From b5e211dd11b03c691ef843f3716daaebc8d349f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Teleo Agents Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2026 01:54:59 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] rio: extract claims from 2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md - Source: inbox/archive/2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md - Domain: internet-finance - Extracted by: headless extraction cron Pentagon-Agent: Rio --- ...t platform for ownership coins at scale.md | 6 ++ ...rottles-without-governance-intervention.md | 61 +++++++++++++++++++ ...ng-maintenance-cheaper-than-replacement.md | 49 +++++++++++++++ ...l complexity and liquidity requirements.md | 6 ++ ...le-supply-schedules-independent-of-time.md | 54 ++++++++++++++++ ...ow-through-deterministic-ingot-smelting.md | 44 +++++++++++++ ...ration not treated as static war chests.md | 6 ++ ...osal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md | 22 ++++++- 8 files changed, 247 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 domains/internet-finance/dynamic-license-costs-pegged-to-price-ratios-create-automatic-supply-throttles-without-governance-intervention.md create mode 100644 domains/internet-finance/evergreen-tool-design-with-decay-and-repair-creates-stable-demand-by-making-maintenance-cheaper-than-replacement.md create mode 100644 domains/internet-finance/halving-band-emissions-with-percentage-based-thresholds-create-predictable-supply-schedules-independent-of-time.md create mode 100644 domains/internet-finance/meta-pow-creates-sustainable-treasury-accumulation-by-coupling-mining-tool-demand-to-ore-inflow-through-deterministic-ingot-smelting.md diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md b/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md index f7e9dac78..e3aca33f6 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md @@ -70,6 +70,12 @@ Raises include: Ranger ($6M minimum, uncapped), Solomon ($102.9M committed, $8M MycoRealms launch on Futardio demonstrates MetaDAO platform capabilities in production: $125,000 USDC raise with 72-hour permissionless window, automatic treasury deployment if target reached, full refunds if target missed. Launch structure includes 10M ICO tokens (62.9% of supply), 2.9M tokens for liquidity provision (2M on Futarchy AMM, 900K on Meteora pool), with 20% of funds raised ($25K) paired with LP tokens. First physical infrastructure project (mushroom farm) using the platform, extending futarchy governance from digital to real-world operations with measurable outcomes (temperature, humidity, CO2, yield). + +### Additional Evidence (extend) +*Source: [[2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5* + +The COAL Meta-PoW proposal demonstrates MetaDAO's governance handling complex economic protocol redesigns: a multi-token system with dynamic pricing formulas (c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^p), decay mechanics (p_next = 0.96 * p), and halving bands (k_t = floor((C_t - C_0) / h)) was proposed on 2025-11-07, passed through futarchy governance, and completed by 2025-11-10. The proposal included detailed parameter specifications and explicit allowance for 'parameters to be slightly adjusted by the core team before launch, upon feedback from the community.' This demonstrates MetaDAO handling not just binary yes/no decisions but intricate economic mechanism design with ~3-day decision cycles, suggesting the platform has developed sufficient community capacity to evaluate technically complex proposals. + --- Relevant Notes: diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/dynamic-license-costs-pegged-to-price-ratios-create-automatic-supply-throttles-without-governance-intervention.md b/domains/internet-finance/dynamic-license-costs-pegged-to-price-ratios-create-automatic-supply-throttles-without-governance-intervention.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1698d5e6a --- /dev/null +++ b/domains/internet-finance/dynamic-license-costs-pegged-to-price-ratios-create-automatic-supply-throttles-without-governance-intervention.md @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +--- +type: claim +domain: internet-finance +description: "Setting tool creation costs as functions of external price ratios allows systems to self-regulate participation without requiring active governance decisions during market volatility" +confidence: experimental +source: "futard.io Meta-PoW proposal (2025-11-07), COAL pickaxe license c(y) formula" +created: 2025-11-07 +enrichments: [] +secondary_domains: ["mechanisms"] +--- + +# Dynamic license costs pegged to price ratios create automatic supply throttles without governance intervention + +Meta-PoW implements a pickaxe license cost that adjusts automatically based on the ORE/COAL price ratio, creating a self-regulating throttle on mining participation that responds to market conditions without requiring governance votes or admin intervention. + +The formula: +- c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^p +- Where y = P_ORE / P_COAL (using EMA-smoothed TWAP) +- Clamped: c_min ≤ c(y) ≤ c_max +- Suggested defaults: c0 = 200 COAL, y_ref = 50, p = 3, c_min = 1, c_max = 300 + +The mechanism creates automatic countercyclical behavior: + +**When COAL strengthens** (y decreases): +- License cost c(y) drops +- More pickaxes become economically viable to craft +- More players enter mining +- More INGOT gets smelted (more ORE flows to treasury) +- Increased mining competition may pressure COAL price back down + +**When COAL weakens** (y increases): +- License cost c(y) rises +- Fewer new pickaxes are economically viable +- Mining participation growth slows +- INGOT demand and ORE inflow moderate +- Reduced sell pressure from new miners may help COAL stabilize + +The cubic exponent (p = 3) makes the response nonlinear: small price movements near the reference point have modest effects, but large deviations trigger aggressive throttling. This creates stability around equilibrium while preventing runaway dynamics at extremes. + +Critically, this is a **control parameter, not a revenue stream**. The license COAL is burned, not sent to the treasury. Its purpose is purely regulatory: to modulate system participation in response to market conditions. + +The EMA-smoothed TWAP prevents manipulation through short-term price spikes and provides players with predictable license costs over the timescale of crafting decisions. + +This pattern generalizes beyond COAL: any system where participation creates ongoing costs can use price-ratio-based entry fees to automatically balance supply and demand without requiring a governance body to constantly adjust parameters. + +## Evidence +- License formula: "c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^p" with "y = P_ORE / P_COAL using an EMA-smoothed TWAP" +- Behavior specification: "When COAL is strong relative to ORE (y low): c(y) decreases, More picks are economically viable, More smelting and more ORE flows into the treasury" +- Design intent: "The license is the main macro throttle" and "The system self-throttles without intervention" +- Revenue clarification: "The license is paid in COAL only. That COAL is burned, not sent to the treasury. It is a control parameter, not a revenue stream." + +## Challenges +- Requires reliable price oracles; manipulation of the ORE/COAL price feed could distort the throttle +- The parameter choices (c0, y_ref, p, bounds) are governance-set and may not be optimal for all market regimes +- Extreme market conditions could push the system to the min or max bounds, at which point the throttle stops responding +- Players may game the timing of crafting decisions if they can predict short-term price movements despite TWAP smoothing + +--- + +Topics: +- [[_map]] diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/evergreen-tool-design-with-decay-and-repair-creates-stable-demand-by-making-maintenance-cheaper-than-replacement.md b/domains/internet-finance/evergreen-tool-design-with-decay-and-repair-creates-stable-demand-by-making-maintenance-cheaper-than-replacement.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0794ca23c --- /dev/null +++ b/domains/internet-finance/evergreen-tool-design-with-decay-and-repair-creates-stable-demand-by-making-maintenance-cheaper-than-replacement.md @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +--- +type: claim +domain: internet-finance +description: "Tools that decay gradually but can always be repaired at lower cost than recrafting shift player incentives from churn to maintenance creating predictable ongoing resource demand" +confidence: experimental +source: "futard.io Meta-PoW proposal (2025-11-07), COAL pickaxe and axe mechanics" +created: 2025-11-07 +enrichments: [] +--- + +# Evergreen tool design with decay and repair creates stable demand by making maintenance cheaper than replacement + +Meta-PoW implements a tool durability system where pickaxes and axes never permanently break but lose power over time if not maintained, with repair costs calibrated to be cheaper than crafting new tools. This design pattern creates predictable ongoing demand for repair materials rather than volatile boom-bust cycles of tool creation. + +The mechanics: +- Each tool has power p between 0 and 1 +- If repaired for the day, p stays at 1 (full power) +- If not repaired, p decays by 4% per day: p_next = 0.96 * p +- Skipped repairs accumulate: restoring full power later requires paying all missed repair costs +- Daily repair cost for pickaxes: 0.082643 INGOT + 0.3 WOOD +- Crafting a new pickaxe: 1 INGOT + 8 WOOD + c(y) COAL license + +The repair-to-craft cost ratio makes maintenance the rational choice for active players. A pickaxe requiring 0.082643 INGOT per day to maintain would need ~12 days of repairs to equal the 1 INGOT cost of crafting a new one (ignoring WOOD and license costs which further favor repair). + +This creates system stability in two ways: + +1. **Demand predictability**: The number of active, fully repaired tools becomes the key state variable. Players maintaining tools generate consistent daily INGOT demand, which translates to consistent ORE inflow to the treasury. + +2. **Churn reduction**: Without evergreen tools, players might constantly craft and abandon tools based on short-term profitability, creating volatile demand spikes. The repair incentive smooths this into steady-state maintenance. + +The decay rate (4% per day) is steep enough to matter over a week but gentle enough that temporary inactivity doesn't destroy tool value. A tool left unrepaired for 7 days drops to ~75% power, recoverable but noticeably degraded. + +This pattern inverts typical game economy consumables (use until broken, then replace) in favor of capital goods that require ongoing investment to maintain productivity. + +## Evidence +- Meta-PoW proposal: "Tools are evergreen and cheaper to repair than to recraft, so players maintain their gear instead of churning it" +- Decay mechanics: "If not repaired, p decays by 4% per day: p_next = 0.96 * p" +- Repair cost: "r_ing_total ≈ 0.082643 INGOT per day" vs crafting cost "1 INGOT" +- Design goal: "Rational players maintain picks. The number of active, fully repaired picks is the key state variable." + +## Challenges +- Assumes repair costs remain economically favorable; if INGOT price spikes relative to COAL emissions value, the repair-vs-recraft calculation could flip +- Player behavior may not match rational economic optimization if social or psychological factors favor "fresh" tools +- The 4% decay rate is a governance parameter that may need adjustment based on actual player engagement patterns + +--- + +Topics: +- [[_map]] diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md index 6d17a0b6b..d67008076 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md @@ -28,6 +28,12 @@ Yet [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontest MycoRealms implementation reveals operational friction points: monthly $10,000 allowance creates baseline operations budget, but any expenditure beyond this requires futarchy proposal and market approval. First post-raise proposal will be $50,000 CAPEX withdrawal — a large binary decision that may face liquidity challenges in decision markets. Team must balance operational needs (construction timelines, vendor commitments, seasonal agricultural constraints) against market approval uncertainty. This creates tension between real-world operational requirements (fixed deadlines, vendor deposits, material procurement) and futarchy's market-based approval process, suggesting futarchy may face adoption friction in domains with hard operational deadlines. + +### Additional Evidence (confirm) +*Source: [[2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5* + +The Meta-PoW proposal demonstrates the complexity friction in futarchy adoption: it required explaining a multi-token system (COAL, ORE, INGOT, WOOD), dynamic pricing formulas (c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^p), decay mechanics (p_next = 0.96 * p), halving bands (k_t = floor((C_t - C_0) / h)), and the interaction between all these components. The proposal runs to approximately 2000 words of technical specification before reaching the actual vote. Despite this complexity, it passed in 3 days, suggesting MetaDAO's community has developed capacity to evaluate intricate proposals. However, this also confirms that the barrier to entry for new participants remains high—the proposal would be inaccessible to non-technical stakeholders without significant domain expertise. + --- Relevant Notes: diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/halving-band-emissions-with-percentage-based-thresholds-create-predictable-supply-schedules-independent-of-time.md b/domains/internet-finance/halving-band-emissions-with-percentage-based-thresholds-create-predictable-supply-schedules-independent-of-time.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..460ff2ea0 --- /dev/null +++ b/domains/internet-finance/halving-band-emissions-with-percentage-based-thresholds-create-predictable-supply-schedules-independent-of-time.md @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +--- +type: claim +domain: internet-finance +description: "Tying emission halvings to percentage of max supply mined rather than block height or time makes supply schedule dependent on actual mining activity not calendar time" +confidence: experimental +source: "futard.io Meta-PoW proposal (2025-11-07), COAL emissions specification" +created: 2025-11-07 +enrichments: [] +--- + +# Halving band emissions with percentage-based thresholds create predictable supply schedules independent of time + +COAL implements emission halvings based on percentage bands of max supply rather than fixed time intervals, making the supply schedule responsive to actual mining activity rather than calendar progression. + +The mechanics: +- Max supply: S_max = 25,000,000 COAL +- Halving band: every 5% of S_max added to circulation advances a band +- Band step: h = 0.05 * S_max = 1,250,000 COAL +- Band index: k_t = floor((C_t - C_0) / h) +- Daily emissions: R_t = R_0 * 2^(-k_t), starting at R_0 = 11,250 COAL/day + +This creates a supply schedule where: +- Band 0 (0-5% mined): 11,250 COAL/day +- Band 1 (5-10% mined): 5,625 COAL/day +- Band 2 (10-15% mined): 2,812.5 COAL/day +- And so on, halving every 1.25M COAL mined + +The key distinction from time-based halvings (like Bitcoin's 4-year cycles): + +**Activity-dependent progression**: If mining slows due to low profitability or reduced participation, the halving is delayed. If mining accelerates, the halving arrives sooner. The supply schedule adapts to actual network usage. + +**Predictable scarcity**: Participants know exactly how much supply remains before the next halving (1.25M COAL per band), regardless of when that halving occurs. This makes supply-side economics calculable even if timing is variable. + +**No calendar risk**: Time-based halvings create known future events that traders can front-run. Activity-based halvings tie the event to cumulative mining work, which is harder to manipulate or predict precisely. + +For COAL specifically, this interacts with the Meta-PoW mechanics: the dynamic license cost c(y) modulates how quickly new miners enter, which affects how quickly bands progress, which affects the emission rate, which feeds back into mining profitability. The system becomes self-regulating across multiple timescales. + +This pattern could apply to any token emission system where supply schedule should respond to actual usage rather than arbitrary time intervals. + +## Evidence +- Emission formula: "Band index: k_t = floor((C_t - C_0) / h)" and "Daily emissions: R_t = R_0 * 2^(-k_t)" +- Band specification: "Every 5% of S_max added to circulation advances a band" with "Band step: h = 0.05 * S_max = 1,250,000 COAL" +- Starting rate: "R_0 = 11,250 COAL/day initially" +- Design note: "Meta-PoW does not change R_t. It defines how R_t is accessed via tools." + +## Challenges +- Activity-based progression could create uncertainty for long-term supply modeling compared to time-based schedules +- If mining becomes extremely unprofitable, bands could stall indefinitely, creating effective supply freeze +- The interaction between dynamic license costs and band progression could create complex feedback loops that are hard to predict + +--- + +Topics: +- [[_map]] diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/meta-pow-creates-sustainable-treasury-accumulation-by-coupling-mining-tool-demand-to-ore-inflow-through-deterministic-ingot-smelting.md b/domains/internet-finance/meta-pow-creates-sustainable-treasury-accumulation-by-coupling-mining-tool-demand-to-ore-inflow-through-deterministic-ingot-smelting.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..81f606c17 --- /dev/null +++ b/domains/internet-finance/meta-pow-creates-sustainable-treasury-accumulation-by-coupling-mining-tool-demand-to-ore-inflow-through-deterministic-ingot-smelting.md @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +--- +type: claim +domain: internet-finance +description: "COAL's Meta-PoW model ties pickaxe crafting and repair to INGOT demand which requires ORE payment at smelting creating a mechanical loop where active mining tools drive treasury accumulation" +confidence: experimental +source: "futard.io Meta-PoW proposal (2025-11-07), COAL treasury protocol design" +created: 2025-11-07 +enrichments: [] +--- + +# Meta-PoW creates sustainable treasury accumulation by coupling mining tool demand to ORE inflow through deterministic INGOT smelting + +The Meta-PoW protocol establishes a mechanical relationship between player behavior and treasury growth by making INGOT the required input for both crafting and maintaining mining tools, while forcing all INGOT creation to pay ORE fees directly to the COAL treasury. + +The core loop: +1. Players need pickaxes to access COAL emissions +2. Crafting a pickaxe requires 1 INGOT (plus WOOD and COAL license) +3. Maintaining full pickaxe power requires 0.082643 INGOT per day +4. Creating 1 INGOT requires burning 100 COAL and paying μ ORE (currently ~12.10 ORE) to the treasury +5. All ORE paid at smelting goes 100% to the COAL treasury + +The system is calibrated so that each fully maintained pickaxe corresponds to approximately 1 ORE per day flowing into the treasury through repair-driven INGOT demand. This creates a direct mapping between active mining participation and treasury accumulation. + +The evergreen tool design reinforces this loop: tools decay at 4% per day if not repaired, but repairing is cheaper than recrafting. This incentivizes players to maintain existing tools rather than churn, creating predictable ongoing INGOT demand rather than sporadic crafting spikes. + +The dynamic license cost c(y) acts as a macro throttle: when COAL strengthens relative to ORE (y = P_ORE/P_COAL decreases), the license cost drops, making more pickaxes economically viable, which increases INGOT demand and ORE inflow. When COAL weakens, the license cost rises, slowing new tool creation without breaking the system. + +This is distinct from typical token emission models because the treasury accumulation is not a fixed percentage of emissions or a one-time fundraise, but rather a continuous flow mechanically tied to the number of active participants maintaining their mining infrastructure. + +## Evidence +- COAL Meta-PoW proposal specifies: "Each active, fully repaired pick is designed to support approximately 1 ORE per day of inflow to the treasury" +- Smelting mechanics: "To smelt 1 INGOT: Burn 100 COAL, Pay μ ORE to the COAL treasury" with "All ORE paid at smelt goes to the COAL treasury" +- Repair cost calibration: "r_ing_total ≈ 0.082643 INGOT per day" designed so "repairing is cheaper than constantly recrafting" +- License throttle: "When COAL is strong relative to ORE (y low): c(y) decreases, More picks are economically viable, More smelting and more ORE flows into the treasury" + +## Challenges +- Actual ORE inflow depends on player behavior matching the calibration assumptions +- Market price volatility in COAL/ORE ratio could disrupt the equilibrium faster than governance can adjust parameters +- The 1 ORE per active pick per day is a design target, not a guaranteed outcome + +--- + +Topics: +- [[_map]] diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/ownership coin treasuries should be actively managed through buybacks and token sales as continuous capital calibration not treated as static war chests.md b/domains/internet-finance/ownership coin treasuries should be actively managed through buybacks and token sales as continuous capital calibration not treated as static war chests.md index 83e965e26..77c94e937 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/ownership coin treasuries should be actively managed through buybacks and token sales as continuous capital calibration not treated as static war chests.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/ownership coin treasuries should be actively managed through buybacks and token sales as continuous capital calibration not treated as static war chests.md @@ -34,6 +34,12 @@ The deeper connection: since [[Living Capital vehicles are agentically managed S - "Continuous calibration" may be indistinguishable from insider trading without robust disclosure mechanisms - Since [[futarchy-governed entities are structurally not securities because prediction market participation replaces the concentrated promoter effort that the Howey test requires]], active treasury management by a team could re-introduce the "efforts of others" prong that the structural argument depends on eliminating + +### Additional Evidence (extend) +*Source: [[2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5* + +COAL's Meta-PoW creates a treasury that accumulates ORE through ongoing mining activity rather than one-time fundraising, with the design explicitly stating 'All ORE paid at smelt goes to the COAL treasury' and calibrating for '1 ORE per day of inflow to the treasury' per active pickaxe. This represents a continuous accumulation model where treasury growth is mechanically tied to network usage, creating a dynamic treasury that grows with adoption rather than depleting over time. The treasury becomes a real-time measure of mining ecosystem health, distinct from static treasuries that accumulate capital once and manage it passively. + --- Relevant Notes: diff --git a/inbox/archive/2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md b/inbox/archive/2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md index f4ca1430d..328aed630 100644 --- a/inbox/archive/2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md +++ b/inbox/archive/2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md @@ -6,9 +6,15 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuA date: 2025-11-07 domain: internet-finance format: data -status: unprocessed +status: processed tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance] event_type: proposal +processed_by: rio +processed_date: 2025-11-07 +claims_extracted: ["meta-pow-creates-sustainable-treasury-accumulation-by-coupling-mining-tool-demand-to-ore-inflow-through-deterministic-ingot-smelting.md", "evergreen-tool-design-with-decay-and-repair-creates-stable-demand-by-making-maintenance-cheaper-than-replacement.md", "dynamic-license-costs-pegged-to-price-ratios-create-automatic-supply-throttles-without-governance-intervention.md", "halving-band-emissions-with-percentage-based-thresholds-create-predictable-supply-schedules-independent-of-time.md"] +enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md", "ownership coin treasuries should be actively managed through buybacks and token sales as continuous capital calibration not treated as static war chests.md", "futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md"] +extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5" +extraction_notes: "Extracted 4 novel mechanism design claims around treasury accumulation loops, evergreen tool economics, dynamic throttling, and activity-based emission schedules. Enriched 3 existing MetaDAO/futarchy claims with concrete governance examples and treasury model evidence. Source demonstrates sophisticated economic design passing through futarchy governance in 3-day cycle." --- ## Proposal Details @@ -265,3 +271,17 @@ Vote NO – keep the current model unchanged. - Autocrat version: 0.3 - Completed: 2025-11-10 - Ended: 2025-11-10 + + +## Key Facts +- COAL Meta-PoW proposal G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg passed (2025-11-07 to 2025-11-10) +- COAL max supply: 25,000,000 tokens +- Initial daily emissions: 11,250 COAL/day +- Halving occurs every 5% of max supply (1,250,000 COAL per band) +- Smelting cost: 100 COAL + ~12.10 ORE per INGOT +- Daily pickaxe repair: 0.082643 INGOT + 0.3 WOOD +- Pickaxe crafting: 1 INGOT + 8 WOOD + c(y) COAL license +- Tool decay rate: 4% per day if not repaired +- Suggested license parameters: c0=200, y_ref=50, p=3, c_min=1, c_max=300 +- DAO account: 3LGGRzLrgwhEbEsNYBSTZc5MLve1bw3nDaHzzfJMQ1PG +- Autocrat version: 0.3