extract: 2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy
This commit is contained in:
Teleo Agents
parent
fac8dfe39b
commit
98266fcbb2
6 changed files with 45 additions and 1 deletions
|
|
@ -34,6 +34,12 @@ Rated experimental because this is a proposed design not yet deployed. The liqui
|
|||
|
||||
Coal's v0.6 migration sets minimum liquidity requirements of 1500 USDC and 2000 coal for proposals, with OTC buyer lined up to purchase dev fund tokens and seed the futarchy AMM. This shows the liquidity bootstrapping pattern extends beyond initial launch to governance upgrades, where projects must arrange capital to meet minimum depth requirements before migration.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### Additional Evidence (confirm)
|
||||
*Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
|
||||
|
||||
MetaDAO's design requires proposers to 'lock-up some initial liquidity, and set the starting price for the pass/fail markets.' The expected liquidity evolution: 'Liquidity would start low when the proposal is launched, someone would swap and move the AMM price to their preferred price, and then provide liquidity at that price since the fee incentives are high. Liquidity would increase over the duration of the proposal.'
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Relevant Notes:
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -21,6 +21,12 @@ This cost differential becomes material at scale: a DAO running 50 proposals ann
|
|||
- AMM state requirements described as "almost nothing"
|
||||
- State rent recovery requires autocrat program migration (feedback section)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### Additional Evidence (confirm)
|
||||
*Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
|
||||
|
||||
MetaDAO proposal CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG quantifies the cost reduction: CLOB market pairs cost 3.75 SOL in state rent per proposal, totaling 135-225 SOL annually ($11,475-$19,125 at 2024 prices) for 3-5 proposals per month. AMMs cost 'almost nothing in state rent' by comparison. Proposal passed and was implemented 2024-01-29.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Relevant Notes:
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -23,6 +23,12 @@ This connects to [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume
|
|||
- Expected pattern: liquidity increases as proposal duration progresses
|
||||
- CLOB minimum order size (1 META) acts as spam filter but fragments liquidity further
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### Additional Evidence (confirm)
|
||||
*Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
|
||||
|
||||
MetaDAO's AMM migration proposal explicitly identifies lack of liquidity as the primary reason for switching from CLOBs: 'Estimating a fair price for the future value of MetaDao under pass/fail conditions is difficult, and most reasonable estimates will have a wide range. This uncertainty discourages people from risking their funds with limit orders near the midpoint price, and has the effect of reducing liquidity (and trading). This is the main reason for switching to AMMs.'
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Relevant Notes:
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -36,6 +36,12 @@ The mechanism depends on futarchy-specific conditions (short duration, governanc
|
|||
- May reduce legitimate trading volume
|
||||
- LP attraction depends on base trading activity
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### Additional Evidence (confirm)
|
||||
*Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
|
||||
|
||||
MetaDAO's implemented design sets 3-5% fees explicitly for dual purpose: 'By setting a high fee (3-5%) we can both: encourage LPs, and aggressively discourage wash-trading and manipulation.' The proposal notes this addresses CLOB vulnerabilities where 'someone with 1 $META can push the midpoint towards the current best bid/ask' and 'VWAP can be manipulated by wash trading.'
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Relevant Notes:
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -30,6 +30,12 @@ The proposal acknowledges CLOB manipulation is "a 1/n problem" addressable by de
|
|||
- No empirical data on manipulation resistance
|
||||
- High fees may reduce legitimate trading volume
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### Additional Evidence (confirm)
|
||||
*Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
|
||||
|
||||
MetaDAO's AMM implementation uses 'liquidity-weighted price over time' as the core metric: 'The more liquidity that is on the books, the more weight the current price of the pass or fail market is given. Every time there is a swap, these metrics are updated/aggregated.' This replaces CLOB midpoint pricing which was vulnerable to manipulation with minimal capital.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Relevant Notes:
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,9 +6,13 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1P
|
|||
date: 2024-01-24
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
status: enrichment
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
processed_by: rio
|
||||
processed_date: 2026-03-16
|
||||
enrichments_applied: ["amm-futarchy-reduces-state-rent-costs-by-99-percent-versus-clob-by-eliminating-orderbook-storage-requirements.md", "futarchy-clob-liquidity-fragmentation-creates-wide-spreads-because-pricing-counterfactual-governance-outcomes-has-inherent-uncertainty.md", "high-fee-amms-create-lp-incentive-and-manipulation-deterrent-simultaneously-by-making-passive-provision-profitable-and-active-trading-expensive.md", "liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-solves-futarchy-manipulation-through-capital-commitment-not-vote-counting.md", "amm-futarchy-bootstraps-liquidity-through-high-fee-incentives-and-required-proposer-initial-liquidity-creating-self-reinforcing-depth.md"]
|
||||
extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Proposal Details
|
||||
|
|
@ -128,3 +132,13 @@ Any important changes or feedback brought up during the proposal vote will be re
|
|||
- Autocrat version: 0.1
|
||||
- Completed: 2024-01-29
|
||||
- Ended: 2024-01-29
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Key Facts
|
||||
- MetaDAO Proposal #4 (CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG) passed on 2024-01-29
|
||||
- Proposal budget was 400 META on passing, plus 800 META on completed migration
|
||||
- Implementation team: joebuild (program), 0xNalloK (frontend), TBD (review)
|
||||
- Estimated timeline was 3 weeks from passing plus 1 week review
|
||||
- CLOB minimum order size was 1 META as spam filter
|
||||
- AMMs remove minimum order size restriction, allowing META trading at any granularity
|
||||
- Proposal included feature to permissionlessly pause AMM swaps after verdict and close AMMs to return state rent SOL once positions are cleared
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in a new issue