diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-markets-can-price-cultural-spending-proposals-by-treating-community-cohesion-and-brand-equity-as-token-price-inputs.md b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-markets-can-price-cultural-spending-proposals-by-treating-community-cohesion-and-brand-equity-as-token-price-inputs.md
index 0065ec1a..9527c5c3 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-markets-can-price-cultural-spending-proposals-by-treating-community-cohesion-and-brand-equity-as-token-price-inputs.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-markets-can-price-cultural-spending-proposals-by-treating-community-cohesion-and-brand-equity-as-token-price-inputs.md
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Dean's List DAO's fee increase proposal included switching quote token from mSOL
 
 
 ### Additional Evidence (extend)
-*Source: [[2024-11-25-futardio-proposal-launch-a-boost-for-hnt-ore]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
+*Source: 2024-11-25-futardio-proposal-launch-a-boost-for-hnt-ore | Added: 2026-03-16*
 
 The HNT-ORE boost proposal frames strategic partnership value through liquidity network effects and brand positioning ('flagship DePIN project', 'competitive unit of account for real world assets'). Markets must price whether Helium association increases ORE's perceived legitimacy and network depth, demonstrating futarchy's ability to evaluate partnership proposals with significant intangible components.
 
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md
index 5c2e7893..42db2e71 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ Dean's List DAO proposal passed with TWAP threshold requiring only 3% MCAP incre
 
 
 ### Additional Evidence (confirm)
-*Source: [[2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
+*Source: 2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model | Added: 2026-03-16*
 
 The Dean's List proposal passed futarchy governance despite requiring complex multi-step economic modeling (FDV projections, TWAP calculations, sell pressure estimates) that most token holders would not independently verify. The 5.33% projected FDV increase exceeded the 3% TWAP requirement, suggesting the proposal's passage reflected trust in the model rather than independent market validation of the buyback mechanics.