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@ -82,6 +82,16 @@ Prandi et al. provide the specific mechanism for why pre-deployment evaluations
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Anthropic's stated rationale for extending evaluation intervals from 3 to 6 months explicitly acknowledges that 'the science of model evaluation isn't well-developed enough' and that rushed evaluations produce lower-quality results. This is a direct admission from a frontier lab that current evaluation methodologies are insufficiently mature to support the governance structures built on them. The 'zone of ambiguity' where capabilities approached but didn't definitively pass thresholds in v2.0 demonstrates that evaluation uncertainty creates governance paralysis.
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Anthropic's stated rationale for extending evaluation intervals from 3 to 6 months explicitly acknowledges that 'the science of model evaluation isn't well-developed enough' and that rushed evaluations produce lower-quality results. This is a direct admission from a frontier lab that current evaluation methodologies are insufficiently mature to support the governance structures built on them. The 'zone of ambiguity' where capabilities approached but didn't definitively pass thresholds in v2.0 demonstrates that evaluation uncertainty creates governance paralysis.
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### Auto-enrichment (near-duplicate conversion, similarity=1.00)
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*Source: PR #1936 — "pre deployment ai evaluations do not predict real world risk creating institutional governance built on unreliable foundations"*
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*Auto-converted by substantive fixer. Review: revert if this evidence doesn't belong here.*
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2026-03-26-anthropic-activating-asl3-protections]] | Added: 2026-03-26*
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Anthropic's ASL-3 activation demonstrates that evaluation uncertainty compounds near capability thresholds: 'dangerous capability evaluations of AI models are inherently challenging, and as models approach our thresholds of concern, it takes longer to determine their status.' The Virology Capabilities Test showed 'steadily increasing' performance across model generations, but Anthropic could not definitively confirm whether Opus 4 crossed the threshold—they activated protections based on trend trajectory and inability to rule out crossing rather than confirmed measurement.
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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