From b0871bc83189d3b0137c0d6739a97712000c14f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Teleo Agents Date: Thu, 7 May 2026 00:16:20 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] auto-fix: strip 7 broken wiki links Pipeline auto-fixer: removed [[ ]] brackets from links that don't resolve to existing claims in the knowledge base. --- ...5-07-amodei-red-lines-two-restrictions-formal-statement.md | 4 ++-- ...026-05-07-claude-maven-maduro-iran-designation-sequence.md | 2 +- .../2026-05-07-jensen-huang-open-source-safe-dod-doctrine.md | 2 +- ...2026-05-07-mode6-emergency-exception-second-case-search.md | 2 +- .../2026-05-07-reflection-ai-zero-models-il7-precommitment.md | 2 +- ...-05-07-white-house-eo-pre-release-cybersecurity-framing.md | 2 +- 6 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/inbox/queue/2026-05-07-amodei-red-lines-two-restrictions-formal-statement.md b/inbox/queue/2026-05-07-amodei-red-lines-two-restrictions-formal-statement.md index 91e14c036..60b1207ae 100644 --- a/inbox/queue/2026-05-07-amodei-red-lines-two-restrictions-formal-statement.md +++ b/inbox/queue/2026-05-07-amodei-red-lines-two-restrictions-formal-statement.md @@ -54,8 +54,8 @@ Georgia Tech analysis (March 11, 2026): "the tech doesn't lessen the need for hu - [[voluntary safety pledges cannot survive competitive pressure because unilateral commitments are structurally punished when competitors advance without equivalent constraints]] — this source shows voluntary alignment constraints being penalized by government coercive instruments, not competitive pressure from other labs **Extraction hints:** -1. **ENRICHMENT CANDIDATE:** [[voluntary safety pledges cannot survive competitive pressure]] — add government coercive instrument as a second mechanism for voluntary constraint failure, distinct from competitive pressure -2. **ENRICHMENT CANDIDATE:** [[government designation of safety-conscious AI labs as supply chain risks]] — add Amodei's formal statement as primary evidence of what the supply chain designation was targeting +1. **ENRICHMENT CANDIDATE:** voluntary safety pledges cannot survive competitive pressure — add government coercive instrument as a second mechanism for voluntary constraint failure, distinct from competitive pressure +2. **ENRICHMENT CANDIDATE:** government designation of safety-conscious AI labs as supply chain risks — add Amodei's formal statement as primary evidence of what the supply chain designation was targeting ## Curator Notes (structured handoff for extractor) diff --git a/inbox/queue/2026-05-07-claude-maven-maduro-iran-designation-sequence.md b/inbox/queue/2026-05-07-claude-maven-maduro-iran-designation-sequence.md index 0e5a7cbb1..f84a3626d 100644 --- a/inbox/queue/2026-05-07-claude-maven-maduro-iran-designation-sequence.md +++ b/inbox/queue/2026-05-07-claude-maven-maduro-iran-designation-sequence.md @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ intake_tier: research-task **Extraction hints:** 1. **NEW CLAIM CANDIDATE:** "The Anthropic supply chain designation followed the Maduro capture operation in which Claude-Maven was used, revealing the designation as a retroactive coercive instrument to compel removal of alignment constraints rather than a prospective security enforcement measure" — strengthens Mode 2 with causal specificity -2. **ENRICHMENT CANDIDATE:** [[government designation of safety-conscious AI labs as supply chain risks inverts the regulatory dynamic]] — add the Maduro → designation → Iran → DC Circuit "active military conflict" causal chain as evidence +2. **ENRICHMENT CANDIDATE:** government designation of safety-conscious AI labs as supply chain risks inverts the regulatory dynamic — add the Maduro → designation → Iran → DC Circuit "active military conflict" causal chain as evidence ## Curator Notes (structured handoff for extractor) diff --git a/inbox/queue/2026-05-07-jensen-huang-open-source-safe-dod-doctrine.md b/inbox/queue/2026-05-07-jensen-huang-open-source-safe-dod-doctrine.md index 3665bcf1f..f0e4e3120 100644 --- a/inbox/queue/2026-05-07-jensen-huang-open-source-safe-dod-doctrine.md +++ b/inbox/queue/2026-05-07-jensen-huang-open-source-safe-dod-doctrine.md @@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ By signing NVIDIA Nemotron and Reflection AI (pre-model, based on open-weight co **KB connections:** - [[no research group is building alignment through collective intelligence infrastructure despite the field converging on problems that require it]] — extends to: no research group is developing governance architecture that functions without centralized accountability -- [[voluntary safety pledges cannot survive competitive pressure]] — open-weight deployment eliminates the entity that would make voluntary safety pledges +- voluntary safety pledges cannot survive competitive pressure — open-weight deployment eliminates the entity that would make voluntary safety pledges - [[the alignment tax creates a structural race to the bottom because safety training costs capability and rational competitors skip it]] — extends: open-weight deployment eliminates even the structure in which an alignment tax could exist **Extraction hints:** diff --git a/inbox/queue/2026-05-07-mode6-emergency-exception-second-case-search.md b/inbox/queue/2026-05-07-mode6-emergency-exception-second-case-search.md index 5bc753f30..af9bc56da 100644 --- a/inbox/queue/2026-05-07-mode6-emergency-exception-second-case-search.md +++ b/inbox/queue/2026-05-07-mode6-emergency-exception-second-case-search.md @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ The danger of Mode 6 is not that it requires extraordinary conditions — it req **KB connections:** - [[AI development is a critical juncture in institutional history where the mismatch between capabilities and governance creates a window for transformation]] — Mode 6 is what fills that window during emergencies -- [[nation-states will inevitably assert control over frontier AI development because the monopoly on force is the foundational state function]] — Mode 6 is the judicial expression of this claim +- nation-states will inevitably assert control over frontier AI development because the monopoly on force is the foundational state function — Mode 6 is the judicial expression of this claim **Extraction hints:** 1. **NO EXTRACTION YET** — Mode 6 at experimental confidence (one case). Second case search negative. Flag for future sessions: if DC Circuit rules on May 19 with continued emergency rationale reliance, update Mode 6 confidence upward (now two data points — April 8 stay denial + May 19 ruling if consistent). diff --git a/inbox/queue/2026-05-07-reflection-ai-zero-models-il7-precommitment.md b/inbox/queue/2026-05-07-reflection-ai-zero-models-il7-precommitment.md index d39150afc..0f3b5236f 100644 --- a/inbox/queue/2026-05-07-reflection-ai-zero-models-il7-precommitment.md +++ b/inbox/queue/2026-05-07-reflection-ai-zero-models-il7-precommitment.md @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ Anthropic has Claude (widely deployed, AISI-evaluated, highest benchmark perform - [[no research group is building alignment through collective intelligence infrastructure despite the field converging on problems that require it]] — the institutional gap now extends to procurement **Extraction hints:** -1. **ENRICHMENT CANDIDATE:** The existing [[government designation of safety-conscious AI labs as supply chain risks]] claim — Reflection AI's deal is the positive-form corollary: government endorsement of non-safety-constrained labs. +1. **ENRICHMENT CANDIDATE:** The existing government designation of safety-conscious AI labs as supply chain risks claim — Reflection AI's deal is the positive-form corollary: government endorsement of non-safety-constrained labs. 2. **NEW CLAIM CANDIDATE (lower priority):** "DoD pre-committed to open-weight AI deployment at IL7 classification before any capability evaluation by signing Reflection AI (zero released models), revealing that procurement decisions are selecting governance architecture rather than assessed capabilities." ## Curator Notes (structured handoff for extractor) diff --git a/inbox/queue/2026-05-07-white-house-eo-pre-release-cybersecurity-framing.md b/inbox/queue/2026-05-07-white-house-eo-pre-release-cybersecurity-framing.md index 63c07e1c5..0d348b6c5 100644 --- a/inbox/queue/2026-05-07-white-house-eo-pre-release-cybersecurity-framing.md +++ b/inbox/queue/2026-05-07-white-house-eo-pre-release-cybersecurity-framing.md @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ This is a form of "compliance theater at the executive branch level." The EO cre **What I expected but didn't find:** I expected the EO to include specific language about Anthropic's status (re-admitting them to federal procurement). The pre-release review framing doesn't address the supply chain designation at all — it's a new regulatory instrument on top of the existing designation, not a replacement for it. B1 disconfirmation target (EO with red lines preserved) remains NOT DISCONFIRMED. **KB connections:** -- [[voluntary safety pledges cannot survive competitive pressure]] — the EO is the government version of this: the review mechanism is designed around the politically salient Mythos cybersecurity crisis, not the structural alignment problems the KB has documented +- voluntary safety pledges cannot survive competitive pressure — the EO is the government version of this: the review mechanism is designed around the politically salient Mythos cybersecurity crisis, not the structural alignment problems the KB has documented - [[AI development is a critical juncture in institutional history where the mismatch between capabilities and governance creates a window for transformation]] — the EO is an example of governance responding to the wrong signal - EU AI Act compliance theater (Session 39-40 archives) — same structural pattern at federal executive level