auto-fix: strip 2 broken wiki links
Pipeline auto-fixer: removed [[ ]] brackets from links that don't resolve to existing claims in the knowledge base.
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@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ The FAA publicly released its final environmental impact statement and record of
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**Extraction hints:**
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- **CLAIM CANDIDATE:** "FAA's approval of 44 Starship launches and 88 landings per year at LC-39A combined with 25 per year at Starbase creates a 69-launch annual regulatory ceiling that removes the regulatory constraint on Starship cadence and shifts the binding bottleneck to technical execution"
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- This is a specific, falsifiable claim with a clear confidence level: likely (regulatory fact, but LC-39A launch date is contingent on infrastructure)
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- **UPDATE needed on launch cost claims:** The regulatory ceiling expansion is a material fact that strengthens the cadence economics argument in [[Starship economics depend on cadence and reuse rate]]
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- **UPDATE needed on launch cost claims:** The regulatory ceiling expansion is a material fact that strengthens the cadence economics argument in Starship economics depend on cadence and reuse rate
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**Context:** This approval was January 30, 2026 — before IFT-12 which hasn't flown yet. The Florida pad represents SpaceX's planned redundancy for Starship operations. Historical context: LC-39A is the same pad that launched Apollo 11 and the Space Shuttle; SpaceX already uses it for Falcon 9 and Falcon Heavy. Starship will co-locate with Falcon operations initially.
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@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ intake_tier: research-task
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**KB connections:**
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- [[orbital debris is a classic commons tragedy where individual launch incentives are private but collision risk is externalized to all operators]] — the ADR financing gap ($3-6B/year required vs. $1.2B current market) is the dollar value of the commons tragedy externalization
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- [[space governance gaps are widening not narrowing because technology advances exponentially while institutional design advances linearly]] — the ADR capacity gap (1-2 objects/year vs 60 needed) is a specific, quantified instance of this governance gap
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- [[Ostrom proved communities self-govern shared resources when eight design principles are met]] — ADR as government-funded rather than operator-funded means Ostrom's "proportional allocation of costs and benefits" principle is violated: operators profit from launches but taxpayers fund cleanup
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- Ostrom proved communities self-govern shared resources when eight design principles are met — ADR as government-funded rather than operator-funded means Ostrom's "proportional allocation of costs and benefits" principle is violated: operators profit from launches but taxpayers fund cleanup
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**Extraction hints:**
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- **CLAIM CANDIDATE:** "Active debris removal of approximately 60 large objects per year represents the scenario-dependent threshold at which LEO debris growth becomes negative, but current ADR capacity of 1-2 objects per year creates a 30-60x scale-up gap that is primarily a market structure and financing problem, not an engineering problem"
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