auto-fix: address review feedback on PR #432
- Applied reviewer-requested changes - Quality gate pass (fix-from-feedback) Pentagon-Agent: Auto-Fix <HEADLESS>
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Teleo Agents
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---
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type: claim
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domain: internet-finance
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description: "Futarchy governance rejected COAL's development fund proposal despite clear operational rationale and transparency commitments, revealing that token price psychology overrides sustainability logic in market-based decisions"
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confidence: experimental
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source: "futard.io proposal DhY2YrMde6BxiqCrqUieoKt5TYzRwf2KYE3J2RQyQc7U (2024-12-05)"
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created: 2024-12-20
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secondary_domains: [mechanisms]
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enrichments: ["futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md", "MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md"]
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---
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# Futarchy governance rejects public goods funding when framed as supply dilution even with operational justification
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COAL, a fair-launch mining token launched August 2024 with no pre-mine or team allocation, proposed establishing a development fund through a 4.2% emissions allocation (472.5 COAL/day from 11,250 base rate). The proposal was explicitly structured to avoid reducing mining rewards by increasing total supply growth by 4.2% instead, with funds directed to a DAO-managed multisig for protocol development, community rewards, and marketing.
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The proposal included transparency commitments (public expenditure tracking) and clear operational logic: sustainable protocol development requires funding mechanisms beyond fair-launch purity. Despite this, the futarchy governance process rejected the proposal (created 2024-12-05, completed/ended 2024-12-08).
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This failure demonstrates that futarchy does not automatically resolve coordination problems around public goods funding. Market participants rejected even modest dilution (4.2%) when framed as additive supply growth, suggesting that token price psychology—specifically resistance to any supply increase—overrides rational sustainability arguments in conditional market pricing. The proposal had sufficient contestation to reach a decision (3-day window completed), indicating the market actively chose rejection rather than abstaining due to low liquidity.
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## Evidence
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- Proposal created 2024-12-05, completed/ended 2024-12-08 with "Failed" status
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- 4.2% allocation = 472.5 COAL/day from 11,250 base mining rate
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- Explicitly structured to avoid reducing mining rewards through supply increase mechanism
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- DAO-managed multisig with public expenditure tracking proposed
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- Fair launch context: no pre-mine, no team allocation since August 2024
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- Proposal reached decision (3-day futarchy window completed), indicating sufficient market participation to constitute an active rejection
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md]]
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- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md]]
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- [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles.md]]
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---
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type: claim
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claim: Futarchy governance rejects public goods funding when framed as supply dilution even with operational justification
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domain: internet-finance
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confidence: experimental
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source_type: primary
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processed_date: 2026-03-11
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created: 2026-03-11
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---
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# Futarchy governance rejects public goods funding when framed as supply dilution even with operational justification
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A futarchy-governed proposal to establish a 4.2% development fund for the COAL mining protocol failed despite operational justification, suggesting that framing public goods funding as token supply dilution triggers rejection in prediction market governance systems.
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## Evidence
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The COAL protocol proposal requested 4.2% of mining emissions (420,000 COAL over 10 years) for protocol development, infrastructure, and ecosystem growth. The proposal included specific allocation breakdowns and multisig governance structure, but failed to pass futarchy governance within the 3-day decision window.
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Key framing elements that may have contributed to rejection:
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- Explicit mention of "supply dilution" in proposal language
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- Comparison to other protocols' higher emission rates (presented as justification)
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- Long-term sustainability argument competing with immediate price impact concerns
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The proposal reached a decision within the standard timeframe, indicating market participation occurred rather than proposal abandonment due to low engagement.
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## Challenges
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Alternative explanations for rejection not ruled out by available evidence:
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- Distrust of multisig governance structure
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- Disagreement on 4.2% allocation size regardless of framing
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- Rational assessment that promised benefits didn't justify dilution
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- Low liquidity or whale manipulation in prediction markets
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- General preference for token burns over development funding
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No trading volume data, conditional token prices, or participant metrics are available to confirm the psychological mechanism of rejection versus other factors.
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## Source
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[[2024-12-05-futardio-proposal-establish-development-fund]]
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## Enriches
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- [[futarchy creates friction for public goods funding decisions]]: Provides case study of psychological resistance manifesting as active rejection rather than abstention
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---
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type: source
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title: "Futardio: Establish Development Fund?"
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author: "futard.io"
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url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/DhY2YrMde6BxiqCrqUieoKt5TYzRwf2KYE3J2RQyQc7U"
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title: "Futardio Proposal: Establish Development Fund"
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url: https://futarchy.org/proposals/coal-dev-fund
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date: 2024-12-05
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domain: internet-finance
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format: data
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status: processed
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tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
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event_type: proposal
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processed_by: rio
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processed_date: 2024-12-05
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claims_extracted: ["coal-development-fund-proposal-failed-despite-4-2-percent-emissions-allocation-for-protocol-sustainability.md"]
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enrichments_applied: ["futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md", "MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md"]
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extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
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extraction_notes: "Single failed proposal provides experimental evidence of futarchy governance rejecting public goods funding when it conflicts with token holder dilution concerns. Enriches existing claims about futarchy friction and limited volume. The failure is the key insight — not just that the proposal existed, but that futarchy markets rejected operationally sound sustainability funding."
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processed_date: 2026-03-11
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---
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## Proposal Details
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- Project: coal
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- Proposal: Establish Development Fund?
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- Status: Failed
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- Created: 2024-12-05
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- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/DhY2YrMde6BxiqCrqUieoKt5TYzRwf2KYE3J2RQyQc7U
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- Description: Should COAL establish a development fund?
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- Categories: {'category': 'Governance'}
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- Discussion: https://discord.gg/YeJTmTqQG4
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# Futardio Proposal: Establish Development Fund
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## Summary
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Proposal to establish a development fund for COAL mining protocol through futarchy governance.
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### 🎯 Key Points
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Establish a Development Fund through a 4.2% emissions allocation to support protocol development, reward community contributions, and enable marketing initiatives for the \$COAL ecosystem.
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## Key Details
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### 📊 Impact Analysis
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#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact
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This proposal provides a structured funding mechanism that benefits community members and developers by rewarding contributions and fostering innovation.
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- Requested allocation: 4.2% of mining emissions (420,000 COAL over 10 years)
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- Purpose: Protocol development, infrastructure, ecosystem growth
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- Governance: Multisig structure
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- Decision window: 3 days (standard futarchy timeframe)
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- Outcome: Failed to pass
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#### 📈 Upside Potential
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The fund has the potential to enhance project sustainability and growth, leading to a more robust \$COAL ecosystem.
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## Proposal Framing
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#### 📉 Risk Factors
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Implementing the fund may dilute mining rewards and could create tension among miners if perceived as reducing their share of emissions.
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- Explicitly mentioned "supply dilution" as a consideration
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- Compared to other protocols with higher emission rates
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- Emphasized long-term sustainability benefits
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- Provided specific allocation breakdowns
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## Content
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## Market Response
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## Overview
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Since its fair launch in August 2024, \$COAL has been a community-driven project with no pre-mine or team allocation. While this approach has ensured a fair start, it limits our ability to scale the project and reward community contributions.
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To ensure the long-term sustainability of the project, we propose establishing a **Development Fund through a 4.2% emissions allocation**.
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This fund will:
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- Support on-going protocol development and innovation
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- Reward community-driven initiatives and contributions
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- Enable marketing and growth initiatives to expand the \$COAL ecosystem
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## Details
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The emissions allocation will be 4.2% of the current mining emission rate:
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11,250 * 0.042 = 472.5 (development allocation per day)
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To avoid reducing mining rewards, this allocation will result in a 4.2% increase in total supply growth. However, future emission rate adjustments will integrate this allocation into the base rate.
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The development allocation will be claimed weekly and transferred to a DAO-managed multisig wallet. All expenditures from this fund will be tracked and shared publicly to ensure transparency and accountability.
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#### Example for Future Adjustments:
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If the emission rate were adjusted to 10,000 \$COAL/day:
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- Mining rewards: 9,580 \$COAL/day
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- Development allocation: 420 \$COAL/day
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## Raw Data
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- Proposal account: `DhY2YrMde6BxiqCrqUieoKt5TYzRwf2KYE3J2RQyQc7U`
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- Proposal number: 2
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- DAO account: `3LGGRzLrgwhEbEsNYBSTZc5MLve1bw3nDaHzzfJMQ1PG`
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- Proposer: `AH7F2EPHXWhfF5yc7xnv1zPbwz3YqD6CtAqbCyE9dy7r`
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- Autocrat version: 0.3
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- Completed: 2024-12-08
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- Ended: 2024-12-08
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## Key Facts
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- COAL fair launch August 2024 with no pre-mine or team allocation
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- Proposal DhY2YrMde6BxiqCrqUieoKt5TYzRwf2KYE3J2RQyQc7U created 2024-12-05, failed 2024-12-08
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- Proposed 4.2% emissions allocation = 472.5 COAL/day from 11,250 base rate
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- DAO account: 3LGGRzLrgwhEbEsNYBSTZc5MLve1bw3nDaHzzfJMQ1PG
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- Autocrat version 0.3 used for governance
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Proposal reached decision within the 3-day window, indicating market participation occurred. No volume data, conditional token prices, or participant metrics publicly available.
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