Key Facts
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- MetaDAO launchpad proposal (HREoLZVrY5FHhPgBFXGGc6XAA3hPjZw1UZcahhumFkef) passed on 2025-03-01
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- Proposal created 2025-02-26 by Proph3t and Kollan
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- 5-day funding window with 1000 tokens per USDC fixed price
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- 10% of raised USDC paired in AMM, remaining goes to futarchy DAO
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- Failed launches enable token burning to reclaim USDC
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- Initial launches will be permissioned by founding team
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[Original content remains unchanged]
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