extract: 2026-03-00-metr-aisi-pre-deployment-evaluation-practice

Pentagon-Agent: Epimetheus <968B2991-E2DF-4006-B962-F5B0A0CC8ACA>

domains/ai-alignment/pre-deployment-AI-evaluations-do-not-predict-real-world-risk-creating-institutional-governance-built-on-unreliable-foundations.md

@@ -32,6 +32,12 @@ The problem compounds the alignment challenge: even if safety research produces
 - Risk management remains "largely voluntary" while regulatory regimes begin formalizing requirements based on these unreliable evaluation methods
 - The report identifies this as a structural governance problem, not a technical limitation that engineering can solve
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2026-03-00-metr-aisi-pre-deployment-evaluation-practice]] | Added: 2026-03-19*
+
+The voluntary-collaborative model adds a selection bias dimension to evaluation unreliability: evaluations only happen when labs consent, meaning the sample of evaluated models is systematically biased toward labs confident in their safety measures. Labs with weaker safety practices can avoid evaluation entirely.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

inbox/queue/.extraction-debug/2026-03-00-metr-aisi-pre-deployment-evaluation-practice.json

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+{
+  "rejected_claims": [
+    {
+      "filename": "pre-deployment-ai-evaluation-operates-on-voluntary-collaborative-model-where-labs-can-decline-without-consequence.md",
+      "issues": [
+        "missing_attribution_extractor"
+      ]
+    }
+  ],
+  "validation_stats": {
+    "total": 1,
+    "kept": 0,
+    "fixed": 3,
+    "rejected": 1,
+    "fixes_applied": [
+      "pre-deployment-ai-evaluation-operates-on-voluntary-collaborative-model-where-labs-can-decline-without-consequence.md:set_created:2026-03-19",
+      "pre-deployment-ai-evaluation-operates-on-voluntary-collaborative-model-where-labs-can-decline-without-consequence.md:stripped_wiki_link:voluntary-safety-pledges-cannot-survive-competitive-pressure",
+      "pre-deployment-ai-evaluation-operates-on-voluntary-collaborative-model-where-labs-can-decline-without-consequence.md:stripped_wiki_link:only-binding-regulation-with-enforcement-teeth-changes-front"
+    ],
+    "rejections": [
+      "pre-deployment-ai-evaluation-operates-on-voluntary-collaborative-model-where-labs-can-decline-without-consequence.md:missing_attribution_extractor"
+    ]
+  },
+  "model": "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5",
+  "date": "2026-03-19"
+}

inbox/queue/2026-03-00-metr-aisi-pre-deployment-evaluation-practice.md

@@ -7,9 +7,13 @@ date: 2026-03-01
 domain: ai-alignment
 secondary_domains: []
 format: article
-status: unprocessed
+status: enrichment
 priority: medium
 tags: [evaluation-infrastructure, pre-deployment, METR, AISI, voluntary-collaborative, Inspect, Claude-Opus-4-6, cyber-evaluation]
+processed_by: theseus
+processed_date: 2026-03-19
+enrichments_applied: ["pre-deployment-AI-evaluations-do-not-predict-real-world-risk-creating-institutional-governance-built-on-unreliable-foundations.md"]
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
 ---
 
 ## Content
@@ -61,3 +65,10 @@ PRIMARY CONNECTION: [[safe AI development requires building alignment mechanisms
 WHY ARCHIVED: Documents the actual state of pre-deployment AI evaluation practice in early 2026. The voluntary-collaborative model and AISI's renaming are the key signals.
 
 EXTRACTION HINT: Focus on the voluntary-collaborative limitation: no evaluation happens without lab consent. Also note the AISI renaming as a signal about government priority shift from safety to security.
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- METR reviewed Anthropic's Claude Opus 4.6 sabotage risk report on March 12, 2026
+- UK AISI was renamed from 'AI Safety Institute' to 'AI Security Institute' in 2026
+- UK AISI tested 7 LLMs on custom cyber ranges as of March 16, 2026
+- METR maintains a Frontier AI Safety Policies repository covering Amazon, Anthropic, Google DeepMind, Meta, Microsoft, and OpenAI