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+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: decision_market
+name: "MetaDAO: Burn 99.3% of META in Treasury"
+domain: internet-finance
+status: passed
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+last_updated: 2026-03-11
+parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
+platform: "futardio"
+proposer: "doctor.sol & rar3"
+proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/ELwCkHt1U9VBpUFJ7qGoVMatEwLSr1HYj9q9t8JQ1NcU"
+proposal_date: 2024-03-03
+resolution_date: 2024-03-08
+category: treasury
+summary: "Burn ~979,000 of 982,464 treasury-held META tokens to reduce FDV and attract investors"
+tags: ["futarchy", "tokenomics", "treasury-management", "meta-token"]
+---
+
+# MetaDAO: Burn 99.3% of META in Treasury
+
+## Summary
+Proposal to burn approximately 99.3% of treasury-held META tokens (~979,000 of 982,464) to significantly reduce the Fully Diluted Valuation. Passed on Autocrat v0.1. The high FDV was perceived as discouraging investors and limiting participation in the futarchy experiment. Post-burn treasury: ~4,500 META valued at ~$4M plus ~$2M in META-USDC LP at the time ($880/META). Total META supply after burn: ~20,885.
+
+## Market Data
+- **Outcome:** Passed (2024-03-08)
+- **Autocrat version:** 0.1
+- **Key participants:** doctor.sol & rar3 (authors), Proph3t (executor)
+
+## Significance
+One of the most consequential early MetaDAO governance decisions. The burn fundamentally changed MetaDAO's token economics — eliminating the treasury's ability to pay in META and forcing future operations to use USDC or market-purchase META. This created a natural scarcity signal but also meant the DAO would eventually need mintable tokens (which the proposal explicitly noted as a future possibility). The burn set the stage for the later token split and elastic supply debates.
+
+The proposal also reveals early futarchy dynamics: community members (not founders) proposed a radical tokenomics change, and the market approved it. This is a concrete example of futarchy enabling non-founder governance proposals with material treasury impact.
+
+## Relationship to KB
+- [[metadao]] — governance decision, treasury management
+- [[futarchy enables trustless joint ownership by forcing dissenters to be bought out through pass markets]] — demonstrates market-governed treasury decisions
+- [[ownership coin treasuries should be actively managed through buybacks and token sales as continuous capital calibration not treated as static war chests]] — burn as extreme active management
+- [[futarchy-daos-require-mintable-governance-tokens-because-fixed-supply-treasuries-exhaust-without-issuance-authority-forcing-disruptive-token-architecture-migrations]] — this burn directly created the conditions that made mintable tokens necessary
+
+---
+
+Relevant Entities:
+- [[metadao]] — parent organization
+- [[proph3t]] — executor
+
+Topics:
+- [[internet finance and decision markets]]