extract: 2024-12-02-futardio-proposal-approve-deans-list-treasury-management
Pentagon-Agent: Ganymede <F99EBFA6-547B-4096-BEEA-1D59C3E4028A>
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@ -83,6 +83,12 @@ Proposal #3 on MetaDAO (account EXehk1u3qUJZSxJ4X3nHsiTocRhzwq3eQAa6WKxeJ8Xs) ra
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Production deployment data from futard.io shows Proposal #1 on DAO account De8YzDKudqgeJXqq6i7q82AgxxrQ1JXXfMgouQuPyhY using Autocrat version 0.3, with proposal created, ended, and completed all on 2025-03-05. This confirms operational use of the Autocrat v0.3 implementation in live governance.
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2024-12-02-futardio-proposal-approve-deans-list-treasury-management]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
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Dean's List DAO treasury proposal required TWAP > 3% for passage, with the proposal arguing potential 5-20% FDV increase from de-risking would exceed this threshold. Proposal completed December 5, 2024 after 3-day duration.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -43,6 +43,12 @@ Single-case evidence limits generalizability. The failure could be specific to:
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However, this case provides concrete evidence that [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] operates even when the economics appear favorable.
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2024-12-02-futardio-proposal-approve-deans-list-treasury-management]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
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Dean's List treasury proposal passed despite requiring active market participation to price a 40 percentage point survival probability improvement. The proposal explicitly calculated that potential FDV increase (5-20%) exceeded the 3% TWAP threshold, suggesting the economics were clearly favorable yet still required formal market validation.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
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{
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"rejected_claims": [
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{
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"filename": "treasury-stablecoin-conversion-increases-dao-survival-probability-through-volatility-elimination.md",
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"issues": [
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"no_frontmatter"
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]
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},
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{
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"filename": "treasury-de-risking-increases-dao-fdv-through-market-confidence-signal.md",
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"issues": [
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"no_frontmatter"
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]
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}
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],
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"validation_stats": {
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"total": 2,
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"kept": 0,
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"fixed": 5,
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"rejected": 2,
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"fixes_applied": [
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"treasury-stablecoin-conversion-increases-dao-survival-probability-through-volatility-elimination.md:set_created:2026-03-15",
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"treasury-stablecoin-conversion-increases-dao-survival-probability-through-volatility-elimination.md:stripped_wiki_link:futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate gov",
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"treasury-de-risking-increases-dao-fdv-through-market-confidence-signal.md:set_created:2026-03-15",
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"treasury-de-risking-increases-dao-fdv-through-market-confidence-signal.md:stripped_wiki_link:coin price is the fairest objective function for asset futar",
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"treasury-de-risking-increases-dao-fdv-through-market-confidence-signal.md:stripped_wiki_link:futarchy-markets-can-price-cultural-spending-proposals-by-tr"
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],
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"rejections": [
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"treasury-stablecoin-conversion-increases-dao-survival-probability-through-volatility-elimination.md:no_frontmatter",
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"treasury-de-risking-increases-dao-fdv-through-market-confidence-signal.md:no_frontmatter"
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]
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},
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"model": "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5",
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"date": "2026-03-15"
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}
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@ -6,9 +6,13 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/4gaJ8bi1gpNEx6xSSsepjVBM6GXqTDfLbiUbzXbARHW
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date: 2024-12-02
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domain: internet-finance
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format: data
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status: unprocessed
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status: enrichment
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tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
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event_type: proposal
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processed_by: rio
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processed_date: 2026-03-15
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enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md", "futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md"]
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extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
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---
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## Proposal Details
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@ -122,3 +126,15 @@ This strategy ensures financial stability while signaling prudence to investors,
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- Autocrat version: 0.3
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- Completed: 2024-12-05
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- Ended: 2024-12-05
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## Key Facts
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- Dean's List DAO treasury valued at $75,000-$87,000 at $350 SOL (excluding DEAN token)
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- Proposal account: 4gaJ8bi1gpNEx6xSSsepjVBM6GXqTDfLbiUbzXbARHW1
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- Proposal number: 5
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- DAO account: 9TKh2yav4WpSNkFV2cLybrWZETBWZBkQ6WB6qV9Nt9dJ
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- Autocrat version: 0.3
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- Proposal completed: 2024-12-05
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- Conservative FDV used in proposal: $500,000
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- Required TWAP threshold for passage: >3%
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- Proposal status: Passed
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