diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate governance scaffolding for treasury operations because market mechanisms alone cannot provide operational security and legal compliance.md b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate governance scaffolding for treasury operations because market mechanisms alone cannot provide operational security and legal compliance.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d26c69b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate governance scaffolding for treasury operations because market mechanisms alone cannot provide operational security and legal compliance.md	
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: "Solomon DP-00001 requires subcommittees, SOPs, confidentiality undertakings, segregated wallets, and three law firms just to begin treasury deployment — evidence that futarchy handles decision quality while traditional structures handle operational execution"
+confidence: experimental
+source: "rio, based on Solomon DAO DP-00001 Treasury Subcommittee proposal (Mar 2026)"
+created: 2026-03-05
+depends_on:
+  - "Solomon DP-00001 full proposal text"
+  - "Three-step staged rollout for treasury deployment"
+  - "Pass threshold asymmetry: -300 bps team-sponsored, +300 bps non-team"
+---
+
+# Futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate governance scaffolding for treasury operations because market mechanisms alone cannot provide operational security and legal compliance
+
+Solomon DAO's DP-00001 proposal is a detailed governance document that would not look out of place at a traditional fund. Subcommittee designates with named bios. Confidentiality undertakings. A segregated legal budget wallet. Three law firms (Morrison Cohen, NXT Law, GVRN). SOP registries with versioning and ratification processes. Operational packs batched for governance approval. A three-step staged rollout where each step has its own proposal and vote.
+
+This is not a failure of futarchy. It is evidence that futarchy and corporate governance are complements, not substitutes. Futarchy excels at decision quality — should we deploy the treasury? should we liquidate this project? should we approve this spending? But operational execution — who holds the keys, what's the multisig threshold, how do we handle a compromised signer, what's the incident response playbook — requires procedural controls that markets cannot provide.
+
+The mechanism insight: since [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]], the same principle applies to operations. Market mechanisms handle strategic decisions where information aggregation matters. Procedural mechanisms handle operational decisions where execution reliability matters. Solomon is discovering this empirically.
+
+The pass threshold asymmetry is a subtle mechanism design detail worth noting. Team-sponsored proposals need only clear -300 bps (the market must believe they won't hurt). Non-team proposals must clear +300 bps (the market must believe they will help). This encodes an implicit trust calibration: teams get benefit of the doubt on operational proposals, while external proposals face a higher bar. This is a pragmatic acknowledgment that not all proposals carry equal information asymmetry.
+
+The contrast with Ranger is instructive. Ranger's liquidation shows futarchy handling a strategic decision decisively ($581K volume, 97% pass). Solomon's treasury proposal shows futarchy handling a procedural decision with low engagement ($5.79K volume, 50% pass). Since [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]], the Solomon proposal validates the existing claim — procedural governance is a weak spot for futarchy markets.
+
+## Evidence
+
+- Solomon DP-00001 full proposal text (Mar 2026) — subcommittees, SOPs, legal budgets, staged rollout
+- Pass threshold asymmetry: -300 bps (team) vs +300 bps (non-team)
+- $5.79K volume at 50% pass — low engagement on procedural proposal
+- Three-step rollout: designates -> buyback framework -> treasury activation
+
+## Challenges
+
+- This convergence may be temporary — early-stage organizational overhead that streamlines as tooling matures. Future DAO tooling might automate the procedural layer
+- The "traditional corporate governance" framing may overstate the similarity — Solomon's SOPs are ratified through futarchy votes, not board decisions, preserving decentralized authority
+- The subcommittee model introduces trusted roles that could recentralize power over time, undermining the trustless property that makes futarchy valuable
+- Since [[Ooki DAO proved that DAOs without legal wrappers face general partnership liability making entity structure a prerequisite for any futarchy-governed vehicle]], some of this scaffolding is legally required rather than a failure of market mechanisms
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]] — extends to operations: markets for strategy, procedures for execution
+- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] — Solomon DP-00001 confirms: procedural proposals get thin markets
+- [[Ooki DAO proved that DAOs without legal wrappers face general partnership liability making entity structure a prerequisite for any futarchy-governed vehicle]] — some scaffolding is legally mandated
+- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]] — Solomon governance maturation enriches platform analysis
+
+Topics:
+- [[internet finance and decision markets]]