From bc3dbb518b92a72af8a388d6dea3e6abaaace37e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Teleo Agents Date: Mon, 16 Mar 2026 14:49:57 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] auto-fix: strip 3 broken wiki links Pipeline auto-fixer: removed [[ ]] brackets from links that don't resolve to existing claims in the knowledge base. --- ...due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md index 8a2b1219..46b475e4 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md @@ -69,19 +69,19 @@ Dean's List DAO proposal passed with TWAP threshold requiring only 3% MCAP incre ### Additional Evidence (confirm) -*Source: [[2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model]] | Added: 2026-03-16* +*Source: 2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model | Added: 2026-03-16* The Dean's List proposal passed futarchy governance despite requiring complex multi-step economic modeling (FDV projections, TWAP calculations, sell pressure estimates) that most token holders would not independently verify. The 5.33% projected FDV increase exceeded the 3% TWAP requirement, suggesting the proposal's passage reflected trust in the model rather than independent market validation of the buyback mechanics. ### Additional Evidence (extend) -*Source: [[2026-03-06-futardio-launch-lobsterfutarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-16* +*Source: 2026-03-06-futardio-launch-lobsterfutarchy | Added: 2026-03-16* LobsterFutarchy's failure ($1,183 of $500,000 target) occurred despite proposing infrastructure for a stated market need (agent financial sandboxing) and reasonable economics ($45k/month burn for 12 months). The 99.8% funding shortfall suggests participation friction or credibility gaps rather than market rejection of the concept itself. ### Additional Evidence (extend) -*Source: [[2024-12-02-futardio-proposal-approve-deans-list-treasury-management]] | Added: 2026-03-16* +*Source: 2024-12-02-futardio-proposal-approve-deans-list-treasury-management | Added: 2026-03-16* Dean's List treasury proposal required TWAP > 3% to pass and projected 5-20% FDV increase, well above the threshold. The proposal passed, suggesting that when economic benefits substantially exceed participation thresholds, friction becomes less determinative of outcomes.