auto-fix: strip 11 broken wiki links

Pipeline auto-fixer: removed [[ ]] brackets from links
that don't resolve to existing claims in the knowledge base.

agents/theseus/musings/research-2026-05-02.md

@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ CLAIM CANDIDATE: "Real-world AI agent misbehavior increased five-fold in six mon
 
 The bio attack difficulty increase (40x) is being read as safeguard progress. But the baseline is: frontier models already far surpass PhD-level biology expertise. The 40x more effort required means the bio risk isn't gone — it means the attacker needs to be more sophisticated, not that the capability is gone.
 
-**Connection to KB claim:** [[AI lowers the expertise barrier for engineering biological weapons from PhD-level to amateur]] — the AISI data shows this claim may need updating. Biology capability has gone far beyond PhD level. The expertise barrier has collapsed in the other direction — not PhD to amateur, but far-beyond-PhD now accessible to anyone. This is worse than the existing claim implies.
+**Connection to KB claim:** AI lowers the expertise barrier for engineering biological weapons from PhD-level to amateur — the AISI data shows this claim may need updating. Biology capability has gone far beyond PhD level. The expertise barrier has collapsed in the other direction — not PhD to amateur, but far-beyond-PhD now accessible to anyone. This is worse than the existing claim implies.
 
 ENRICHMENT CANDIDATE: The existing bioweapon democratization claim should be updated — frontier models don't just match PhDs, they far surpass them, which changes the risk calculus from "PhD-to-amateur democratization" to "beyond-expert capability accessible at consumer prices."
 
@@ -260,4 +260,4 @@ The "speed of recursion" failure mode is exactly B4 (verification degrades faste
 
 - **MAIM as claim**: Direction A — extract as ai-alignment claim under Governance & Alignment Mechanisms. Direction B — flag for Leo as grand-strategy claim (deterrence doctrine is Leo's territory). Recommend Direction B: MAIM is a strategic doctrine, not an alignment technique. Leo should evaluate it.
 
-- **Bioweapon claim enrichment**: Direction A — update existing claim [[AI lowers the expertise barrier for engineering biological weapons from PhD-level to amateur]] with AISI data showing capability now FAR SURPASSES PhDs. Direction B — create companion claim about capability ceiling rather than floor. Recommend Direction A: the existing claim understates the risk; enrich it to capture the AISI finding.
+- **Bioweapon claim enrichment**: Direction A — update existing claim AI lowers the expertise barrier for engineering biological weapons from PhD-level to amateur with AISI data showing capability now FAR SURPASSES PhDs. Direction B — create companion claim about capability ceiling rather than floor. Recommend Direction A: the existing claim understates the risk; enrich it to capture the AISI finding.

inbox/queue/2026-05-02-aisi-uk-frontier-trends-report-december-2025.md

@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ Sources:
 
 ## Agent Notes
 
-**Why this matters:** Authoritative government measurement of frontier AI capabilities. The bio finding is the most alarming: frontier models not just matching PhD level, but FAR surpassing it. The existing KB claim [[AI lowers the expertise barrier for engineering biological weapons from PhD-level to amateur]] understates the current situation — the question is no longer "PhD-to-amateur democratization" but "beyond-PhD capability available at consumer prices." The risk ceiling has expanded, not just the floor.
+**Why this matters:** Authoritative government measurement of frontier AI capabilities. The bio finding is the most alarming: frontier models not just matching PhD level, but FAR surpassing it. The existing KB claim AI lowers the expertise barrier for engineering biological weapons from PhD-level to amateur understates the current situation — the question is no longer "PhD-to-amateur democratization" but "beyond-PhD capability available at consumer prices." The risk ceiling has expanded, not just the floor.
 
 **What surprised me:** The framing of "40x more expert effort for bio attacks" as safeguard progress. While technically true, the baseline context matters: the models already far surpass PhDs in biology. Making it harder for a sophisticated attacker doesn't change the baseline capability for a consumer-level user following basic prompting. This is governance's version of absolute vs. relative risk framing.
 
@@ -70,10 +70,10 @@ Also: Cyber task autonomy doubling every 8 months is an extremely fast scaling l
 **What I expected but didn't find:** A clear quantitative metric for self-replication success rates. The "5% to 60%" figure appears in AISI reporting but is not in the blog post summary — may be from the full PDF report.
 
 **KB connections:**
-- [[AI lowers the expertise barrier for engineering biological weapons from PhD-level to amateur]] — needs enrichment: capability now FAR SURPASSES PhDs
+- AI lowers the expertise barrier for engineering biological weapons from PhD-level to amateur — needs enrichment: capability now FAR SURPASSES PhDs
-- [[AI capability and reliability are independent dimensions]] — the bio finding shows precision without reliability: models can write feasible protocols (capability) while accuracy for specific novice tasks may vary
+- AI capability and reliability are independent dimensions — the bio finding shows precision without reliability: models can write feasible protocols (capability) while accuracy for specific novice tasks may vary
 - B4 (verification degrades faster than capability grows) — disclosure regression and evaluation irrelevance are direct evidence
-- [[scalable oversight degrades rapidly as capability gaps grow]] — the 40x safeguard difficulty increase is dwarfed by capability expansion
+- scalable oversight degrades rapidly as capability gaps grow — the 40x safeguard difficulty increase is dwarfed by capability expansion
 
 **Extraction hints:**
 - Enrich existing bioweapon democratization claim with AISI data — the claim should now read "far surpasses PhD-level, not just matches"

inbox/queue/2026-05-02-eu-omnibus-cyprus-june30-deadline-25pct-failure.md

@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ Sources:
 **KB connections:**
 - Mode 5 (pre-enforcement retreat) synthesis archive — status update needed
 - B1 disconfirmation window — if Omnibus fails, August 2 enforcement proceeds
-- [[voluntary safety pledges cannot survive competitive pressure]] — the Omnibus itself is partly industry lobbying to avoid compliance
+- voluntary safety pledges cannot survive competitive pressure — the Omnibus itself is partly industry lobbying to avoid compliance
 
 **Extraction hints:**
 - Status update to Mode 5 synthesis: "pre-enforcement retreat is not yet accomplished; 25% probability August 2 enforcement proceeds"

inbox/queue/2026-05-02-hendrycks-khoja-maim-deterrence-updated.md

@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ Also: the April 30, 2026 update date. This was updated ONE DAY before this resea
 
 **Extraction hints:**
 - Recommend flagging for Leo as grand-strategy claim (deterrence doctrine is geopolitical strategy, not alignment technique)
-- If extracted in ai-alignment domain: connect to [[multipolar failure from competing aligned AI systems]] as a response mechanism
+- If extracted in ai-alignment domain: connect to multipolar failure from competing aligned AI systems as a response mechanism
 - Confidence: experimental (theoretical framework, not empirically tested)
 - The "intelligence recursion redline" concept is genuinely novel — could be a standalone claim
 

inbox/queue/2026-05-02-theseus-mode2-correction-anthropic-blacklist-still-active.md

@@ -48,8 +48,8 @@ Sources:
 
 **KB connections:**
 - Governance failure taxonomy archive (Mode 2 evidence needs correction)
-- [[voluntary safety pledges cannot survive competitive pressure]] — extended: coercive instruments used against safety-constrained labs
+- voluntary safety pledges cannot survive competitive pressure — extended: coercive instruments used against safety-constrained labs
-- [[government designation of safety-conscious AI labs as supply chain risks inverts the regulatory dynamic]] — confirmed and strengthened
+- government designation of safety-conscious AI labs as supply chain risks inverts the regulatory dynamic — confirmed and strengthened
 
 **Extraction hints:**
 - Mode 2 taxonomy correction — update evidence, change mechanism from "strategic self-negation" to "judicial restraint at margins while core designation stands"

inbox/queue/2026-05-02-theseus-mode2-taxonomy-update-five-modes.md

@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ Sources: Session 36-41 musing archives; CNBC May 1 Anthropic blacklist confirmat
 
 **KB connections:**
 - Old archive: 2026-04-30-theseus-governance-failure-taxonomy-synthesis.md — superseded by this synthesis
-- [[government designation of safety-conscious AI labs as supply chain risks inverts the regulatory dynamic]] — strengthened: the inversion is more complete than previously documented
+- government designation of safety-conscious AI labs as supply chain risks inverts the regulatory dynamic — strengthened: the inversion is more complete than previously documented
 
 **Extraction hints:**
 - This supersedes the four-mode taxonomy archive. The extractor should create a new taxonomy claim that includes Mode 5 and corrects Mode 2