From a8b352048dfe37975cb46213356a809809766d4d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Teleo Agents Date: Mon, 16 Mar 2026 11:30:14 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] auto-fix: strip 3 broken wiki links Pipeline auto-fixer: removed [[ ]] brackets from links that don't resolve to existing claims in the knowledge base. --- ...mmunity-cohesion-and-brand-equity-as-token-price-inputs.md | 2 +- ...l-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-markets-can-price-cultural-spending-proposals-by-treating-community-cohesion-and-brand-equity-as-token-price-inputs.md b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-markets-can-price-cultural-spending-proposals-by-treating-community-cohesion-and-brand-equity-as-token-price-inputs.md index a5e29167..ff85af0c 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-markets-can-price-cultural-spending-proposals-by-treating-community-cohesion-and-brand-equity-as-token-price-inputs.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-markets-can-price-cultural-spending-proposals-by-treating-community-cohesion-and-brand-equity-as-token-price-inputs.md @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ The single data point is limited. One passed proposal doesn't establish a reliab ### Additional Evidence (extend) -*Source: [[2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure]] | Added: 2026-03-15* +*Source: 2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure | Added: 2026-03-15* Dean's List DAO's fee increase proposal included switching quote token from mSOL back to SOL, a decision with no direct revenue impact but potential effects on user experience and composability. The futarchy market approved this alongside the fee changes, suggesting it priced the operational simplification and ecosystem alignment as net positive for token value despite being a 'cultural' rather than purely financial decision. diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md index a673038a..bd0a9965 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ However, this case provides concrete evidence that [[futarchy adoption faces fri ### Additional Evidence (confirm) -*Source: [[2024-08-27-futardio-proposal-fund-the-drift-superteam-earn-creator-competition]] | Added: 2026-03-15* +*Source: 2024-08-27-futardio-proposal-fund-the-drift-superteam-earn-creator-competition | Added: 2026-03-15* Drift's $8,250 creator competition proposal failed despite having clear upside potential (community engagement, content generation, B.E.T awareness) and minimal downside risk. The proposal offered a structured prize pool across multiple tracks (video, Twitter threads, trade ideas) with established evaluation criteria, yet still failed to generate sufficient market participation. This is a canonical example of participation friction killing an economically sensible proposal. @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ Dean's List treasury proposal passed despite requiring active market participati ### Additional Evidence (extend) -*Source: [[2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure]] | Added: 2026-03-15* +*Source: 2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure | Added: 2026-03-15* Dean's List DAO fee structure proposal passed despite requiring traders to actively migrate to new pools and accept 20x higher fees (0.25% to 5%). The proposal explicitly acknowledged potential 20-30% volume decrease but passed anyway, suggesting the market priced the net treasury benefit (~$19k-25k annual growth) as worth the migration friction. This demonstrates that futarchy can approve proposals with significant user friction when the economic benefit is clear.