rio: extract from 2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme.md
- Source: inbox/archive/2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme.md - Domain: internet-finance - Extracted by: headless extraction cron (worker 5) Pentagon-Agent: Rio <HEADLESS>
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---
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type: entity
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entity_type: decision_market
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name: "Dean's List: ThailandDAO Event Promotion to Boost Governance Engagement"
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domain: internet-finance
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status: failed
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parent_entity: "[[deans-list]]"
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platform: "futardio"
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proposer: "HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz"
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proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM"
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proposal_date: 2024-06-22
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resolution_date: 2024-06-25
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category: "strategy"
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summary: "Proposal to boost Dean's List DAO governance engagement through ThailandDAO event incentives, offering travel and accommodation for top governance power holders"
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tracked_by: rio
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created: 2026-03-11
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key_metrics:
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budget: "$15,000"
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current_fdv: "$123,263"
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projected_fdv: ">$2,000,000"
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required_twap_increase: "3%"
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trading_period: "3 days"
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autocrat_version: "0.3"
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proposal_account: "DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM"
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dao_account: "9TKh2yav4WpSNkFV2cLybrWZETBWZBkQ6WB6qV9Nt9dJ"
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---
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# Dean's List: ThailandDAO Event Promotion to Boost Governance Engagement
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## Summary
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Proposal to create a promotional campaign increasing governance power engagement within Dean's List DAO by offering exclusive perks for ThailandDAO event (Sept 25 - Oct 25, 2024, Koh Samui). Top 5 governance power holders would receive airplane fares and accommodation ($10K), top 50 would get event access and airdrops ($5K). The proposal included a 10% payment discount in $DEAN tokens for contributors and projected 16x FDV growth through token locking mechanics.
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## Market Data
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- **Outcome:** Failed
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- **Proposer:** HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz
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- **Platform:** Futardio (Autocrat v0.3)
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- **Trading Period:** 3 days (2024-06-22 to 2024-06-25)
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- **Pass Threshold:** 3% TWAP increase ($3,698 absolute)
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- **Budget:** $15K total
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- **Current FDV:** $123,263
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- **Projected FDV:** >$2,000,000 (16x growth)
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## Significance
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This proposal demonstrates futarchy market failure modes when proposals combine favorable stated economics with complex multi-component incentive structures. Despite presenting a clear cost-benefit analysis ($15K cost vs $1.9M projected gain) and low pass threshold (3% TWAP increase), the proposal failed, suggesting:
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1. **Liquidity constraints**: Small DAO FDV ($123K) may have lacked sufficient market depth for accurate pricing
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2. **Credibility issues**: 16x FDV growth projection from token locking may have seemed unrealistic to traders
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3. **Complexity friction**: Multi-component proposal (events + token economics + leaderboard + payment discounts) increased evaluation difficulty
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4. **Cold start problem**: Limited trading history in Dean's List DAO markets
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The proposal also introduced a novel mechanism design pattern: using leaderboard-based event incentives to create token locking pressure without explicit staking contracts. This approach converts social rewards (IRL experiences, community status) into economic pressure to lock tokens, inspired by MonkeDAO and SuperTeam's event-driven community models.
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## Relationship to KB
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- [[deans-list]] - governance proposal
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- [[futardio]] - platform
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- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] - mechanism used
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- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] - failure case evidence
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- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] - confirms pattern
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@ -47,3 +47,6 @@ Topics:
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## Timeline
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- **2024-12-19** — [[deans-list-implement-3-week-vesting]] passed: 3-week linear vesting for DAO payments to reduce sell pressure from 80% immediate liquidation to 33% weekly rate, projected 15%-25% valuation increase
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- **2024-06-22** — [[deans-list-thailanddao-event-promotion]] proposed: $15K budget for ThailandDAO event incentives targeting 16x FDV growth through governance power competition
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- **2024-06-25** — [[deans-list-thailanddao-event-promotion]] failed: Proposal rejected despite favorable economics (3% TWAP threshold, $15K cost vs $1.9M projected gain)
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@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ MetaDAO's token launch platform. Implements "unruggable ICOs" — permissionless
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- **2026-03-07** — Areal DAO launch: $50K target, raised $11,654 (23.3%), REFUNDING status by 2026-03-08 — first documented failed futarchy-governed fundraise on platform
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- **2026-03-04** — [[seekervault]] fundraise launched targeting $75,000, closed next day with only $1,186 (1.6% of target) in refunding status
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- **2024-06-22** — Dean's List DAO [[deans-list-thailanddao-event-promotion]] demonstrates futarchy failure mode: complex multi-component proposal with favorable economics fails to reach 3% TWAP threshold, suggesting liquidity or credibility constraints in small DAO markets
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## Competitive Position
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- **Unique mechanism**: Only launch platform with futarchy-governed accountability and treasury return guarantees
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- **vs pump.fun**: pump.fun is memecoin launch (zero accountability, pure speculation). Futardio is ownership coin launch (futarchy governance, treasury enforcement). Different categories despite both being "launch platforms."
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@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM
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date: 2024-06-22
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domain: internet-finance
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format: data
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status: unprocessed
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status: processed
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tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
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event_type: proposal
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processed_by: rio
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@ -14,6 +14,11 @@ processed_date: 2024-06-22
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enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md", "futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md", "MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md"]
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extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
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extraction_notes: "Extracted 2 claims about futarchy market failure modes and DAO incentive mechanisms. Both claims are experimental/speculative due to single-case evidence. Proposal failed despite seemingly favorable economics, which itself is evidence about futarchy adoption barriers. Enriched 3 existing claims with concrete implementation data and failure case confirmation."
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processed_by: rio
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processed_date: 2026-03-11
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enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md", "futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md", "MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md"]
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extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
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extraction_notes: "Extracted 2 claims about futarchy market failure modes and DAO incentive mechanisms. Both claims are experimental/speculative due to single-case evidence. Proposal failed despite seemingly favorable economics, which itself is evidence about futarchy adoption barriers. Created decision_market entity for the proposal as it represents a significant governance event with novel mechanism design (leaderboard-based token locking incentives). Enriched 3 existing claims with concrete implementation data and failure case confirmation. The proposal's failure provides valuable negative evidence about futarchy adoption constraints in small DAOs with limited liquidity."
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---
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## Proposal Details
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@ -182,3 +187,15 @@ This proposal to create a promotional event at ThailandDAO, incentivizing govern
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- Proposal completed: 2024-06-25
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- Required TWAP increase: 3% ($3,698 absolute)
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- Trading period: 3 days
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## Key Facts
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- Dean's List DAO FDV: $123,263 (2024-06-22)
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- ThailandDAO event dates: Sept 25 - Oct 25, 2024, Koh Samui Thailand
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- Proposal budget: $15K ($10K travel for top 5, $5K events for top 50)
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- Required TWAP increase: 3% ($3,698 absolute)
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- Trading period: 3 days
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- Autocrat version: 0.3
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- Proposal account: DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM
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- DAO account: 9TKh2yav4WpSNkFV2cLybrWZETBWZBkQ6WB6qV9Nt9dJ
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- Proposer: HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz
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