Merge pull request 'extract: 2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model' (#1065) from extract/2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model into main
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3 changed files with 29 additions and 3 deletions
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@ -57,16 +57,22 @@ Dean's List treasury proposal passed despite requiring active market participati
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
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*Source: 2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure | Added: 2026-03-15*
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Dean's List DAO fee structure proposal passed despite requiring traders to actively migrate to new pools and accept 20x higher fees (0.25% to 5%). The proposal explicitly acknowledged potential 20-30% volume decrease but passed anyway, suggesting the market priced the net treasury benefit (~$19k-25k annual growth) as worth the migration friction. This demonstrates that futarchy can approve proposals with significant user friction when the economic benefit is clear.
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Dean's List DAO fee structure proposal passed despite requiring traders to actively migrate to new pools and accept 20x higher fees (0.25% to 5%). The proposal explicitly acknowledged potential 20-30% volume decrease but passed anyway, suggesting the market priced the net treasury benefit (~$19k-25k annual growth) as worth the migration friction. This demonstrates that futarchy can approve proposals with significant user friction when the economic benefit is clear.
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
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*Source: 2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure | Added: 2026-03-16*
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Dean's List DAO proposal passed with TWAP threshold requiring only 3% MCAP increase ($307,855 vs $298,889 baseline), suggesting the market viewed the fee increase as marginally positive but not strongly so. The conservative 3% threshold indicates either low participation or weak conviction despite clear revenue projections showing 20x fee increase.
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Dean's List DAO proposal passed with TWAP threshold requiring only 3% MCAP increase ($307,855 vs $298,889 baseline), suggesting the market viewed the fee increase as marginally positive but not strongly so. The conservative 3% threshold indicates either low participation or weak conviction despite clear revenue projections showing 20x fee increase.
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
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The Dean's List proposal passed futarchy governance despite requiring complex multi-step economic modeling (FDV projections, TWAP calculations, sell pressure estimates) that most token holders would not independently verify. The 5.33% projected FDV increase exceeded the 3% TWAP requirement, suggesting the proposal's passage reflected trust in the model rather than independent market validation of the buyback mechanics.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -36,6 +36,12 @@ The model assumes consistent service demand (6 dApp reviews per month) and stabl
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The proposal passed MetaDAO governance but represents a single implementation without long-term performance data. The 80% sell-off assumption is stated as "assumption" in the proposal itself, not empirically validated. No mechanism prevents citizens from selling more than 80% if they face liquidity pressure.
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The proposal passed MetaDAO governance but represents a single implementation without long-term performance data. The 80% sell-off assumption is stated as "assumption" in the proposal itself, not empirically validated. No mechanism prevents citizens from selling more than 80% if they face liquidity pressure.
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
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The Dean's List DAO proposal demonstrates buyback mechanics with specific numbers: charging clients 2500 USDC per review, taking 20% DAO tax in USDC (500), using remaining 2000 USDC to purchase $DEAN tokens, then distributing purchased tokens to DAO citizens as payment. With 80% of recipients selling, the model claims net positive price action because buys exceed sells by 20%. Example shows 400 USDC daily purchases creating 80% increase in trading volume relative to baseline 500 USDC/day, with estimated 5.33% FDV increase from $337,074 to $355,028 monthly.
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Relevant Notes:
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -6,9 +6,13 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/5c2XSWQ9rVPge2Umoz1yenZcAwRaQS5bC4i4w87B1WU
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date: 2024-07-18
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date: 2024-07-18
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domain: internet-finance
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domain: internet-finance
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format: data
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format: data
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status: unprocessed
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status: enrichment
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tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
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tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
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event_type: proposal
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event_type: proposal
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processed_by: rio
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processed_date: 2026-03-16
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enrichments_applied: ["treasury-buyback-model-creates-constant-buy-pressure-by-converting-revenue-to-governance-token-purchases.md", "futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md"]
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extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
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## Proposal Details
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## Proposal Details
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@ -146,3 +150,13 @@ This way we create volume (3600 \$USDC volume) and the price action is always po
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- Autocrat version: 0.3
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- Autocrat version: 0.3
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- Completed: 2024-07-22
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- Completed: 2024-07-22
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- Ended: 2024-07-22
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- Ended: 2024-07-22
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## Key Facts
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- The Dean's List DAO had FDV of $337,074 and daily trading volume of $500 as of July 2024
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- The Dean's List DAO charges 2500 USDC per dApp review
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- The Dean's List DAO proposal assumed 6 dApp reviews per month (15,000 USDC monthly revenue)
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- The Dean's List DAO circulating supply: 100,000,000 $DEAN tokens
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- The Dean's List DAO $DEAN price was $0.00337 at proposal time
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- The Dean's List DAO proposal set 20% DAO tax rate with remainder used for token buybacks
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- The Dean's List DAO proposal estimated 80% of paid DAO citizens would sell their $DEAN tokens
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