extract: 2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy
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---
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type: claim
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domain: internet-finance
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description: Requiring proposers to lock initial liquidity and set starting prices prevents frivolous proposals while establishing market baseline
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confidence: experimental
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source: MetaDAO proposal CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG
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created: 2026-03-15
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---
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# AMM futarchy proposer liquidity lockup requirement creates spam filter and initial price discovery mechanism
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The proposal states 'these types of proposals would also require that the proposer lock-up some initial liquidity, and set the starting price for the pass/fail markets.' This serves dual functions: economic spam prevention and price anchoring. The lockup requirement means proposers must commit capital to launch proposals, replacing the CLOB's '1 META minimum order size' spam filter with a more substantial barrier. The starting price setting gives proposers the ability to anchor initial market expectations based on their private information, after which 'someone would swap and move the AMM price to their preferred price, and then provide liquidity at that price since the fee incentives are high.' This creates a natural progression from proposer signal to market validation to liquidity provision.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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- amm-futarchy-bootstraps-liquidity-through-high-fee-incentives-and-required-proposer-initial-liquidity-creating-self-reinforcing-depth.md
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Topics:
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- [[_map]]
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@ -21,6 +21,12 @@ This cost differential becomes material at scale: a DAO running 50 proposals ann
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- AMM state requirements described as "almost nothing"
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- State rent recovery requires autocrat program migration (feedback section)
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
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Proposal provides specific cost data: CLOB pairs cost 3.75 SOL in state rent per market, totaling 135-225 SOL annually ($11,475-$19,125 at 2024 prices) for 3-5 proposals per month, while 'AMMs cost almost nothing in state rent'
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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---
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type: claim
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domain: internet-finance
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description: The metric aggregates price updates weighted by liquidity depth at each swap creating manipulation resistance through capital requirements
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confidence: experimental
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source: MetaDAO proposal CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG
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created: 2026-03-15
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---
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# AMM futarchy uses liquidity-weighted price over time as settlement metric replacing midpoint price with capital commitment weighting
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The proposal specifies that AMMs track 'liquidity-weighted price over time' where 'the more liquidity that is on the books, the more weight the current price of the pass or fail market is given. Every time there is a swap, these metrics are updated/aggregated.' This differs from CLOB midpoint pricing by making price manipulation proportional to liquidity provision rather than order placement. The mechanism creates a direct cost for moving the settlement price: an attacker must either provide substantial liquidity at their desired price point or execute large swaps that move price against existing liquidity. The proposal explicitly notes this solves CLOB manipulation where 'someone with 1 $META can push the midpoint towards the current best bid/ask' by requiring capital commitment proportional to desired price influence.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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- liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-solves-futarchy-manipulation-through-capital-commitment-not-vote-counting.md
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- amm-futarchy-bootstraps-liquidity-through-high-fee-incentives-and-required-proposer-initial-liquidity-creating-self-reinforcing-depth.md
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Topics:
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- [[_map]]
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@ -23,6 +23,12 @@ This connects to [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume
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- Expected pattern: liquidity increases as proposal duration progresses
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- CLOB minimum order size (1 META) acts as spam filter but fragments liquidity further
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
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Proposal identifies that 'estimating a fair price for the future value of MetaDao under pass/fail conditions is difficult, and most reasonable estimates will have a wide range. This uncertainty discourages people from risking their funds with limit orders near the midpoint price, and has the effect of reducing liquidity (and trading).'
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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---
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type: claim
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domain: internet-finance
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description: The fee structure creates asymmetric costs where active trading is expensive but passive provision is profitable
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confidence: experimental
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source: MetaDAO proposal CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG
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created: 2026-03-15
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---
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# High fee AMMs 3-5 percent deter wash trading manipulation while incentivizing passive liquidity provision
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The proposal specifies 'by setting a high fee (3-5%) we can both: encourage LPs, and aggressively discourage wash-trading and manipulation.' This creates a cost asymmetry: wash traders attempting to manipulate the liquidity-weighted price metric must pay 3-5% on each trade, making repeated manipulation expensive, while liquidity providers earn these fees passively. The mechanism addresses the CLOB vulnerability where 'VWAP can be manipulated by wash trading' by making the cost of manipulation proportional to trading volume. A manipulator moving price through wash trades pays cumulative fees that LPs capture, creating a profitable defense opportunity similar to the general futarchy property that 'attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders.'
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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- high-fee-amms-create-lp-incentive-and-manipulation-deterrent-simultaneously-by-making-passive-provision-profitable-and-active-trading-expensive.md
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- liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-solves-futarchy-manipulation-through-wash-trading-costs-because-high-fees-make-price-movement-expensive.md
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Topics:
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- [[_map]]
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@ -6,9 +6,14 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1P
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date: 2024-01-24
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domain: internet-finance
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format: data
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status: unprocessed
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status: processed
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tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
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event_type: proposal
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processed_by: rio
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processed_date: 2026-03-15
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claims_extracted: ["amm-futarchy-uses-liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-as-settlement-metric-replacing-midpoint-price-with-capital-commitment-weighting.md", "amm-futarchy-proposer-liquidity-lockup-requirement-creates-spam-filter-and-initial-price-discovery-mechanism.md", "high-fee-amms-3-5-percent-deter-wash-trading-manipulation-while-incentivizing-passive-liquidity-provision.md"]
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enrichments_applied: ["amm-futarchy-reduces-state-rent-costs-by-99-percent-versus-clob-by-eliminating-orderbook-storage-requirements.md", "futarchy-clob-liquidity-fragmentation-creates-wide-spreads-because-pricing-counterfactual-governance-outcomes-has-inherent-uncertainty.md"]
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extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
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---
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## Proposal Details
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@ -128,3 +133,14 @@ Any important changes or feedback brought up during the proposal vote will be re
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- Autocrat version: 0.1
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- Completed: 2024-01-29
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- Ended: 2024-01-29
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## Key Facts
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- MetaDAO CLOB markets cost 3.75 SOL in state rent per pass/fail market pair
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- MetaDAO averages 3-5 proposals per month as of January 2024
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- Annual state rent costs for CLOB markets: 135-225 SOL ($11,475-$19,125 at January 2024 prices)
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- AMM proposal budget: 400 META on passing, 800 META on completion
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- AMM implementation timeline: 3 weeks development + 1 week review
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- Proposal contributors: joebuild (program), 0xNalloK (frontend), TBD (review)
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- CLOB minimum order size: 1 META (spam filter)
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- Proposed AMM fee range: 3-5%
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