rio: extract from 2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md

- Source: inbox/archive/2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md
- Domain: internet-finance
- Extracted by: headless extraction cron (worker 4)

Pentagon-Agent: Rio <HEADLESS>

domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md

@@ -82,6 +82,12 @@ Futardio cult launch (2026-03-03 to 2026-03-04) demonstrates MetaDAO's platform
 
 (challenge) Areal's failed Futardio launch ($11,654 raised of $50K target, REFUNDING status) demonstrates that futarchy-governed fundraising does not guarantee capital formation success. The mechanism provides credible exit guarantees through market-governed liquidation and governance quality through conditional markets, but market participants still evaluate project fundamentals and team credibility. Futarchy reduces rug risk but does not eliminate market skepticism of unproven business models or early-stage teams.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
+
+(extend) The Meta-PoW proposal demonstrates MetaDAO's platform evolution beyond simple fundraising into complex economic mechanism design. COAL's proposal introduces a multi-token system (COAL, ORE, INGOT, WOOD) with dynamic pricing mechanisms (license cost c(y) scaling with price ratios), evergreen tool economics (4% daily decay with repair-vs-recraft tradeoffs), and treasury accumulation mechanics (all ORE flows through INGOT smelting at fixed μ rate). The proposal passed through futarchy governance and includes explicit governance parameter tuning (c0, y_ref, p, μ, r_ing_total, w0) showing MetaDAO's capacity to evaluate and approve sophisticated tokenomic designs, not just binary funding decisions.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/dynamic performance-based token minting replaces fixed emission schedules by tying new token creation to measurable outcomes creating algorithmic meritocracy in token distribution.md

@@ -32,6 +32,12 @@ The connection to futarchy governance is important. Since [[MetaDAOs Autocrat pr
 - If performance metrics are poorly chosen, dynamic minting could be more inflationary than fixed schedules, diluting holders during periods of metric gaming
 - Without robust oracle or futarchy verification of performance claims, this reduces to governance theater with extra steps
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
+
+(extend) Meta-PoW implements dynamic emissions through tool-gated access rather than direct performance metrics. COAL has fixed max supply (25M) with halving-band emissions (R_t = R_0 * 2^(-k_t), R_0 = 11,250 COAL/day), but access to those emissions requires crafting and maintaining pickaxes. The dynamic element comes through the license cost c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^p, which adjusts crafting costs based on ORE/COAL price ratio. When COAL strengthens (y decreases), license costs fall, more pickaxes come online, and more players access emissions. When COAL weakens (y increases), license costs rise toward 300 COAL cap, throttling new tool creation. This creates a market-responsive emission access system where token price dynamics determine who can economically participate in mining, rather than fixed schedules or direct performance measurement.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/meta-pow-implements-evergreen-tool-economics-where-repair-cost-is-cheaper-than-recrafting-creating-stable-demand-for-ingot-and-ore-treasury-inflow.md

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: "COAL's Meta-PoW uses 4% daily decay and repair costs below crafting costs to incentivize tool maintenance over churn, creating predictable INGOT demand and ORE treasury inflow"
+confidence: experimental
+source: "futard.io, Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol proposal, 2025-11-07"
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# Meta-PoW implements evergreen tool economics where repair cost is cheaper than recrafting, creating stable demand for INGOT and ORE treasury inflow
+
+COAL's Meta-PoW proposal introduces "evergreen" pickaxe mechanics where tools decay by 4% per day if not repaired, but repair costs (0.082643 INGOT + 0.3 WOOD daily) are calibrated to be cheaper than recrafting a new pickaxe (1 INGOT + 8 WOOD + c(y) COAL license). This creates a structural incentive for players to maintain existing tools rather than constantly craft new ones.
+
+The evergreen design serves two economic functions: (1) it stabilizes the number of active mining tools as a predictable state variable, and (2) it creates consistent daily INGOT demand, which drives ORE inflow to the treasury since INGOT can only be minted by smelting (burning 100 COAL + paying μ ORE, currently ~12.10 ORE per INGOT).
+
+The proposal calibrates repair costs so that "a fully maintained pick effectively corresponds to about 1 ORE/day of smelt demand into the treasury." This means the number of active, fully repaired pickaxes becomes a direct proxy for daily ORE accumulation rate.
+
+The 4% decay rate creates a meaningful but not catastrophic penalty for skipping repairs. Players who abandon tools can later restore them by paying accumulated repair costs, avoiding permanent loss while maintaining economic pressure to stay active.
+
+## Evidence
+
+- Meta-PoW proposal specifies: "Each pick has power p between 0 and 1. If repaired for the day, p stays at 1. If not repaired, p decays by 4% per day: p_next = 0.96 * p"
+- Daily repair cost: r_ing_total ≈ 0.082643 INGOT + 0.3 WOOD
+- Crafting cost: 1 INGOT + 8 WOOD + c(y) COAL (where c(y) ranges from 1-300 COAL depending on price ratio)
+- Proposal states: "Tools are evergreen and cheaper to repair than to recraft, so players maintain their gear instead of churning it"
+- Design goal: "Rational players maintain picks. The number of active, fully repaired picks is the key state variable. In equilibrium: ORE per day to the treasury is approximately equal to the number of active, fully repaired picks."
+
+## Challenges
+
+The 1:1 correspondence between active picks and daily ORE inflow assumes rational player behavior and stable participation. If COAL price crashes or player engagement drops, the treasury inflow could fall below projections even with the evergreen mechanics in place.
+
+The repair-vs-recraft calculation depends on the dynamic license cost c(y). If COAL strengthens significantly (y drops), the license cost falls toward c_min = 1 COAL, potentially making recrafting competitive with long-term repair costs.
+
+---
+
+Topics:
+- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]

domains/internet-finance/meta-pow-separates-ore-payment-to-smelting-only-creating-single-choke-point-for-treasury-inflow-measurement-and-governance-tuning.md

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: "Meta-PoW concentrates all ORE payments at INGOT smelting only, creating a single measurement point for treasury inflow and simplifying governance tuning through a single μ parameter"
+confidence: experimental
+source: "futard.io, Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol proposal, 2025-11-07"
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# Meta-PoW separates ORE payment to smelting only, creating single choke point for treasury inflow measurement and governance tuning
+
+The Meta-PoW proposal concentrates all ORE payments at a single point in the economic loop: INGOT smelting. To mint 1 INGOT, players must burn 100 COAL and pay μ ORE (currently calibrated at ~12.10 ORE) directly to the COAL treasury. No ORE is charged at pickaxe crafting, repair, or any other game action.
+
+This architectural choice creates three key properties:
+
+1. **Single measurement point**: Treasury inflow rate equals INGOT minting rate times μ. Since INGOT is required for all tool crafting and repair, INGOT demand becomes the sole driver of ORE accumulation.
+
+2. **Governance simplicity**: The ORE inflow rate can be tuned by adjusting a single parameter (μ) rather than balancing multiple fee points across different game actions.
+
+3. **Transparent accounting**: All ORE paid goes directly to treasury with no intermediate routing or distribution logic. The proposal states: "All ORE paid at smelt goes to the COAL treasury."
+
+The proposal calibrates μ so that "a fully maintained pick maps to roughly 1 ORE/day of smelt-driven inflow." With daily repair costs of ~0.082643 INGOT per pickaxe, this implies each active pickaxe generates approximately 1 ORE/day of treasury inflow through its INGOT consumption.
+
+This design contrasts with multi-point fee models where different actions charge different tokens, making it difficult to track which activities drive treasury growth and creating complex tuning problems when adjustments are needed.
+
+The proposal explicitly notes that axes (WOOD-producing tools) "do not receive COAL emissions" and "are excluded from ORE accrual logic," reinforcing that the pickaxe-INGOT-smelting loop is the exclusive path for ORE treasury accumulation.
+
+## Evidence
+
+- Smelting cost: burn 100 COAL + pay μ ORE (μ ≈ 12.10 ORE per INGOT)
+- Proposal states: "ORE enters only at smelt. No ORE is charged at craft or repair."
+- Proposal states: "All ORE paid at smelt goes to the COAL treasury."
+- Daily repair cost: r_ing_total ≈ 0.082643 INGOT per pickaxe
+- Design target: "a fully maintained pick maps to roughly 1 ORE/day of smelt-driven inflow"
+- Axes explicitly excluded: "Axes do not receive COAL emissions. Axes are excluded from ORE accrual logic. Any ORE used to smelt their INGOT is incidental."
+
+## Challenges
+
+The single-point design creates a potential bottleneck: if INGOT demand collapses (due to low COAL emissions, high license costs, or player exodus), ORE inflow stops entirely. There is no diversified revenue stream to maintain baseline treasury growth.
+
+The 1:1 correspondence between active pickaxes and daily ORE inflow assumes stable μ calibration. If the ORE/COAL price ratio shifts dramatically, the current μ value may become misaligned with economic reality, requiring governance intervention to adjust.
+
+The proposal allows "parameters to be slightly adjusted by the core team before launch, upon feedback from the community," suggesting the μ calibration is still experimental and may require post-launch tuning.
+
+---
+
+Topics:
+- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]

domains/internet-finance/meta-pow-uses-dynamic-license-costs-as-macro-throttle-where-coal-strength-increases-crafting-and-ore-inflow-while-coal-weakness-self-throttles-without-intervention.md

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: "Meta-PoW's dynamic license cost c(y) scales with ORE/COAL price ratio, creating automatic supply response to token price dynamics without governance intervention"
+confidence: experimental
+source: "futard.io, Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol proposal, 2025-11-07"
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# Meta-PoW uses dynamic license costs as macro throttle where COAL strength increases crafting and ORE inflow while COAL weakness self-throttles without intervention
+
+The Meta-PoW proposal introduces a dynamic pickaxe license cost c(y) that adjusts based on the ORE/COAL price ratio (y = P_ORE / P_COAL), creating an automatic feedback mechanism that responds to token price dynamics without requiring governance intervention.
+
+The license formula is: c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^p, clamped between c_min and c_max. With suggested defaults (c0 = 200 COAL, y_ref = 50, p = 3, c_min = 1, c_max = 300), the license cost varies by up to 300x depending on relative token prices.
+
+When COAL strengthens relative to ORE (y decreases), the license cost falls, making pickaxe crafting more economically viable. This increases the number of active mining tools, which drives more INGOT smelting (the only source of ORE treasury inflow), creating a positive feedback loop: strong COAL → cheap licenses → more crafting → more smelting → more ORE accumulation.
+
+When COAL weakens relative to ORE (y increases), the license cost rises toward the 300 COAL cap, making new pickaxe crafting prohibitively expensive. This naturally throttles new tool creation without breaking existing gameplay, since evergreen mechanics allow existing tools to continue operating through repairs.
+
+The cubic exponent (p = 3) creates strong sensitivity to price changes. A 2x change in the price ratio produces an 8x change in license cost, making the throttle highly responsive to market conditions.
+
+The proposal explicitly frames this as a control parameter rather than a revenue mechanism: "The license is paid in COAL only. That COAL is burned, not sent to the treasury. It is a control parameter, not a revenue stream."
+
+## Evidence
+
+- License formula: c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^p, with c_min ≤ c(y) ≤ c_max
+- Suggested defaults: c0 = 200 COAL, y_ref = 50, p = 3, c_min = 1, c_max = 300
+- Price ratio: y = P_ORE / P_COAL using EMA-smoothed TWAP
+- Proposal states: "When COAL is strong relative to ORE (y low): c(y) decreases, More picks are economically viable, More smelting and more ORE flows into the treasury"
+- Proposal states: "When COAL is weak relative to ORE (y high): c(y) increases, Crafting slows, The system self-throttles without intervention"
+- All license COAL is burned, not sent to treasury
+
+## Challenges
+
+The mechanism assumes liquid markets for both COAL and ORE with reliable price feeds. If either market is illiquid or manipulable, the license cost could be gamed through price manipulation.
+
+The EMA-smoothed TWAP introduces lag, meaning the license cost responds to recent price history rather than current spot prices. This could create arbitrage opportunities or misalignment during rapid price movements.
+
+The cubic exponent creates extreme sensitivity at the tails. Small price movements near the boundaries could cause dramatic shifts in crafting economics, potentially creating instability rather than smooth adjustment.
+
+---
+
+Topics:
+- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]

entities/internet-finance/coal-meta-pow-ore-treasury-protocol.md

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: decision_market
+name: "COAL: Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol"
+domain: internet-finance
+status: passed
+parent_entity: "[[futardio]]"
+platform: "futardio"
+proposer: "coal project"
+proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg"
+proposal_date: 2025-11-07
+resolution_date: 2025-11-10
+category: "mechanism"
+summary: "Introduces Meta-PoW economic model with dynamic license costs, evergreen tool mechanics, and ORE treasury accumulation through INGOT smelting"
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# COAL: Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol
+
+## Summary
+
+The Meta-PoW proposal establishes a sustainable economic model for COAL by creating a multi-token system (COAL, ORE, INGOT, WOOD) where mining power resides in pickaxes, crafting drives deterministic ORE accumulation into the treasury, and dynamic license costs create automatic supply response to token price dynamics. The proposal passed futarchy governance and implements evergreen tool mechanics where repair is cheaper than recrafting, creating stable demand for INGOT and predictable ORE inflow.
+
+## Market Data
+
+- **Outcome:** Passed
+- **Proposer:** coal project
+- **Created:** 2025-11-07
+- **Completed:** 2025-11-10
+- **Proposal Account:** G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg
+- **DAO Account:** 3LGGRzLrgwhEbEsNYBSTZc5MLve1bw3nDaHzzfJMQ1PG
+
+## Significance
+
+This proposal demonstrates MetaDAO's capacity to evaluate and approve complex tokenomic designs beyond simple funding decisions. The Meta-PoW model introduces:
+
+1. **Dynamic macro throttle**: License cost c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^p adjusts crafting costs based on ORE/COAL price ratio, creating automatic supply response without governance intervention
+
+2. **Single-point treasury inflow**: All ORE payments concentrated at INGOT smelting (burn 100 COAL + pay μ ORE ≈ 12.10 ORE), making treasury accumulation predictable and auditable
+
+3. **Evergreen tool economics**: 4% daily decay with repair costs (0.082643 INGOT + 0.3 WOOD) calibrated below recrafting costs (1 INGOT + 8 WOOD + c(y) COAL), incentivizing maintenance over churn
+
+4. **Governance parameter space**: Explicit tuning variables (c0, y_ref, p, μ, r_ing_total, w0) showing sophisticated mechanism design thinking
+
+The proposal includes a GUI implementation on minechain.gg and allows "parameters to be slightly adjusted by the core team before launch, upon feedback from the community," indicating iterative development approach.
+
+## Relationship to KB
+
+- [[futardio]] - governance decision
+- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]] - demonstrates platform evolution into complex mechanism design
+- [[dynamic performance-based token minting replaces fixed emission schedules by tying new token creation to measurable outcomes creating algorithmic meritocracy in token distribution]] - implements tool-gated emission access with market-responsive throttle

entities/internet-finance/futardio.md

@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ MetaDAO's token launch platform. Implements "unruggable ICOs" — permissionless
 
 - **2026-03-07** — Areal DAO launch: $50K target, raised $11,654 (23.3%), REFUNDING status by 2026-03-08 — first documented failed futarchy-governed fundraise on platform
 - **2026-03-04** — [[seekervault]] fundraise launched targeting $75,000, closed next day with only $1,186 (1.6% of target) in refunding status
+- **2025-11-07** — [[coal-meta-pow-ore-treasury-protocol]] passed: COAL project approved Meta-PoW economic model with dynamic license costs, evergreen tool mechanics, and ORE treasury accumulation through INGOT smelting
 ## Competitive Position
 - **Unique mechanism**: Only launch platform with futarchy-governed accountability and treasury return guarantees
 - **vs pump.fun**: pump.fun is memecoin launch (zero accountability, pure speculation). Futardio is ownership coin launch (futarchy governance, treasury enforcement). Different categories despite both being "launch platforms."

inbox/archive/2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md

@@ -6,9 +6,15 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuA
 date: 2025-11-07
 domain: internet-finance
 format: data
-status: unprocessed
+status: processed
 tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
 event_type: proposal
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2026-03-11
+claims_extracted: ["meta-pow-implements-evergreen-tool-economics-where-repair-cost-is-cheaper-than-recrafting-creating-stable-demand-for-ingot-and-ore-treasury-inflow.md", "meta-pow-uses-dynamic-license-costs-as-macro-throttle-where-coal-strength-increases-crafting-and-ore-inflow-while-coal-weakness-self-throttles-without-intervention.md", "meta-pow-separates-ore-payment-to-smelting-only-creating-single-choke-point-for-treasury-inflow-measurement-and-governance-tuning.md"]
+enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md", "dynamic performance-based token minting replaces fixed emission schedules by tying new token creation to measurable outcomes creating algorithmic meritocracy in token distribution.md"]
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
+extraction_notes: "Extracted 3 mechanism design claims about evergreen tool economics, dynamic license throttle, and single-point treasury inflow. Enriched 2 existing claims about MetaDAO platform capabilities and dynamic emission systems. Created decision_market entity for the proposal and updated futardio timeline. Source demonstrates sophisticated tokenomic design with explicit governance parameter tuning."
 ---
 
 ## Proposal Details
@@ -265,3 +271,18 @@ Vote NO – keep the current model unchanged.
 - Autocrat version: 0.3
 - Completed: 2025-11-10
 - Ended: 2025-11-10
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- COAL max supply: 25,000,000 tokens
+- COAL halving bands: every 5% of max supply (1,250,000 COAL)
+- Initial daily emissions: R_0 = 11,250 COAL/day
+- INGOT smelting cost: burn 100 COAL + pay ~12.10 ORE
+- Pickaxe crafting cost: 1 INGOT + 8 WOOD + c(y) COAL license
+- Daily pickaxe repair cost: 0.082643 INGOT + 0.3 WOOD
+- Tool decay rate: 4% per day if not repaired
+- License cost formula: c(y) = 200 * (y/50)^3, clamped between 1-300 COAL
+- Axe crafting cost: 1 INGOT + 6 WOOD
+- Axe daily repair cost: 0.082643 INGOT + 0.25 WOOD
+- Proposal passed: 2025-11-10
+- Discussion: discord.com/channels/1003424756080590878/1436448452631593091