rio: extract claims from 2024-02-18-futardio-proposal-engage-in-50000-otc-trade-with-pantera-capital.md
- Source: inbox/archive/2024-02-18-futardio-proposal-engage-in-50000-otc-trade-with-pantera-capital.md - Domain: internet-finance - Extracted by: headless extraction cron (worker 1) Pentagon-Agent: Rio <HEADLESS>
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@ -53,6 +53,12 @@ Autocrat is MetaDAO's core governance program on Solana -- the on-chain implemen
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**Limitations.** [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] -- when proposals are clearly good or clearly bad, few traders participate because the expected profit from trading in a consensus market is near zero. This is a structural feature, not a bug: contested decisions get more participation precisely because they're uncertain, which is when you most need information aggregation. But it does mean uncontested proposals can pass or fail with very thin markets, making the TWAP potentially noisy.
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2024-02-18-futardio-proposal-engage-in-50000-otc-trade-with-pantera-capital]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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The Pantera OTC proposal demonstrates a novel application of Autocrat's TWAP settlement mechanism beyond simple pass/fail governance decisions. The proposal specified that the price per META would be determined by ppM = min((twapPass + twapFail) / 2, 100), directly incorporating the conditional market TWAPs into the transaction terms rather than just governance outcomes. This shows the TWAP settlement mechanism can serve dual purposes: (1) governance decision-making (pass/fail settlement), and (2) market-based pricing for treasury operations (OTC pricing oracle). The proposal failed before execution on 2024-02-23, so this pricing application remains untested empirically, but it demonstrates that Autocrat's TWAP infrastructure can be extended beyond its original governance function.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -17,6 +17,12 @@ In uncontested decisions -- where the community broadly agrees on the right outc
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This evidence has direct implications for governance design. It suggests that [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]] -- futarchy excels precisely where disagreement and manipulation risk are high, but it wastes its protective power on consensual decisions. The MetaDAO experience validates the mixed-mechanism thesis: use simpler mechanisms for uncontested decisions and reserve futarchy's complexity for decisions where its manipulation resistance actually matters. The participation challenge also highlights a design tension: the mechanism that is most resistant to manipulation is also the one that demands the most sophistication from participants.
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2024-02-18-futardio-proposal-engage-in-50000-otc-trade-with-pantera-capital]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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The Pantera Capital OTC proposal (Proposal #7, failed 2024-02-23) represents a contested decision where futarchy markets actively rejected a proposal despite institutional validation and strategic partnership framing. The proposal's complexity (7-party multisig with 5/7 threshold, dynamic TWAP pricing formula, 12-month Streamflow vesting, multi-step verification) and speculative strategic benefits (~25% META appreciation from partnership) created genuine disagreement. This contrasts with the 'limited trading volume in uncontested decisions' pattern by showing that futarchy markets do engage substantively with complex, contested proposals. However, the rejection suggests markets may systematically discount speculative strategic narratives when execution complexity is high, indicating futarchy markets distinguish between concrete terms and speculative benefits.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -28,6 +28,12 @@ Yet [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontest
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MycoRealms implementation reveals operational friction points: monthly $10,000 allowance creates baseline operations budget, but any expenditure beyond this requires futarchy proposal and market approval. First post-raise proposal will be $50,000 CAPEX withdrawal — a large binary decision that may face liquidity challenges in decision markets. Team must balance operational needs (construction timelines, vendor commitments, seasonal agricultural constraints) against market approval uncertainty. This creates tension between real-world operational requirements (fixed deadlines, vendor deposits, material procurement) and futarchy's market-based approval process, suggesting futarchy may face adoption friction in domains with hard operational deadlines.
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2024-02-18-futardio-proposal-engage-in-50000-otc-trade-with-pantera-capital]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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The Pantera proposal's failure provides evidence supporting the complexity friction claim. Execution required: (1) 7-party multisig with 5/7 threshold across Pantera (2 signers) and MetaDAO community members (5 signers), (2) dynamic pricing via TWAP formula with $100 ceiling, (3) Streamflow vesting program configuration, (4) multi-step token transfers (20% immediate, 80% vested over 12 months), (5) verification steps confirming balances, (6) remainder token returns to treasury. The proposal document itself required support from 4 parties (Pantera Capital, 0xNallok, 7Layer, Proph3t) just to draft. This operational complexity created multiple execution risk vectors that markets appear to have priced negatively, supporting the claim that proposal complexity creates adoption friction in futarchy systems.
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
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---
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type: claim
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domain: internet-finance
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description: "MetaDAO's OTC proposal used TWAP-based pricing formulas averaging pass and fail market prices with a ceiling, extending futarchy's conditional markets beyond governance into treasury pricing"
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confidence: experimental
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source: "MetaDAO Proposal #7, futard.io 2024-02-18"
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created: 2024-02-18
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---
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# MetaDAO's Pantera OTC proposal applied futarchy's TWAP mechanism to treasury pricing by averaging conditional market prices with a buyer-protection ceiling
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The Pantera Capital OTC proposal introduced a pricing mechanism where the final price per META token would be determined post-vote as:
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ppM = min((twapPass + twapFail) / 2, 100)
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This formula:
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1. Takes the time-weighted average price (TWAP) from both the pass and fail conditional markets
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2. Averages them to find a consensus price independent of proposal outcome
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3. Caps the result at $100 to provide buyer downside protection
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The mechanism extends futarchy's conditional markets beyond governance decision-making into treasury operations. Rather than using fixed negotiated terms, the OTC pricing would be determined by market-validated prices from the proposal's own prediction markets. This creates:
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- Dynamic price discovery where market participants trading in pass/fail markets directly influence the final OTC price
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- Buyer protection via the $100 ceiling (META spot price was $96.93 at proposal time)
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- Market-validated pricing rather than arbitrary negotiation
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- Theoretical independence from proposal outcome by averaging both conditional markets
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This represents a novel application of futarchy's conditional markets as a pricing oracle for treasury operations. The approach could generalize to other DAO treasury transactions where market-based pricing is preferable to fixed terms or traditional negotiation.
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The proposal's failure on 2024-02-23 means this pricing mechanism was never executed, so we have no empirical data on whether the formula would have produced acceptable prices for both parties or whether the averaging approach actually captures "true" value independent of proposal outcome.
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## Evidence
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- Pricing formula: ppM = min((twapPass + twapFail) / 2, 100)
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- TWAP measured over 3-day voting window (standard MetaDAO proposal duration)
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- $100 ceiling provided buyer protection against upside
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- Final allocation quantity = $50,000 / calculated ppM
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- META spot price at proposal: $96.93 (approximately 97% of ceiling)
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- Proposal failed before pricing mechanism could execute
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- Formula explicitly stated in proposal document: "The price per META shall be determined upon passing of the proposal and the lesser of the average TWAP price of the pass / fail market and $100"
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md]]
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- [[decision markets make majority theft unprofitable through conditional token arbitrage.md]]
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- [[futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders.md]]
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Topics:
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- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
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- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]
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@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
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---
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type: claim
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domain: internet-finance
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description: "MetaDAO's futarchy markets rejected a $50k institutional OTC proposal, suggesting markets price execution complexity and speculative strategic benefits more heavily than partnership narratives"
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confidence: experimental
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source: "MetaDAO Proposal #7 (failed 2024-02-23), futard.io"
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created: 2024-02-18
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---
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# MetaDAO futarchy markets rejected the Pantera Capital OTC proposal, suggesting conditional markets discount speculative strategic benefits and price execution complexity as risk
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MetaDAO's Proposal #7 sought a $50,000 OTC trade with Pantera Capital, structured with 20% immediate transfer and 80% linear vesting over 12 months. The proposal explicitly framed the deal as a "strategic partnership" offering visibility, Solana ecosystem exposure, and potential deal flow beyond the direct capital injection. The proposal document claimed a ~25% increase in META value due to Pantera's "high profile" and "strategic resources."
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The proposal failed on 2024-02-23 despite institutional validation and strategic partnership framing.
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This outcome provides evidence that futarchy markets at MetaDAO weighted concrete transaction terms (price per META capped at $100, determined by TWAP of pass/fail markets) more heavily than speculative strategic benefits. Market participants either:
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1. Did not believe the strategic partnership would deliver the claimed 25% value increase
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2. Valued the META tokens at less than the proposed price floor
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3. Preferred to avoid dilution regardless of partnership benefits
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4. Priced the execution complexity (7-party multisig, dynamic pricing formula, Streamflow vesting) as unacceptable operational risk
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The proposal's complexity created multiple execution risk vectors: 5/7 multisig threshold across 7 parties, dynamic TWAP pricing formula with ceiling, Streamflow vesting program configuration, multi-step token transfers, and verification requirements. This suggests futarchy markets do engage substantively with complex proposals but may systematically discount speculative strategic narratives when execution risk is high.
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## Evidence
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- Proposal #7 created 2024-02-18, failed 2024-02-23 (5-day voting window)
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- Proposed $50,000 USDC for META tokens at price = min((twapPass + twapFail)/2, $100)
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- Rationale emphasized "strategic partnership," "boost visibility," "strategic resources," "meaningful feedback"
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- Proposal claimed "~25% increase in META value due to the high profile of Pantera"
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- Execution required 7-party multisig (2 Pantera + 5 MetaDAO community members) with 5/7 threshold
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- 20% immediate transfer, 80% into 12-month linear Streamflow vest
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- META spot price at proposal time: $96.93 (near the $100 ceiling)
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- Circulating supply: 14,530 META
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- Proposal drafted with support from 4 parties (Pantera Capital, 0xNallok, 7Layer, Proph3t)
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md]]
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- [[decision markets make majority theft unprofitable through conditional token arbitrage.md]]
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- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md]]
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Topics:
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- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
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- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]
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@ -6,9 +6,15 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/H59VHchVsy8UVLotZLs7YaFv2FqTH5HAeXc4Y48kxie
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date: 2024-02-18
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domain: internet-finance
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format: data
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status: unprocessed
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status: processed
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tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
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event_type: proposal
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processed_by: rio
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processed_date: 2024-02-18
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claims_extracted: ["metadao-pantera-otc-proposal-failed-despite-strategic-partnership-rationale.md", "metadao-otc-pricing-uses-twap-average-of-conditional-markets-with-price-ceiling.md"]
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enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md", "MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md", "futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md"]
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extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
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extraction_notes: "First documented institutional OTC proposal to MetaDAO. Failed despite strategic partnership framing. Introduced novel TWAP-based pricing mechanism for OTC trades. Demonstrates futarchy markets can reject complex proposals with speculative strategic benefits. High execution complexity (multisig, vesting, dynamic pricing) likely contributed to failure."
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## Proposal Details
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@ -109,3 +115,15 @@ Here are the pre-money valuations at different prices:
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- Autocrat version: 0.1
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- Completed: 2024-02-23
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- Ended: 2024-02-23
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## Key Facts
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- MetaDAO Proposal #7 created 2024-02-18, failed 2024-02-23
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- Pantera Capital offered $50,000 USDC for META tokens
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- Pricing formula: ppM = min((twapPass + twapFail) / 2, 100)
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- META spot price at proposal: $96.93
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- META circulating supply: 14,530 tokens
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- Execution required 7-party multisig (2 Pantera + 5 MetaDAO members)
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- Vesting structure: 20% immediate, 80% linear over 12 months via Streamflow
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- Proposal account: H59VHchVsy8UVLotZLs7YaFv2FqTH5HAeXc4Y48kxieY
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- DAO account: 7J5yieabpMoiN3LrdfJnRjQiXHgi7f47UuMnyMyR78yy
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