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epimetheus: 3 decision records from proposal extraction

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Batch extraction of event_type: proposal sources into structured
decision records with full verbatim text + LLM analysis.

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---
type: decision
entity_type: decision_market
name: 'MetaDAO: Develop a LST Vote Market'
domain: internet-finance
status: passed
tracked_by: rio
created: '2026-03-24'
last_updated: '2026-03-24'
parent_entity: '[[metadao]]'
platform: metadao
proposer: Proph3t
proposal_url: https://www.futard.io/proposal/9RisXkQCFLt7NA29vt5aWatcnU8SkyBgS95HxXhwXhW
proposal_date: '2023-11-18'
resolution_date: '2023-11-18'
category: product
summary: This proposal funded development of a centralized bribe platform for MNDE
and mSOL holders to earn yield by directing their stake to validators, modeled after
Ethereum's Votium. MetaDAO allocated 3,000 META to build the platform, with projected
annual revenue of $150k-$170k and an estimated $10.5M increase to MetaDAO's enterprise
value if successfully executed.
tags:
- futardio
- metadao
- futarchy
- solana
- governance
- metadao
---
# MetaDAO: Develop a LST Vote Market
## Summary
This proposal funded development of a centralized bribe platform for MNDE and mSOL holders to earn yield by directing their stake to validators, modeled after Ethereum's Votium. MetaDAO allocated 3,000 META to build the platform, with projected annual revenue of $150k-$170k and an estimated $10.5M increase to MetaDAO's enterprise value if successfully executed.
## Market Data
- Status: Passed
- after 1 month passes, veMNDE and mSOL holders can claim their SOL bribes from the pools
- [Solana Compass Turbo Staking](https://solanacompass.com/staking/turbo-staking)
- Proposal account: `9RisXkQCFLt7NA29vt5aWatcnU8SkyBgS95HxXhwXhW`
- DAO account: `3wDJ5g73ABaDsL1qofF5jJqEJU4RnRQrvzRLkSnFc5di`
- Proposer: `HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz`
- Autocrat version: 0
## Significance
This proposal represents MetaDAO's first attempt to build a profit-generating product under its futarchy governance model, explicitly framed as a legitimacy-building exercise. The proposer argues that a fundamentally new organizational form like MetaDAO must 'prove that the model works' by demonstrating commercial viability, not just governance innovation. This reflects a critical tension in futarchy adoption: can prediction markets govern effectively without traditional corporate structures to execute operational decisions?
The proposal's financial modeling is notably sophisticated for a DAO governance decision, including market sizing ($1.7M total addressable market), revenue projections ($135k average annual revenue), SaaS valuation multiples (7.8x), and probabilistic value calculations accounting for execution risk (70% success probability). This level of financial rigor suggests futarchy governance may naturally select for more analytically-grounded proposals compared to token-voting DAOs, where emotional appeals and community sentiment often dominate.
The non-custodial Votium-style design choice reveals how futarchy-governed organizations still rely on traditional risk management principles. Despite using prediction markets for go/no-go decisions, the proposal explicitly prioritizes user fund security over potential revenue optimization, demonstrating that market-based governance doesn't eliminate the need for conservative operational design. The proposal also introduces performance-based retroactive incentives, creating a precedent for outcome-contingent compensation that aligns contributor incentives with the conditional market structure.
## Full Proposal Text
## Proposal Details
- Project: MetaDAO
- Proposal: Develop a LST Vote Market?
- Status: Passed
- Created: 2023-11-18
- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/9RisXkQCFLt7NA29vt5aWatcnU8SkyBgS95HxXhwXhW
- Description: This platform would allow MNDE and mSOL holders to earn extra yield by directing their stake to validators who pay them.
## Summary
### 🎯 Key Points
The proposal aims to develop a centralized bribe platform for MNDE and mSOL holders to earn extra yield by directing their stake to validators, addressing the fragmented current market. It seeks 3,000 META to fund the project, with the expectation of generating approximately $1.5M annually for the Meta-DAO.
### 📊 Impact Analysis
#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact
The platform will enable small MNDE and mSOL holders to compete with whales for higher yields, enhancing their earning potential.
#### 📈 Upside Potential
If successful, the platform could significantly increase the Meta-DAO's enterprise value by an estimated $10.5M, with potential annual revenues of $150k to $170k.
#### 📉 Risk Factors
Execution risk is a concern, as the project's success is speculative and hinges on a 70% chance of successful implementation, which could result in a net value creation of only $730k after costs.
## Content
## Overview
The Meta-DAO is awakening.
Given that the Meta-DAO is a fundamentally new kind of organization, it lacks legitimacy. To gain legitimacy, we need to first *prove that the model works*. I believe that the best way to do that is by building profit-turning products under the Meta-DAO umbrella.
Here, we propose the first one: an [LST bribe platform](https://twitter.com/durdenwannabe/status/1683150792843464711). This platform would allow MNDE and mSOL holders to earn extra yield by [directing their stake](https://docs.marinade.finance/marinade-products/directed-stake#snapshot-system) to validators who pay them. A bribe market already exists, but it's fragmented and favors whales. This platform would centralize the market, facilitating open exchange between validators and MNDE / mSOL holders and allowing small holders to earn the same yield as whales.
#### Executive summary
- The product would exist as a 2-sided marketplace between validators who want more stake and MNDE and mSOL holders who want more yield.
- The platform would likely be structured similar to Votium.
- The platform would monetize by taking 10% of bribes.
- We estimate that this product would generate \$1.5M per year for the Meta-DAO, increasing the Meta-DAO's enterprise value by \$10.5M, if executed successfully.
- We are requesting 3,000 META and the promise of retroactively-decided performance-based incentives. If executed, this proposal would transfer the first 1,000 META.
- Three contributors have expressed interest in working on this: Proph3t, for the smart contracts; marie, for the UI; and nicovrg, for the BD with Marinade. Proph3t would be the point person and would be responsible for delivering this project to the Meta-DAO.
## Problem statement
Validators want more stake. MNDE and mSOL holders want more yield. Since Marinade allows its MNDE and mSOL holders to direct 40% of its stake, this creates an opportunity for mSOL and MNDE to earn higher yield by selling their votes to validators.
Today, this market is fragmented. Trading occurs through one-off locations like Solana Compass' [Turbo Stake](https://solanacompass.com/staking/turbo-staking) and in back-room Telegram chats. This makes it hard for people who don't actively follow the Solana ecosystem and small holders to earn the highest yields.
We propose a platform that would centralize this trading. Essentially, this would provide an easy place where validators who want more stake can pay for the votes of MNDE and mSOL holders. In the future, we could expand to other LSTs like bSOL.
## Design
There are a number ways you could design a bribe platform. After considering a few options, a Votium-style system appears to be the best one.
### Votium
[Votium](https://votium.app/) is a bribe platform on Ethereum. Essentially, projects that want liquidity in their token pay veCRV holders to allocate CRV emissions to their token's liquidity pool (the veCRV system is fairly complex and out of scope for this proposal). For example, the Frax team might pay veCRV holders to allocate CRV emissions to the FRAX+crvUSD pool.
If you're a project that wants to pay for votes, you do so in the following way:
- create a Votium pool
- specify which Curve pool (a different kind of pool, I didn't name them :shrug:) you want CRV emissions to be directed to
- allocate some funds to that pool
If you're a veCRV-holder, you are eligible to claim from that pool. To do so, you must first vote for the Curve pool specified. Then, once the voting period is done, each person who voted for that Curve pool can claim a pro rata share of the tokens from the Votium pool.
Alternatively, you can delegate to Votium, who will spread your votes among the various pools.
### Our system
In our case, a Votium-style platform would look like the following:
- Once a month, each participating validator creates a pool, specifying a *price per vote* and depositing SOL to their pool. The amount of SOL deposited in a pool defines the maximum votes bought. For example, if Laine deposits 1,000 SOL to a pool and specifies a price per vote of 0.1 SOL, then this pool can buy up to 10,000 votes
- veMNDE and mSOL holders are given 1 week to join pools, which they do by directing their stake to the respective validator (the bribe platform UI would make this easy)
- after 1 month passes, veMNDE and mSOL holders can claim their SOL bribes from the pools
The main advantage of the Votium approach is that it's non-custodial. In other words, *there would be no risk of user fund loss*. In the event of a hack, the only thing that could be stolen are the bribes deposited to the pools.
## Business model
The Meta-DAO would take a small fee from the rewards that are paid to bribees. Currently, we envision this number being 10%, but that is subject to change.
## Financial projections
Although any new project has uncertain returns, we can give rough estimates of the returns that this project would generate for the Meta-DAO.
Marinade Finance currently has \$532M of SOL locked in it. Of that, 40% or \$213M is directed by votes. Validators are likely willing to pay up to the marginal revenue that they can gain by bribing. So, at 8% staking rates and 10% comissions, the **estimated market for this is \$213M * 0.08 * 0.1, or \$1.7M**.
At a 10% fee, the revenue available to the Meta-DAO would be \$170k. The revenue share with Marinade is yet to be negotiated. At a 10% revshare, the Meta-DAO would earn \$150k per year. At a 30% revshare, the Meta-DAO would earn \$120k per year.
We take the average of \$135k per year and multiply by the [typical SaaS valuation multiple](https://aventis-advisors.com/saas-valuation-multiples/#multiples) of 7.8x to achieve the estimate that **this product would add \$1.05M to the Meta-DAO's enterprise value if executed successfully.**
Of course, there is a chance that is not executed successfully. To estimate how much value this would create for the Meta-DAO, you can calculate:
[(% chance of successful execution / 100) * (estimated addition to the Meta-DAO's enterprise value if successfully executed)] - up-front costs
For example, if you believe that the chance of us successfully executing is 70% and that this would add \$10.5M to the Meta-DAO's enterprise value, you can do (0.7 * 10.5M) - dillution cost of 3,000 META. Since each META has a book value of \$1 and is probably worth somewhere between \$1 and \$100, this leaves you with **\$730k - \$700k of value created by the proposal**.
As with any financial projections, these results are highly speculative and sensitive to assumptions. Market participants are encouraged to make their own assumptions and to price the proposal accordingly.
## Proposal request
We are requesting **3,000 META and retroactively-decided performance-based incentives** to fund this project.
This 3,000 META would be split among:
- Proph3t, who would perform the smart contract work
- marie, who would perform the UI/UX work
- nicovrg, who would be the point person to Marinade Finance and submit the grant proposal to the Marinade forums
1,000 META would be paid up-front by the execution of this proposal. 2,000 META would be paid after the proposal is done.
The Meta-DAO is still figuring out how to properly incentivize performance, so we don't want to be too specific with how that would done. Still, it is game-theoretically optimal for the Meta-DAO to compensate us fairly because under-paying us would dissuade future builders from contributing to the Meta-DAO. So we'll put our trust in the game theory.
## References
- [Solana LST Dune Dashboard](https://dune.com/ilemi/solana-lsts)
- [Marinade Docs](https://docs.marinade.finance/), specifically the pages on - [MNDE Directed Stake](https://docs.marinade.finance/the-mnde-token/mnde-directed-stake) and [mSOL Directed Stake](https://docs.marinade.finance/marinade-products/directed-stake)
- [Marinade's Validator Dashboard](https://marinade.finance/app/validators/?sorting=score&direction=descending)
- [MNDE Gauge Profit Calculator](https://cogentcrypto.io/MNDECalculator)
- [Marinade SDK](https://github.com/marinade-finance/marinade-ts-sdk/blob/bc4d07750776262088239581cac60e651d1b5cf4/src/marinade.ts#L283)
- [Solana Compass Turbo Staking](https://solanacompass.com/staking/turbo-staking)
- [Marinade Directed Stake program](https://solscan.io/account/dstK1PDHNoKN9MdmftRzsEbXP5T1FTBiQBm1Ee3meVd#anchorProgramIDL)
## Raw Data
- Proposal account: `9RisXkQCFLt7NA29vt5aWatcnU8SkyBgS95HxXhwXhW`
- Proposal number: 0
- DAO account: `3wDJ5g73ABaDsL1qofF5jJqEJU4RnRQrvzRLkSnFc5di`
- Proposer: `HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz`
- Autocrat version: 0
- Completed: 2023-11-29
- Ended: 2023-11-29
## Relationship to KB
- [[futarchy-governed-daos-prioritize-revenue-generating-products-over-pure-governance-innovation-to-establish-organizational-legitimacy]]
- [[prediction-market-governance-selects-for-financially-rigorous-proposals-with-quantified-risk-return-analysis-compared-to-token-voting-governance]]
- [[futarchy-organizations-still-require-traditional-corporate-risk-management-frameworks-despite-using-market-mechanisms-for-strategic-decisions]]
- [[metadao-uses-retroactive-performance-based-compensation-to-align-contributor-incentives-with-prediction-market-conditional-structures]]
- [[futarchy-governed-product-development-proposals-frame-execution-risk-as-probabilistic-value-calculations-rather-than-binary-go-or-no-go-decisions]]
---
Relevant Entities:
- [[metadao]] — parent organization
Topics:
- [[internet finance and decision markets]]

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---
type: decision
entity_type: decision_market
name: 'MetaDAO: Develop a Saber Vote Market'
domain: internet-finance
status: passed
tracked_by: rio
created: '2026-03-24'
last_updated: '2026-03-24'
parent_entity: '[[metadao]]'
platform: metadao
proposer: metaproph3t
proposal_url: https://www.futard.io/proposal/GPT8dFcpHfssMuULYKT9qERPY3heMoxwZHxgKgPw3TYM
proposal_date: '2023-12-16'
resolution_date: '2023-12-16'
category: product
summary: MetaDAO voted to build a vote market platform for Saber (veSBR holders),
funded with $150,000 by ecosystem teams including UXD, BlazeStake, LP Finance, and
Saber, with MetaDAO owning 65% of the platform. The platform would charge a 5-15%
take rate on vote trades, with projected annual revenue of $60-240k based on Saber's
$20M TVL and comparable Curve/Aura vote market volumes.
tags:
- futardio
- metadao
- futarchy
- solana
- governance
- metadao
---
# MetaDAO: Develop a Saber Vote Market
## Summary
MetaDAO voted to build a vote market platform for Saber (veSBR holders), funded with $150,000 by ecosystem teams including UXD, BlazeStake, LP Finance, and Saber, with MetaDAO owning 65% of the platform. The platform would charge a 5-15% take rate on vote trades, with projected annual revenue of $60-240k based on Saber's $20M TVL and comparable Curve/Aura vote market volumes.
## Market Data
- Status: Passed
- That proposal passed
- Proposal account: `GPT8dFcpHfssMuULYKT9qERPY3heMoxwZHxgKgPw3TYM`
- DAO account: `7J5yieabpMoiN3LrdfJnRjQiXHgi7f47UuMnyMyR78yy`
- Proposer: `HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz`
- Autocrat version: 0.1
## Significance
This proposal represents MetaDAO's second attempt to build vote market infrastructure after pivoting from Marinade when that project developed an internal solution. The Saber partnership demonstrates MetaDAO's strategy of building legitimacy through collaborations with established DeFi protocols, using external funding to derisk development while retaining majority ownership of revenue-generating products. The financial model explicitly references Curve's Votium and Convex ecosystems as benchmarks, projecting $1 in yearly vote trade volume per $50 of protocol TVL.
The proposal is significant for testing whether futarchy-governed organizations can successfully execute complex product development with multiple stakeholders and tight timelines. The detailed execution plan includes specific team members, weekly deliverables from December 2023 through February 2024, and audit commitments from known Solana developers. This level of operational specificity contrasts with typical DAO proposals and reflects MetaDAO's attempt to prove futarchy can drive accountable execution, not just capital allocation decisions.
The explicit focus on legitimacy as a flywheel—where successful product launches attract talent and capital, which funds more products, generating more legitimacy—reveals MetaDAO's theory of how futarchy-governed organizations bootstrap credibility. By building infrastructure for other protocols rather than competing directly, MetaDAO positions itself as neutral governance infrastructure, potentially creating a new category of DAO that provides "governance-as-a-service" to the broader ecosystem.
## Full Proposal Text
## Proposal Details
- Project: MetaDAO
- Proposal: Develop a Saber Vote Market?
- Status: Passed
- Created: 2023-12-16
- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/GPT8dFcpHfssMuULYKT9qERPY3heMoxwZHxgKgPw3TYM
- Description: I propose that we build a vote market as we proposed in proposal 0, only for Saber instead of Marinade.
## Summary
### 🎯 Key Points
The proposal aims to develop a Saber Vote Market funded by $150,000 from various ecosystem teams, enabling veSBR holders to earn extra yield and allowing projects to easily access liquidity.
### 📊 Impact Analysis
#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact
The platform will benefit users by providing them with opportunities to earn additional yield and assist teams in acquiring liquidity more efficiently.
#### 📈 Upside Potential
The Meta-DAO could generate significant revenue through a take rate on vote trades, enhancing its legitimacy and value.
#### 📉 Risk Factors
There is a potential risk of lower than expected trading volume, which could impact the financial sustainability and operational success of the platform.
## Content
## Overview
It looks like things are coming full circle. Here, I propose that we build a vote market as we proposed in [proposal 0](https://hackmd.io/ammvq88QRtayu7c9VLnHOA?view), only for Saber instead of Marinade. I'd recommend you read that proposal for the context, but I'll summarize briefly here:
- I proposed to build a Marinade vote market
- That proposal passed
- We learned that Marinade was developing an internal solution, we pivoted to supporting them
All of that is still in motion. But recently, I connected with [c2yptic](https://twitter.com/c2yptic) from Saber, who happens to be really excited about the Meta-DAO's vision. Saber was planning on creating a vote market, but he proposed that the Meta-DAO build it instead. I think that this would be a tremendous opportunity for both parties, which is why I'm proposing this.
Here's the high-level:
- The platform would be funded with $150,000 by various ecosystem teams that would benefit from the platform's existence including UXD, BlazeStake, LP Finance, and Saber.
- veSBR holders would use the market to earn extra yield
- Projects that want liquidity could easily pay for it, saving time and money relative to a bespoke campaign
- The Meta-DAO would own the majority of the platform, with the remaining distributed to the ecosystem teams mentioned above and to users via liquidity mining.
## Why a Saber Vote Market would be good for users and teams
### Users
Users would be able to earn extra yield on their SBR (or their veSBR, to be precise).
### Teams
Teams want liquidity in their tokens. Liquidity is both useful day-to-day - by giving users lower spreads - as well as a backstop against depeg events.
This market would allow teams to more easily and cheaply pay for liquidity. Rather than a bespoke campaign, they would in effect just be placing limit orders in a central market.
## Why a Saber Vote Market would be good for the Meta-DAO
### Financial projections
The Meta-DAO is governed by futarchy - an algorithm that optimizes for token-holder value. So it's worth looking at how much value this proposal could drive.
Today, Saber has a TVL of $20M. Since votes are only useful insofar as they direct that TVL, trading volume through a vote market should be proportional to it.
We estimate that there will be approximately **\$1 in yearly vote trade volume for every \$50 of Saber TVL.** We estimate this using Curve and Aura:
- Today, Curve has a TVL of \$2B. This round of gauge votes - which happen every two weeks - [had \$1.25M in tokens exchanged for votes](https://llama.airforce/#/incentives/rounds/votium/cvx-crv/59). This equates to a run rate of \$30M, or \$1 of vote trade volume for every \$67 in TVL.
- Before the Luna depeg, Curve had \$20B in TVL and vote trade volume was averaging between [\$15M](https://llama.airforce/#/incentives/rounds/votium/cvx-crv/10) and [\$20M](https://llama.airforce/#/incentives/rounds/votium/cvx-crv/8), equivalent to \$1 in yearly vote trade volume for every \$48 in TVL.
- In May, Aura has \$600M in TVL and [\$900k](https://llama.airforce/#/incentives/rounds/hh/aura-bal/25) in vote trade volume, equivalent to \$1 in yearly vote trade volume for every \$56 of TVL
The other factor in the model will be our take rate. Based on Convex's [7-10% take rate](https://docs.convexfinance.com/convexfinance/faq/fees#convex-for-curve), [Votium's ~3% take rate](https://docs.votium.app/faq/fees#vlcvx-incentives), and [Hidden Hand's ~10% take rate](https://docs.redacted.finance/products/pirex/btrfly#is-there-a-fee-for-using-pirex-btrfly), I believe something between 5 and 15% is reasonable. Since we don't expect as much volume as those platforms but we still need to pay people, maybe we start at 15% but could shift down as scale economies kick in.
Here's a model I put together to help analyze some potential scenarios:
![Screenshot from 2023-12-14 15-18-26](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/B1vCn9d8p.png)
The 65% owned by the Meta-DAO would be the case if we distributed an additional 10% of the supply in liquidity incentives / airdrop.
### Legitimacy
As [I've talked about](https://medium.com/@metaproph3t/an-update-on-the-first-proposal-0e9cdf6e7bfa), assuming futarchy works, the most important thing to the Meta-DAO's success will be acquiring legitimacy. Legitimacy is what leads people to invest their time + money into the Meta-DAO, which we can invest to generate financially-valuable outputs, which then generates more legitimacy.
![image](https://hackmd.io/_uploads/BkPF69dL6.png)
By partnering with well-known and reputable projects, we increase the Meta-DAO's legitimacy.
## How we're going to execute
### Who
So far, the following people have committed to working on this project:
- [Marie](https://twitter.com/swagy_marie) to build the UI/UX
- [Matt / fzzyyti](https://x.com/fzzyyti?s=20) to build the smart contracts
- [Durden](https://twitter.com/durdenwannabe) to design the platform & tokenomics
- [Joe](https://twitter.com/joebuild) and [r0bre](https://twitter.com/r0bre) to audit the smart contracts
- [me](https://twitter.com/metaproph3t) to be the [accountable party](https://discord.com/channels/1155877543174475859/1172275074565427220/1179750749228519534) / program manager
UXD has also committed to review the contracts.
### Timeline
#### December 11th - December 15th
Kickoff, initial discussions around platform design & tokenomics
#### December 18th - December 22nd
Lower-level platform design, Matt starts on programs, Marie starts on UI design
#### December 25th - January 5th (2 weeks)
Holiday break
#### January 8th - January 12th
Continued work on programs, start on UI code
#### January 15th - January 19th
Continued work on programs & UI
Deliverables on Friday, January 19th:
- Basic version of program deployed to devnet. You should be able to create pools and claim vote rewards. Fine if you can't claim $BRB tokens yet. Fine if tests aren't done, or some features aren't added yet.
- Basic version of UI. It's okay if it's a Potemkin village and doesn't actually interact with the chain, but you should be able to create pools (as a vote buyer) and pick a pool to sell my vote to.
#### January 22nd - 26th
Continue work on programs & UI, Matt helps marie integrate devnet program into UI
Deliverables on Friday, January 26th:
- MVP of program
- UI works with the program delivered on January 19th
#### January 29th - Feburary 2nd
Audit time! Joe and r0bre audit the program this week
UI is updated to work for the MVP, where applicable changes are
#### February 5th - Febuary 9th
Any updates to the program in accordance with the audit findings
UI done
#### February 12th - February 16th
GTM readiness week!
Proph3t or Durden adds docs, teams make any final decisions, we collectively write copy to announce the platform
#### February 19th
Launch day!!! 🎉
### Budget
Based on their rates, I'm budgeting the following for each person:
- $24,000 to Matt for the smart contracts
- $12,000 to Marie for the UI
- $7,000 to Durden for the platform design
- $7,000 to Proph3t for program management
- $5,000 to r0bre to audit the program
- $5,000 to joe to audit the program
- $1,000 deployment costs
- $1,000 miscellaneous
That's a total of \$62k. As mentioned, the consortium has pledged \$150k to make this happen. The remaining \$90k would be custodied by the Meta-DAO's treasury, partially to fund the management / operation / maintenance of the platform.
### Terminology
For those who are more familiar with bribe terminology, which I prefer not to use:
- briber = vote buyer
- bribee = vote seller
- bribe platform = vote market / vote market platform
- bribes = vote payments / vote trade volume
## References
- [Solana DeFi Dashboard](https://dune.com/summit/solana-defi)
- [Hidden Hand Volume](https://dune.com/embeds/675784/1253758)
- [Curve TVL](https://defillama.com/protocol/curve-finance)
- [Llama Airforce](https://llama.airforce/#/incentives/rounds/votium/cvx-crv/59)
## Raw Data
- Proposal account: `GPT8dFcpHfssMuULYKT9qERPY3heMoxwZHxgKgPw3TYM`
- Proposal number: 2
- DAO account: `7J5yieabpMoiN3LrdfJnRjQiXHgi7f47UuMnyMyR78yy`
- Proposer: `HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz`
- Autocrat version: 0.1
- Completed: 2023-12-22
- Ended: 2023-12-22
## Relationship to KB
- [[futarchy-governed-daos-prioritize-legitimacy-accumulation-over-short-term-profit-maximization-because-token-value-depends-on-attracting-contributors-and-partners]]
- [[vote-markets-and-governance-as-a-service-emerge-as-sustainable-business-models-for-futarchy-daos-because-they-align-incentive-design-expertise-with-recurring-revenue]]
- [[futarchy-proposals-that-include-detailed-execution-plans-with-named-accountable-parties-have-higher-success-rates-than-abstract-strategic-proposals]]
- [[metadao's-product-strategy-focuses-on-building-infrastructure-for-other-protocols-rather-than-end-user-applications-because-b2b-relationships-provide-more-stable-revenue-and-legitimacy]]
- [[external-funding-partnerships-allow-futarchy-daos-to-derisk-product-development-while-maintaining-majority-ownership-and-control]]
---
Relevant Entities:
- [[metadao]] — parent organization
Topics:
- [[internet finance and decision markets]]

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---
type: decision
entity_type: decision_market
name: 'MetaDAO: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1'
domain: internet-finance
status: passed
tracked_by: rio
created: '2026-03-24'
last_updated: '2026-03-24'
parent_entity: '[[metadao]]'
platform: metadao
proposer: HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz
proposal_url: https://www.futard.io/proposal/AkLsnieYpCU2UsSqUNrbMrQNi9bvdnjxx75mZbJns9zi
proposal_date: '2023-12-03'
resolution_date: '2023-12-13'
category: governance
summary: This proposal migrated 990,000 META, 10,025 USDC, and 5.5 SOL from the original
autocrat program treasury to an upgraded v0.1 program that makes proposal duration
configurable with a new 3-day default (down from longer periods). The upgrade aimed
to enable faster feedback loops in MetaDAO's futarchy governance process, though
it notably lacked verifiable builds and required trust in the proposer.
tags:
- futardio
- metadao
- futarchy
- solana
- governance
- metadao
---
# MetaDAO: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1
## Summary
This proposal migrated 990,000 META, 10,025 USDC, and 5.5 SOL from the original autocrat program treasury to an upgraded v0.1 program that makes proposal duration configurable with a new 3-day default (down from longer periods). The upgrade aimed to enable faster feedback loops in MetaDAO's futarchy governance process, though it notably lacked verifiable builds and required trust in the proposer.
## Market Data
- Proposal: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1?
- Status: Passed
- Proposal account: `AkLsnieYpCU2UsSqUNrbMrQNi9bvdnjxx75mZbJns9zi`
- DAO account: `3wDJ5g73ABaDsL1qofF5jJqEJU4RnRQrvzRLkSnFc5di`
- Proposer: `HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz`
- Autocrat version: 0
## Significance
This proposal represents a critical early test of MetaDAO's ability to upgrade its own core governance infrastructure through futarchy markets. The migration to v0.1 with configurable 3-day proposal windows demonstrates the DAO's willingness to experiment with faster decision cycles, a key parameter in futarchy system design that balances market information aggregation against operational speed.
The passage of this proposal despite acknowledged counter-party risk (non-verifiable builds requiring trust in the proposer) reveals important tensions in early-stage futarchy governance. Token holders accepted significant security trade-offs to achieve operational improvements, suggesting that in practice, futarchy DAOs may prioritize iteration speed over cryptographic guarantees during bootstrap phases. This creates a precedent where governance upgrades can pass even when they temporarily compromise the trustless properties that theoretically justify blockchain governance.
The focus on "quicker feedback loops" as the primary justification highlights a meta-governance concern: futarchy systems must tune their own temporal parameters to remain viable. Three-day proposal windows represent a hypothesis that faster cycles improve governance quality, but this also compresses the time available for market participants to research, trade, and price in information. This proposal thus tests whether MetaDAO's market depth and participant sophistication could support accelerated decision-making without sacrificing prediction accuracy.
## Full Proposal Text
## Proposal Details
- Project: MetaDAO
- Proposal: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1?
- Status: Passed
- Created: 2023-12-03
- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/AkLsnieYpCU2UsSqUNrbMrQNi9bvdnjxx75mZbJns9zi
- Description: Most importantly, I’ve made the slots per proposal configurable, and changed its default to 3 days to allow for quicker feedback loops.
## Summary
### 🎯 Key Points
The proposal aims to migrate assets (990,000 META, 10,025 USDC, and 5.5 SOL) from the treasury of the first autocrat program to the second program, while introducing configurable proposal slots and a default duration of 3 days for quicker feedback.
### 📊 Impact Analysis
#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact
Stakeholders may benefit from enhanced feedback efficiency and asset management through the upgraded autocrat program.
#### 📈 Upside Potential
The changes could lead to faster decision-making processes and improved overall program functionality.
#### 📉 Risk Factors
There is a risk of potential bugs in the new program and trust issues regarding the absence of verifiable builds, which could jeopardize the security of the funds.
## Content
## Overview
I've made some improvements to the autocrat program. You can see these [here](https://github.com/metaDAOproject/meta-dao/pull/36/files). Most importantly, I've made the slots per proposal configurable, and changed its default to 3 days to allow for quicker feedback loops.
This proposal migrates the 990,000 META, 10,025 USDC, and 5.5 SOL from the treasury owned by the first program to the treasury owned by the second program.
## Key risks
### Smart contract risk
There is a risk that the new program contains an important bug that the first one didn't. I consider this risk small given that I didn't change that much of autocrat.
### Counter-party risk
Unfortunately, for reasons I can't get into, I was unable to build this new program with [solana-verifiable-build](https://github.com/Ellipsis-Labs/solana-verifiable-build). You'd be placing trust in me that I didn't introduce a backdoor, not on the GitHub repo, that allows me to steal the funds.
For future versions, I should always be able to use verifiable builds.
## Raw Data
- Proposal account: `AkLsnieYpCU2UsSqUNrbMrQNi9bvdnjxx75mZbJns9zi`
- Proposal number: 1
- DAO account: `3wDJ5g73ABaDsL1qofF5jJqEJU4RnRQrvzRLkSnFc5di`
- Proposer: `HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz`
- Autocrat version: 0
- Completed: 2023-12-13
- Ended: 2023-12-13
## Relationship to KB
- [[futarchy-implementations-prioritize-operational-iteration-speed-over-security-guarantees-during-early-development-phases]]
- [[futarchy-governed-daos-face-inherent-tensions-between-trustless-verification-requirements-and-the-need-for-rapid-governance-system-upgrades]]
- [[shorter-proposal-durations-in-futarchy-markets-trade-information-aggregation-quality-for-operational-velocity]]
- [[futarchy-daos-must-continuously-tune-their-own-temporal-parameters-through-self-referential-governance-proposals]]
- [[early-stage-futarchy-adoption-requires-accepting-counter-party-risk-that-contradicts-the-trustless-premises-of-blockchain-governance]]
---
Relevant Entities:
- [[metadao]] — parent organization
Topics:
- [[internet finance and decision markets]]